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The aim of this study is to examine the development of social policy 
in a colonial society, to analyse the effects of policy in specific areas 
and to assess how far, directly or indirectly, social policy protected 
and forwarded the interests of metropolitan capitalism as a whole and the 
section involved in plantation agriculture in particular. 
At one level the study aims to document and interpret an historical 
process. At another it attempts a sociological analysis of a 
comparatively neglected aspect of colonialism and colonial society. The 
study of social policy in inc1ustr ialised societies is nOvl well advanced 
and the development of the welfare state is considered by many to be 
central to the functioning of the industrial/capitalist state.l There 
have been very few studies of social policy in the ex-colonial countries 
which form a large part of the third, or undeveloped, world, Furnivall's 
early analysis standing almost alone until very recently when the subject 
has provoked few responses.2 The proceEs of lmderdevelopment itself has 
been extensively studied over the last tvlenty years, but cornparati vely 
Ii ttle attention has been given to social sector developments. Where 
social pol icy has been consicered, the usual conclusion has been that it 
was relatively unimportant and underdeveloped because of the primacy 
given to the economic rather than social sectors. 
It is hoped to demonstrate that, just as the development of the 
welfare state may be seen as important in the growth of modern 
capitalism, the role of social policy was important and sometimes 
cr i tical to the functioning of colonial economies. Considerable 
attention is given to the economic and social character of each period 
examined because it is intendeo to present social policy as an integral 
part of colonial policy as a whole and not a peripheral and relatively 
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period up to 1940. Chapter Six analyses the important changes in 
colonial policy \'lhich deeply affected the direction of Guyanese social 
r:oliey in the post-war p:rioc1, whilst Chapter Eight looks at the effects 
of this policy in several areas. Chapter Nine analyses the effects of 
the political crisis which resulted in the suspension of the Constitution 
in 1953 on social policy. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter Ten. 
Guyana - the backgro\.U)d 
The subject of study is Guyana, formerly British GUiana3• The 
country covers 83,000 square miles on the shoulder of the continent of 
South America. In spite of this location Guyana, like the other Guianas 
(now Surinam and Cayenne), is historically and culturally part of the 
Caribbean, not Latin America. Originally three separate colonies -
Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo which now form the counties of Guyana -
Guyana was the object of attention from the British, Dutch and French. 
Settlements were made from the seventeenth century on, originally under 
the aegis of the Dutch West Indies Company. From 1742 to 1772 the 
government of Demerara was exercised by the Dutch Commandeur, Laurens 
Storm Van Gravesande, who opened settlement to people from all countries 
with the result that by 1760 the majority of planters were British. The 
possession of the colonies passed back and forth between the colonial 
powers as a consequence of the fortunes of European wars, but from 1803 
there was continuous occupation by the British, although Dutch influence 
remained in the retention of existing law and modes of taxation and 
administration. 
The major crops producec were at this time cotton, coffee and sugar. 
They were grown mainly along the alluvial coastlands and in the riverair. 
areas using African slave labour. Many of the planters and slaves came 
to Guyana from the Caribbean islands where soil fertility was beginning 
3 
unimportant by-product of political and economic domination. Social 
policy is seen as developing in a dialectical fashion wid1 economic and 
social/political factors: that is, the prevailing economic and social 
power relationships arc seen aE determinate of the general form of social 
policy which in turn generally acted to facilitate the {:€rpetuation of 
those relationships. The "generalityll of this statement is not due to 
over-caution but rather reflects the vie'." of history adopted: that it 
cannot be simply "read off" according to theoretical assumptions about 
the relationship between the classes or indeed any groups in society. 
The direction of a society's history is the outcome of struggles between 
classes and groups within a particular economic context, an outcome which 
can never be assumed but which must be examined empirically and which is 
rarely constant. "Social policy" or "economic policy" is in actuality 
composed of many decisions which do not necessarily lead in the same 
direction, although in totality they may, and usually do, reflect the 
power structure, which in the colonial situation is a structure which 
goes beyond the colonial society itself. 
After a brief introduction to Guyanese history to 1828, the sequence 
is as follows: in the first chapter several important theoretical issues 
are dealt with; the general framework for viewing colonial society and 
economy is elaborated, the nature of the colonial state is considered as 
are the definition and functions of social policy. The chapter ends with 
a note on the determination of the division of time into historical 
periods. Chapter Two deals with nineteenth century policy developments 
which form the background to the main period of study. Chapter Three 
contains an analysis of social anC! economic conditions in the {:€riod 1891 
to 1930, with Chapters Five and Seven dealing similarly with the periods 
1930 to 1940 and 1940 to 1953. Chapter Four ccnsiders the IT:ost important 
aspects of social policy, that is land settlement and health during the 
2 
to drop. Guyana offered high yield land, waterways for transport, 
regular and plentiful rainfall, abundant land for cash crops and the 
growing of slave food which offset the comparatively high costs of 
rroc1uction determined by the need to maintain sea defences. 
~be native people of the Guianas are the Amerindians. They mainly 
inhabited the interior areas and carried out slash and burn agriculture. 
Their numbers, pattern of settlement and land holding made them 
comparatively unimportant to the process of colonisation that is when 
compared with the native populations of other areas of colonisation in 
Africa, India and South-East Asia. The l'.Jn€r indians vlere not enslaved 
themselves as it proved more profitable for the planters to view them as 
allies in the enslavement of others, using them to track (1o\1n runaways 
and generally perform policing functions4• 
Between 1810 and 1824 developments in world economy led to the 
abandonment of cotton and coffee and an increase in sugar production as 
estates were converted to sugar. Throughout the period considered in 
this study, sugar remained the dominant sector of the economy. In spite 
of the advantages of Guyana perceived by the Island planters elsewhere in 
the Car ibbean, the land posed problems for those wishing to maximise 
profits. Chief of these was the system of sea defence and drainage 
required for the cultivation of the coastal strip. 
Guyana is generally considered to be composed of three main 
geographical areas: the coastal zone, the forest zone and the savannahs5• 
The savannahs, covering approximately 6,000 square miles, contain poor 
soil mainly suitable for cattle grazing. The forest zone, which covers 
four-f ifths of the total area, is mainly sandy and supports scrub and 
both seasonal and rain forests. The economic value of this area lies in 
its mineral content and its timber. The third, comparatively small area 
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is the coastal zone. This is bet\'leen one and forty miles w ide and is 
composed of rich fertile clays and silts. Originally, this land was 
mangrove swamp. It lies below sea level but has been made cultivable by 
a system of sea defence and drainage instituted by the Dutch. Along 
much of the coastline there is a system of walls against the sea 
interspersed by sluices, kno\,ln locally as "kokers", raised at low tide to 
allow land water to drain off, and closed at high tide. The coastal zone 
is the site of the plantations. Fabulous profits made in the eighteenth 
century heyday of West Indian sugar made it worth\vhile for planters to 
maintain the costly sea defences to reap tbe benefits of the rich soil. 
The three colonies \-lere united under British rule and, although the 
demand for sugar never again reached the levels which provoked the prices 
of the latter part of the eighteenth century, it was still sufficiently 
profitable for the planters who remained after the recession in coffee 
and cotton prices to continue CUltivation. It remained so, for some, 
even after the aboli tion of slavery changed the position of labour and 
created for a brief period, before indentured immigrants were introduced, 
a free market for labour6• 
In this brief introduction the characteristics of Guyanese 
geography, economy and society have been outlined. One of the most 
outstanding features of the society which is examined in the chapters 
which follow is the extent to which these characteristics remained 
basically unchanged. 
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THEQRETlCALQ)NSIDERATIONS 
Although there may be continued debate about the precise nature of 
the relationship between social policy and economic systems it is 
generally considered that there is a relationship, and that an 
understanding of the characteristics of an economy is necessary to the 
proper analysis of the development of social pOlicy.! As Titmuss has 
said: 
" ••• the study of social policy cannot be isolated from the study 
of society as a whole in all its varied social, economic and 
political asp=cts" (2) 
The Marxist and Neo-Harxist writers have particularly stressed this 
relationship, but the functionalists who see social sector developments 
as meeting systemic needs and even the 'technicists' who see them as 
resulting from technological change also express their explanations of 
social policy in terms of the wider socio-economic context in which they 
occur. The character of these explanations of the welfare state will be 
taken up later; at this point the purpose is simply to affirm the 
proposition that economy and society must enter the analysis made in this 
study. To this end, in this section consideration is made of the 
theoretical delineation of the economic nature of Guyanese society. 
Economies may condition the form of social policies; they do not however 
determine them directly. It is necessary also to have a theoretical 
perspective on the social structure so that the comparative power of 
different groups in society to influence decisions in the policy making 
process may be taken into account, hence the nature of Guyanese society 
is also discussed. 
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lhe Colonial Economy 
Guyana's economy was dominated from the early nineteenth century by 
the production of a single crop - sugar. The production of sugar was 
achieved almost entirely on plantations with peasant cane cultivation 
accounting for a negligible amount of the total. The plantations 
belonged, until the post First World War period, to individual 
capitalists who were sometimes resident in Guyana but increasingly lived 
in England and had their properties managed by attorneys and managers. 
In the post 1914-1918 period the plantation sector came increasingly 
under the control of a single foreign owned company, Booker Bros. 
McConnell Co. Ltd., but retained its position in the economy as the 
largest exporter and largest employer of labour. 
Societies thus dominated by plantation production have sometimes 
been described as having 'plantation economies', the view being that they 
exhibit sufficiently similar and distinguishing characteristics to be 
identified as different from other types of economy: 
"The common plantation influence gives the set of countries a 
certain homogeneity: each is fundamentally similar to the others, 
in terms of not only economic structure and economic problems but 
also social structure, political organisation and other aspects of 
human life". (3) 
As can be seen in this quotation, the effects of plantation 
agriculture are not seen as confined to the economy but forming part of a 
'plantation system' or, for some writers, 'a plantation mode of 
production'. Mandel describes the plantation in terms of four 
attributes: 
"First, large scale export - orientated agriculture dominates the 
society. Second, the labour force requirements of that 
agricultural sector are greater than can be supplied through the 
functioning of a domestic labour market. Third, as a result, a 
non-market mechanism of mobilising and allocating labour is 
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present and this mechanism is dominant in defining the class 
relations of the society. Finally, a specific culture both 
emerges from and reinforces the class relations which are 
articulated in this way." (4) 
In a plantation economy the means of production are in the main 
foreign owned and the crops produced are for the export market. The 
plantation economy is thus determined not by internal factors in the 
society, but is part of a wider system, the focus of control of which 
lies in the metropole. Although the plantation is efficient in 
production terms, it acts to 'underdevelop' the economy and society it 
dominates. It has this effect partly because the production of the 
agricultural crop is linked vertically within the multinational 
corporation rather than horizontally within the society in which it is 
grown; the plantation itself absorbs considerable capital and may 
generate technological innovation, but the effects of these are not 
spread within the plantation society.5 Further, the plantation stifles 
the development of other sectors of the economy, notably the subsistence 
sector. This it does firstly because of its ability to attract 
resources to itself. This is of particular importance in relation to 
public funds. Because of their centrality to the whole economy, 
plantations are successful in claiming aid and assistance from the local 
and metropolitan governments in the form of tax reliefs, development 
grants, bounties and other subsidies.6 In this way the plantation sector 
is able to secure a major part of limited funds. 
The plantation sector may also inhibit the development of other 
industry through its monopoly of all, or the best, agricultural land and 
through its owners' ability to influence the condi tions for the 
acquisition of land and the granting of credit facilities.7 In addition 
the legacy of slavery in many plantation economies creates a 
comparatively low level of demand for locally produced goods and a high 
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demand for imports so that a taste for goods produced in the metropole 
generated in a society dominated by a metropolitan bourgeoisie, inhibits 
the development of local enterprise. 
Another characteristic of the plantation economy is a low wage rate, 
or in the case of plantation production on a basis of slave labour, low 
labour costs. Rates of pay generally depend on the availability of 
labour. In pre-industrial societies this in turn depends on the 
availability of land. The relationship in economies formerly based on 
slavery is more complex than this suggests: 
"The labour market is also affected in a very special way by the 
high value placed on independence which fixes a minimum 
requirement of own-account production, and by taste patterns which 
dictate a minimum requirement of imported consumption goods. 
These are r:arameters fixed by the legacy of slavery. However high 
are wage rates on the estates labour will work on its own land in 
the interest of independence. However low they be, cultivators 
will offer a few tasks of work in order to procure cash to buy 
imports. " (8) 
The suggestion here is that there are social or psychological 
factors which, in addition to land availability, encourage subsistence 
farming even where labour is in short supply and plantation wages 
consequently high. The tendency for wages to increase where land was 
available was often offset by the procurement of additional sources of 
labour, usually immigrant, which was bound to plantation work through 
contract and thus represented a moderation of market forces in the 
determination of wages. Although immigrant contract labour was often 
sought initially to fill an absolute need for labour, created for 
example by the abandonment of estate work by some former slaves at 
emancipation, it affects the rate of pay of free labour by reducing 
planter dependence on that labour. Coercion enters the relationship 
between planter and free labourer in so far as the latter finds a 
necessity to work on the estates for lack of alternative employment or in 
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the case of indentured labour through state enforced legal compulsion or 
violence. 
The concept of the plantation economy is useful in clarifying the 
effect of the plantation on the whole national economy and the 
relationship between that and the international economy. It has been 
particularly valuable in the critique of the Idual economy' theory.9 
This suggests that underdeveloped economies typically are comprised of 
two or more economically unrelated systems one of which is modern and 
capitalist and the other(s) backward, often based on peasant subsistence 
agriculture using traditional, low-tech methods. Seen in this way the 
problem of development becomes one of transferring to the tradi tional 
system the methods and attitudes of the modern sector. The theorists of 
the 'plantation economy' have demonstrated that the modern plantation 
sector rather than being an independent development model for the 
traditional sector is in fact the cause of underdevelopment. 
It does however, have some limitations which need to be considered 
as they relate to the formulation of an adequate perspective for the 
analysis of the political economy of social policy. The notion of a 
'plantation economy' does not adequately deal with the relationship 
between different sectors of the economy. The point is not merely to 
note that plantation dominance frustrates the peasant sector, but rather 
to explore the possible functional significance of the latter for the 
former. As will be shown, such a consideration is necessary for the 
understanding of many of the land-population policies of the colonial 
government in Guyana. 
In the first instance it may be noted that even in Guyana where 
plantations were perhaps more dominant than in most countries, 
substantial m.nnbers of people, from the middle of the nineteenth century 
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were not engaged in plantation agriculture. Narrow concentration on the 
plantation may misrepresent the totality.IO Also the role of the 
colonial state is obscured whereas it played a vital role in the 
mediation of purely market factors and in Guyana as elsewhere, assisted 
in the reproduction of plantation production factors. The coercion 
involved in obtaining labour for plantations has been noted but to quote 
Alavi, "we cannot judge the significance and nature of 'coercion' without 
reference to the structure of the colonial state power".ll 
So whilst the literature on the plantation economy illuminates the 
nature of the plantation as an economic institution and certain aspects 
of the relation of the plantations to the worldwide capitalist system, it 
is less successful in proposing a model of underdevelopment as a whole. 
An alternative approach considers that the particular combination of 
elements in economies like that of Guyana constitute a 'colonial 
econany'. 
In the colonial mode "ce rtain elements of the colonial economy, 
which are in varying degress 'capitalist' combine with elements which 
have no place in a capi talist mode of production - such as peasant and 
subsistence agriculture - to produce an integral and particular colonial 
mode. ,,12 
The different sectors - capitalist (plantation) and peasant 
(subsistence and cash crop) sectors - are mutually dependent sectors of 
but one mode of production. Thus in this study the linkages between the 
two will be explored especially in so far as social policies were evolved 
which related to the maintenance of this mutual interdependence. 
The idea of a specific 'colonial economy' has been developed by 
critics of current theory relating to underdevelopment. Writers like 
1? 
Barbalet, Banaji and Alavi, arguing within a Marxist framework, claim 
that colonial societies exhibit certain economic characteristics which 
distinguish them both from capitalist and feudal societies or 
composites of the two, and which comprise a 'colonial mode of 
production.' In this view colonial economies are neither capitalist by 
virtue of their involvement in the world capitalist system as Gunder 
Frank argues, nor dual economies combining capitalist and feudal sectors 
as Frank's critic Ernest Laclau claims.13 The theorists of the 'colonial 
mode' suggest that different sectors of colonial economies - capitalist 
plantation, peasant subsistence and cash crop sectors - are mutually 
dependent sectors of but one mode of production. This position has been 
useful in the present study in the conceptualisation of the links between 
economic sectors and the role of social policy in supporting those links. 
lbe Colonial State 
In societies like Guyana the mechanisms of surplus extraction and 
the maintenance of the structures of exploitation have been orchestrated 
by the state. This in itself does not make colonial societies unusual. 
It is the extent and type of state activity which differentiates the 
colonial from the capitalist state: 
I~e colonial state plays a much greater role quantatively as well 
as qualitatively, in the colonial system than perhaps in any other 
social formation. Unlike in the capitalist system, where the 
states chief role is to provide the legal and institutional 
infrastructure for capitalist production relations - the colonial 
state is not a super-structure erected on the base of colonial 
economy; it is an integral and intrusive element in the 
structur ing and functioning of the colonial economy". (14) 
In Guyana the state made possible the production of crops through 
slave and, later, indentured labour by providing the legal framework 
within which the relations of exploitation were sanctioned and without 
which the plantation system would have been unviable. Thus a paradox 
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arises: whilst, at least until the 1940s, the colonial state extended its 
involvement in development activities slowly and the official view was 
that the state's proper role was confined to the maintenance of law and 
order and economic activity therefore inappropriate, the state was 
actually involved in the structuring of the economy in the most basic and 
direct way, by maintaining the conditions for colonial production thus 
producing a situation such as that described as typical in colonial 
societies by Chandra: 
"The colonial state gave active financial aid and other help 
to •••• capitalists, even when the doctrine of laissez-faire reigned 
supreme at horne". (15) 
In Guyana, the state not only 'held the ring' for private enterprise 
but through the subsidisation of immigration, the allocation of public 
funds, land policy and other measures provided the context for, and 
actively supported, the sugar industry. Whilst individual governors and 
the British establishment were not necessarily in sympathy with the 
'Saccharine Lords,' the sugar lobby both in Guyana and in England managed 
to foster a belief in the identity of Guyana's (and Britain's) interests 
with those of sugar. The state usually acted in such a way as to protect 
sugar by, for example, the varying of the cost of Crown land according to 
the labour situation on the estates. 
The colonial state then, takes to itself not only the tasks 
proclaimed for it - the maintenance of law, a political and 
administrative structure with at least minimal provision of education and 
other social services - but also actively directs the economy. This 
produces a contradiction in that the financing of these extended 
functions creates a continuous budgetary crisis which hampers the state's 
capacity to finance (~velopment investment. The contradiction arises in 
that the idcolcSY of the colonial authori ties emphasized development: 
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they did not seek the underdevelopnent of the colonies, on the contrary 
the whole moral philosophy of colonialism was premised on the advancement 
of colonial people and its economic philosophy embraced the idea of 
developing markets for British manufactured goods. As Chandra says: 
"Underdevelopment was not the desired but the inevitable 
consequence of the inexorable working of colonialism, of trade and 
its minor contradictions •••••• there was no imperialist theory of 
under-development - underdevelopment was the result of the 
practice of p:1rticular theories of developnent". (16) 
Social policy formed part of the colonial theory of development in 
so far as it was considered to contribute to the promotion of social and 
cultural aavancement and modernisation which would allow colonial people 
to participate in the development process. 
The contradiction between colonial ideology and the actual effects 
of colonial policy was deepened by its inability to finance the 
development of welfare measures. The amount of the limited state 
resources used to maintain law and order functions and the bureaucracy 
necessary to its appropriation functions hampered the state's ability to 
undertake social improvement. In Guyana, for example, the proportion of 
the budget allocated to law and order functions ran at 15.5% in 1920, and 
the funds available for social development increased only as those 
directly allocated to law and order decreased, which is suggestive of the 
substitution of social welfare as a means of social control for.more 
direct means. As will be shown, the increase in the availability of 
funds for social welfare and development arose as a result of worker 
unrest and government attempts at appeasement when the likelihood of war 
in Europe made stability within the Empire additionally desirable. 
Generally, however, the availability of public funds for social 
development purposes was decreased by the proportionately large sums 
directed to policing and other law and order functions. 
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The importance of the colonial state's financial limitations can be 
seen more clearly when another of the state's characteristics is 
considered. The colonial state faces graver legitimation problems than 
the capitalist state. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the 
structure of colonialism is much more easily grasped by the masses than 
that of industrial capitalism. In advanced capitalism the ramifications 
of capital are obscure and the loci of power shrouded but in colonial 
situations, to use Chandra's phrase, "the opaqueness of the colonial 
state, of its mystifying shell, is easily renetrated".l7 The simplified 
social structure produced by colonialism with its clear division between 
ruler and ruled, between, in the case of Guyana, the planters and the 
masses, made for easy identification of class interests. In addition the 
masses in colonial societies have no access to the power structure of the 
state, no channels to the decision making bodies, no input to policy. As 
a consequence the state has few opportunities for co-opting dissenting 
elements and discontent tends to manifest itself explosively and 
sometimes violently. Finally, the legitimacy of the state may be 
questioned by the masses as a result of the low wages and poor living 
conditions general in colonial situations. Wages and conditions may be 
no poorer than those pertaining under, particularly early, industrial 
capitalism, but they more often cause crises of legitimacy because of the 
relative ease with which the state's role in the production of these 
condi tions may be r:ercei ved and because the caste-like social structure 
of colonial societies gives relatively few opportunities for the release 
of social tension through the perception of chances for individual or 
group social mobility. 
Colonial states were generally in no posi tion to divert funds to 
finance social reforms to avert challenges to the legitimacy of the state 
in the manner of Bismarck who, with his SQzialpolitik, furnished history 
1(:, 
with perhaps the most famous eY~mple of the use of social legislation to 
avert social revolution. The resultant pattern, characteristic of 
colonies, was high spending on direct forms of social control, low 
allocations to social and welfare sectors against a background of 
legi tirnation problems. 
Colonial Society 
Before proceeding to an examination of colonial society, it is to be 
noted that the distinction between economy and society, which form a 
total matrix in the colonial system, is made for analytical purposes only 
and does not reflect a view of the economic and social as non-reacting 
levels of society. In constructing a framework for the analysis of 
Guyanese society, the plantation will again be taken as a starting point. 
As noted earlier, the plantation has effects in society wider than 
tho~e pertaining to its economic organisation. In societies where it 
predominates the whole community is affected; involved is a "totality of 
institutional 2xrangements surrounding the production and marketing of 
plantation crops.nlB The peculiar features of plantation social 
organisation have sometimes been described using Goffman's concept of the 
'total institution,19 The labour requirements of the plantation economy 
places in juxtaposition a large mass of relatively undifferentiated, 
unskilled labour and a small group of managers/owners where 
stratification often assumed a caste-like quality due to the coincidence 
of class with colour/race. The hierarchical structure of plantation 
society corresf:X)nds to the sharp divide between 'inmates' and 'staff' in 
more familiar total institutions like the mental hospital or prison. 
To this may be added, to strengthen the analogy, the extraordinary 
all-encompassing nature of the plantation, particularly under slavery or 
where indentured labour \'las used. In Guyana indentured labourers lived 
on the estates, in estate provided houses. They had their illnesses 
treated on the estates, in their own hospi tals. Their movements ,..;ere 
severely restricted and confined to the estates by a welter of labour 
regulations which circumscribed their lives. 
Plantation life, although separating estate labour from the rest of 
the population, accomplished a degree of homogenisation with the 
disP<3_rate caste and cultural groups of the estate which carne firstly as 
slaves and later as indentured labourers. 
But beyond its impact on the estate communities themselves, the 
plantation has an effect on the whole society. Beckford, and others, 
have considered that plantation dominance leads to social as well as 
economic underdevelopment of the whole national structure. He notes that 
the particular social organisation which evolves around a plantation 
economy precludes the full utilisation and development of the human 
potential of the whole population: 
"On the whole the plantation has a demoralising influence on the 
community. It destroys or discourages the institution of the 
family and so undermines the entire social fabric. It engenders 
an ethos of dependence and patronage and so depr i ves people of 
dignity, security and self-respect. And it impedes the material, 
social and spiritual advance of the majority of the people. In 
the circumstances we could hardly expect to find a lightly 
motivated population displaying the kinds of characteristics the 
development demands. The energies of most people are employed in 
trying to bear the system in one way or another."(20) 
This is inevitable in any system where persons are distributed to 
occupations according to ascriptive characteristics and where there is no 
mobility. Further the rigidity of structure dampens and distorts 
achievement motivations to produce attitudes which are anti-thetical to 
development and in other ways demoralise society. 
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These, then, are some of the social characteristics which have been 
attributed to plantation societies: rigid stratification, a mass of 
undifferentiated, unskilled labour, the use of extra- economic coercion 
in various forms, 'total institution' like features in the plantation 
communities themselves and lack of social development in the whole 
society. 
In the same ""Jay t.hat the concept of a plantation economy was seen as 
limiting consideration of the relationship between the plantation and 
other economic sectors, it is suggested that the conceptual parameters of 
'plantation society' are set too narrowly. Considering the social 
aspects which have been described above, many of these characteristics 
are not peculiar to plantation based societies but rather are generic to 
colonial situations and are in the final analysis linked to colonialism 
rather than the plantation l2tl..s..e.. It is not at all clear that such 
factors as rigid stratification, extra-economic coercion and social 
stagnation are primarily associated with plantations rather than being 
the product of the wider colonial situation within which plantation 
production often occurred. Also, in the analysis of these factors the 
'plantation society/economy' concept does not facilitate a full 
understanding of the power system through which plantation interests 
dominated society. 
Again, a consideration of the colonial state is vital. For example, 
the necessity of extra-market, coercive methods of mobilising labour in 
the plantation system has been noted, but reference must be made to the 
structure of colonial state power. The state's role in providing the 
legal sanction and institutional framework for coercive relationships was 
vital to both slavery and the immigration system in Guyana and elsewhere 
in the Empire. Similarly, we are told that in India: 
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"Lan,d in fact was not yet the most valued resource in pre-British 
Incha for there was an abundance of it relative to the number of 
people available to extract the fruits of the unyielding earth. 
The truly precious possession was labour. The labourer had 
therefore to be made unfree as a necessary condition for his 
exploi ta tion. He had to be held by coercion. It was only vlhen 
under the colonial regime all land was appropriated and the 
labou.rer had no direct access any more to 'waste' land and had 
nothing therefore to sell but his labour power that conditions of 
his exploitation in freedom arose."(21) 
The question of the relationship of the local bourgeoisie and the 
metropolitan capitalists to the state and of the masses to the state is 
significant to the s};€cial interest of the present v70rk as the relative 
power of different groups to influence social policy and direct it is 
central to the form policy takes. In colonial societies the state acts 
as the agent of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, where necessary mediates 
between different sections of that group and generally guards the 
interest of the metropolitan capitalist against those of the local 
bourgeoisie. In Ghana, for example, the state moderated between 
metropolitan mine owners, shippers and financiers but impeded the 
development of local bourgeois groups as it: 
"did not permit cevelopments in industr ial proGuction, did not 
encourage diversification of Ghanian agriculture, and did not even 
encourage the development of higher quality crops. As long as the 
dominant trading and mining sectors, along with the banks and 
shippers, could obtain reasonable profits from the maintenance of 
Ghanian society in its peripheral capitalist mode of 
production •••• (it) was willing to guarantee the continuation of 
this level of underdevelopment. n (22) 
The situation was similar in Guyana. In the nineteenth century 
planters domina ted the local legislature and although this on occasion 
brought them into conflict with colonial representatives, in the final 
analysis the sugar interest was protected by the state through its 
securing of planter life and property and its allocation of public funds 
in favour of the sugar industry. In the twentieth century planter 
representation in the le:sislature was much reduced but even before full 
Crown Colony status was assumed in 1928 the power of the elected 
representatives of the local bourgeoisie to influence policy was minimal 
and the state continued to represent the interest of the sugar industry, 
by then almost completely owned by a large, expatriate business house. 
It did so in so far as alternative paths of development through interior 
development or agricultural diversification in both of which local 
professional and business people held interests but which were opfX)sed by 
the sugar industry, never received full colonial support. The exception 
to this was in the development of the rice industry which was grown as a 
peasant crop ini tially but as will be shown later had, in its origin, a 
special relationship to sugar and in its developed form to metropolitan 
aims for the region as a whole. Although the colonial state in Guyana 
acted for the most part in support of the sugar companies, this was 
because of a perception of the coincidence of interest between the sugar 
industry and the state, and in the final instance between the sugar 
industry and the metropolitan state. This reflects a general 
relationship between the colonial and metropolitan states and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie. 
Whilst the p:>litical structure of a cOlony may allow local bourgeois 
groups some access to policy makers and may even involve their 
representatives in local legislatures, as in the case of Guyana, the 
labouring and peasant classes have little opportunity for direct 
influence. Narrow electorates excluded these classes from participation 
in the formal political process. The nature of colonial administration 
further excluded them. vlhilst members of the local bourgeoisie were 
consulted over matters of policy in extra-legislature situations and 
representatives of the metropolitan capitalists were consulted almost as 
a matter of course, the other local classes were not invited to 
participate. As Jones has said: 
"">1 
"Orientations of the politico-administrative class failed ••• to 
facilitate any form of popular decision-making or the development 
of autonomous interest articulation within the lower social 
strata. For the administrative processes were tied much too 
closely to elite values and goals and too often took the form of a 
};X)sitive narrowing or limiting of conflictual issues".(23) 
Essentially bureaucratic, the administration system rather than the 
legislature was the immediate locus of power in colonial society. This 
is reflected in the high status and personal authority enjoyed by 
colonial state functionaries. Its main function was to "maintain 
political control and to enforce social integration when it suited the 
Imperial power".24 Colonial administrative systems implemented policies 
directed by the metro};X)litan state, although colonial states were allowed 
a certain amount of autonomy in the day to day regulations of colonies. 
In the Br i ti sh colonial system this appeared in pr actice as the 
subordination of the Governor of a colony to the Colonial Secretary and 
of the colonial bureaucracy to the Colonial Office in London. 
Typically the problem of government in the colonies was seen as an 
administrative rather than a political task. The ideology supporting 
this approach proposed that colonial people were unfit, insufficiently 
educated, too childlike to participate in politics. The development of 
popular politics was consequently opposed until the spread of anti-
imperialist sentiment caused colonial authorities to seek to control the 
politicisation process through the sponsorship and nurturing of 
'responsible', that is non-radical attitudes. As a result the 
bureaucracy combined within it both the administrative and political 
functions. As has been noted: 
"This made for an extremely blurred distinction between the 
'administrative' and the 'political' and the result was obviously 
a highly politicised bureaucracy. Policy was largely formulated 
and implemented by the same people - the Governor and his chosen 
subordinates. "(25) 
22 
Although in colonial ideology the state was to represent the interests of 
groups unrepresented in the legislatures as Gordon Lewis has said, this 
ideal was almost never realised.26 The state op=rated to maintain the 
status quo as long as this was consonant with imperial interest. 
To conclude, the study of social policy may be approached in many 
different ways but they all suppose a theoretical perspective of some 
sort, and when the aim is to understand the development of policy in a 
specific society the necessity of a theoretical perspective extends to 
the viewing of the society itself. This study seeks to explore the 
development of social policy in a colonial society the economy of which 
was dominated by the production of a single crop on a plantation system. 
Consideration of the role and structure of the colonial state and its 
relationships to local and metropolitan classes conditions the empirical 
enquiry by directing questions about where policy originates and how 
different social classes were able to influence the policy making 
process. 
lhe functions ~ Social Poliey 
A further important consideration relates to the function of social 
policy in society. Just as most studies of social policy are premised, 
explicitly or otherwise, on a conceptualisation of society as a whole, so 
do they involve understandings about the function which policy fulfills. 
With regard to colonial societies it has already been suggested that one 
of the contradictions of colonialism has been that whilst colonial 
authorities did not intend to underdevelop their colonies, this was the 
result as a consequence of the state's support of the development of 
foreign owned enterprises at the expense of indigenous development of the 
whole society. This has led to an investigation in this study of the 
extent to which social policy in Guyana contributed to the country's 
economic underdevelopment. 
To carry the discussion of the functions of social policy in a 
coloni~l setting further, it is useful to consider its function in 
capitalist metropolitan societies. Two major approaches, the 
Functionalist and the Neo-Marxist are considered briefly here. The 
discussion of social policy and welfare in mature capitalist societies 
has usually been conducted within the context of the analysis of the 
welfare state. Colonial societies were, it has been argued, neither 
capi talist nor welfare states, but the contrast provided assists in the 
formulation of an approach to the role of colonial social policy. 
For the functionalists industrialisation has created a new set of 
strains upon the social system and social policies have been set in 
motion to correct the dysfunctions which have arisen thereby. In this 
view 'welfare' has played a legitimate role in the maintenance of 
stability and social inbegration.27 The technical determinists also feel 
that welfare policies have arisen from necessities created by 
industrialisation and urbanisation. For them the basic character of 
society is given by the technological level it has reached, rather than 
the dominant ideological position, although the latter may be considered 
influential at the early stages of development.. Technology eventually 
overrides ideology and the result is a convergence of all advanced 
societies - irrespective of their ideological stance - towards a common 
'ideal type' advanced society where social structure corresponds to 
industr ial requi rernents. 2 8 
According to the functionalists and the related technicist view, 
industrialisation and economic growth is the 'explanation' of the growth 
of social welfare. Its function is to facilitate further growth and cope 
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with the unfortunate but necessary dysfunctions produced as 'side 
effects' to growth. Clearly the type of explanation of social policy's 
development produced by the functionalist and technicist perspective is 
inappropriate in the case of societies where there has been little or no 
growth or industrialisation. Indeed the burden of the discussion so far 
has been that colonial social policy was part of the process of 
underdevelop-nent. Yet the general approach of the functionalists may yet 
be relevant if it could be shown that colonial social policy met the 
needs of metropolitan society, some section of it or capitalism in 
general. But there are additional reasons for rejecting a straight 
forward functionalist approach. 
The functionalist approach to social policy exhibits the same 
limitations as the theOl? in general. Firstly, it may be criticised for 
failing the deal with the level of 'social action'. Explanations are 
couched in terms of abstract 'needs of society' rather than in terms of 
the intended action of individuals, and groups working towards 
determinate needs.29 Secondly, it may be deemed insufficient for its 
failure to encompass adequately considerations of power. The role of 
class struggle in the production and direction of social policy may be 
minimised. 
A more satisfactory approach to the role of social policy in modern 
society is provided by the Marxist and Nee-Marxist writers who note, as 
does Gough, the way in which class struggle and the functional requisites 
of capitalism are related. Central to the argument is the concept of the 
state. For Gough capitalism has an 'autonomous dynamic': 
"The course of capitalism continually generates new 'needs' or 
'requirements' in the areas of social policy". (30) 
Yet although it is possible, and indeed useful, to analyse the 'changing 
functional requirements of capitalist economies', it is, says Gough, 
incorrect to assume tllat the state or any other entity will necessarily 
fulfil these requirements. That the state does often act to do so is due 
to the emergence of a 'class-conscious political directorate' of the 
state which acts in promotion of the long term interest of capital even 
though this requires at times operating against the interests of a 
particular fraction of capital.3l Mishra similarly stresses the role of 
class action in the determination of the role of the welfare state: 
"For ultimately the welfare state is the result of elite response 
to certain problems of industrial capitalism - above all and in 
its earlier stages, the problem of how to ensure the compliance of 
the broad masses to the capitalist order."(32) 
In this way the criticism levelled earlier at functionalist use of 
the concept of 'system needs' is at least partially avoided but the 
Marxist concept of the state and its relationship to the dominant class 
is not without problems as indicated by the celebrated Miliband-
Poulantzas debate.33 The view taken here is that the means by which the 
state comes to mediate capitalist interest is to be demonstrated 
empirically. 
O'Connor similarly takes a broadly functionalist approach but seeks 
to relate the fulfillment of 'system needs' to class action. He suggests 
that capitalists have two major aims - accumulation and legitimation. 
Social policy plays a part in securing both goals. The way in which it 
does so may be exemplified by the development of state responsibility for 
universal education: educaticr. plofits the capitalist, that is aids in 
accumulation, by providing labour with the requisite skills and attitudes 
for profitable production and also has a legitmation function like most 
state welfare institutions. 34 01Connor does not, however, suggest that 
the volume and type of expenditure by the state is c€termined by abstract 
functional requisites but rather 'reflect and are structurally determined 
by social and economic conflicts between class and groups". 35 
By contrast, in colonial societies the state's budgetary restraints 
restricted social investment and private enterprise often undertook 
social expenditure which would increase labour producti vi ty, although 
generally only in situations where labour supplies were limited. vfuen 
unlimited the state often took steps to compel private investment often 
in order to ensure the long term viability of colonial expansion and 
prevent a scenario similar to that described by Polanyi who saw 
developnents in nineteenth century European social policy as inevitable 
lest industrial capitalism 'physically destroyed man and transformed his 
surrounding into a wilderness.·36 In the case of Guyana and elsewhere 
in the British Empire where indentured labour was used the state 
legitimised and facilitated the supply of contract labour by enforcing, 
or at least enacting, legislation relating to the housing and medical 
care of labourers. After indenture, when labour shortages, anticipated 
or real, were exper ienced investments were made \,li th the intention of 
attracting labour and increasing productivity. Aid and grants from the 
metropolitan state from the 1940's on can be seen as directed to the 
fulfillment of productivity and legitimation goals: the productivity of 
labour was to be raised by improved housing and other services: the 
development of infrastructure such as transport and the assumption of 
social costs previously met by private enterprise in health, education 
and housing reduced labour costs to private enterprise; expenditure was 
di rected, especially in the Car ibbean, towards the appeasement of the 
labouring class and the defusing of anti-colonial movements. 
In this study accordingly, attention is focused on: 
1. the function of social policy in legi timating colonial rule, 
integrating colonial society and assisting in the production of private 
profits. 
2. the ideology of social policy, including the motivations and 
intentions of policy makers. 
3. the comparative role of the colonial state and private enterprise in 
the promotion of social welfare. 
4. the extent to which social policy has been influenced by the anti-
imperialist movement and local class struggle. 
A Definition ~ Social Poli~ 
The concept of social policy has been various defined but 
traditionally analysts have approached policy and welfare institutionally 
that is, by focusing on specific services such as health, social security 
and housing. In the Ii terature on the Third World also there have been 
many studies of specif ic sector s, health in particular, but few which 
consicer social policy as a whole. Hence there has been no real 
consideration of a suitable definition of social policy in the context of 
colonial societies. Further, there has been a concentration on the 
public ·sector resulting in such definitions as: 
"The policy of government wi th regard to action having a direct 
imract on the welfare of citizens by providing them with services 
or incane." (37) 
There is much to recommend a general movement away from simple 
administrative definitions of policy area to a more functional analysis, 
i.e. one conducted in terms of interests and effects rather than 
administrative conventions.38 The advantages of broadening the scope of 
social policy analysis are clear. It allows for the inclusion of such 
measures as taxation, subsidisation or land settlement schemes, none of 
which are commonly thought of as 'social policies' yet are just as 
closely related to the distribution of wealth and social justice as are 
health and social security. In the colonial context a wide definition of 
social policy is necessary for two additional reasons: firstly, because 
of the importance of private enterprise's own welfare arrangements, 
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voluntary agencies and, in some territories, the church, it would be 
extrEIT:ely distorting to consider only 'public' social policy, that is 
sovernment action; secondly, the extended function of the state into the 
economic sphere in colonial structures means that a broader based enquiry 
is necessary to encompass state policy with regard to areas such as 
immigration, land policy and agricultural policy all of which were tied 
closely to the social welfare of the masses. 
Further, a broader approach can allow for relationships between 
policy and the power structure to be brought into focus. Whilst it may 
not be clear what the purpo~es or function of a particular piece of 
legislation or a specific administrative arrangement may be, viewing 
policy as a whole may enable a clearer picture to be arrived at. By 
examining, say, the institution of poor relief in this wider frame\alOrk, 
questions can be posed about its relationship to ttle entire system of 
rewards within a society and to the functions of unemployment in a 
colonial economy. 
The disadvantages of a widened definition of social policy are 
equally clear. An enquiry based on a theoretical assumption of the 
importance of a broad framework can easily become diffuse and unfocused. 
HO\'lever, to argue that an analysis should be set in a framework where 
policy is defined in its broadest sense does not preclude a concentration 
on specific policy areas. Thus, in this study, particular attention is 
given to health, housing, land policy, rural policy and poor relief as 
these are considered to be central areas but they are seen within the 
matrix of a particular economy and specific institutional parameters. 
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A Note .on Historical Periods 
The presentation of material in this study is basically 
chronological. The question inevitably arose of where to start and where 
to end, a problem made more difficult by the fact that Guyanese history 
is not yet sufficiently developed for there to be any firm conventions 
guiding the division of time into specific epochs. The background to the 
main period of study covers the years from 1838 to 189'0. 1838 is a date 
significant to this study as it marked the change from slavery to free 
labour conditions. From this date to 189'0 the basic structure of the 
social welfare system was laid down. 193'0 was chosen as the next cut-off 
point since the years from that date to 194'0 produced economic and social 
developments which began to challenge the existing structure of society 
and economy and also saw changes in colonial ideology. In the years up 
to 1953, the next division of time used, the r,esults of these changes 
developed. 1953 is a significant date in Guyanese history as it was 
marked by the withdrawal of the Constitution and, in terms of the 
development of social policy, produced renewed efforts to foster a 
moderate, popular political orientation. 
These dates, 189'0, 193'0, 194'0 and 1953 also pinpoint approximately 
the important changes in the imperial order through the second wave of 
confident colonial expansion, through the world recession of the thirties 
into the post-war preparations for the break-up of the Empire. 
The study takes 1957 as a finishing point. In this year, the 
Consti tution was reinstated, internal government was assumed shortly 
after and Guyana entered a new period of development. 
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THE QRIGINS OF SOCIAL FOLlCY J?7 GUYANA 
Immigrant Heath Provision 
In this chapter a broad view of nineteenth century socio-economic 
developments and social policy in Guyana will be given. The starting 
p:>int is the accommodations which were made to t.he changes brought about 
by the end of slavery. The measures taken by the state to control the 
conditions under which immigrant labour lived were of great significance 
to the character taken by social policy in the private and public sectors 
until well into the twentieth century. They were the basis for the 
emergence of a two-tier policy which had effects outside the welfare 
system itself. 
The advent of emancipation in 1838 threatened the very basis of the 
Guyanese economy, built as it had been cn a foundation of slave labour. 
The planters almost immediately set about a search for a source of labour 
alternate to the newly freed slaves of African descent, fearing for the 
viability of their estates if such were the sin'jle source. Two factors 
dictated their search. The first was that there was an excess of land 
over population such as to allow for the establis:lment of a peasantry 
independent of work on the estates. Guyana was - and today remains -
underpopulated with the concentration of population confined to the 
narrow alluvial belt along the coast where the sugar estates were sited. 
Behind this lay the vast hinterland and even on the coastal strip there 
were lands available for CUltivation including estate lands which had 
been abandoned by proprietors in times of economic difficulty. Fears 
that the ex-slaves would take to the hinterland proved to be largely 
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unfounded. The difficulty of terrain and comparative [X)verty of the land 
discouraged interior settlement. Much more attractive were the abandoned 
estates. These were rapidly transformed into villages by freed men Vlho 
pooled together money, saved during the period of apprenticeship which 
preceded full emancipation and from subsequent wages, and made joint 
purchases of land.l 
The second factor relates to the conditions under which sugar is 
produced in Guyana. The need for labour varies greatly over the crop 
cycle. While canes are growing labour requirements are low, the main 
task being weeding. In crop season when the canes are cut the demand for 
labour is heavy. Further, cane-fields are burnt before cutting takes 
place and it is essential to the quality of sugar prcduced that the canes 
be cut and processed within a specific period after burning. This 
requirement could put the planter at the mercy of labourers at the 
critical period should they threaten to withdraw their labour. Strikes 
for higher wages in 1842 and 1848 underlined the ~llnerability created by 
reliance on free labour. In addition, the necessity of keeping wages low 
became increased by an Act passed in the British Parliament in 1846 which 
equalised duties payable on slave and free labour grown sugar imported 
into Britain, thus placing the Guyanese planter at a competitive 
disadvantage, as slave produced sugar was cheaper.2 Formerly the duty on 
"free labour sugar" was lower than that placed on slave-grown sugar. 
Taken together these two factors demanded that if the level of 
profitability of the estates was to be maintained more labour would be 
required both to offset that lost to the villages and also to create an 
oversupply which could counteract demands for higer wages. 
More free labour, however, could not guarantee an abundance of cheap 
and controlled labour. The anS\>ler to the problem was bound labour. The 
earliest experiments in indentured immigraticn Here made with the 
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TABLE 2(i) 
~GRANTS INTRODUCED BY THE IMHIGRJI.TION DEP1,RTMENT 1895 - 1928 
I 
~ III 'Ill ~ ~ ,gj ~ I\j o u I\j • .-1 ~ Q) I\j '8 .:s . .-1 ~ ~ ;a ~ t:;a .Q .-i ~ .1-< ty\ !~ ~ ~~ +l ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ &j g 
-
1835 - 429 - 157 - - - - -
- 586 
1836 - - - 1427 
- - - - -
- 1427 
1837 I - - - 12150 - - - - - - 2150 
1838 396 -
- ' 1266 91 I - - - - - 1763 I 
1839 - - - 192 
- - - - 208 - 400 , 
1840 - - - 29CO - - - - - 70 3970 
1841 - 4297 - 2745 1102 - - - - - 8144 
1842 - 432 - 506 1829 - - - - - 2767 
, 
1843 - 45 i - 180 325 - 550 - - - -, 
I I 1844 - 140 - 225 523 - - - - - 918 
, 
1845 816 i 668 - 722 I 1425 - - - - - 3632 , 
1846 ' 4019 5975 - 428 1097 - - - - - 1519 ! 
1847 3461 3761 - - 565 - - - - - 7787 
1848 3545 300 - - 1697 - i 
- - - - 5542 I 
I I - i 1849 ( - 86 I - - 111 - - - - - 197 
1850 - 1040 164 - 1219 - - - - - 2259 I 
1851 517 1101 - - 453 i 21 - - - - 2256 I 
1852 2805 i 10J9 
- - 268 - - - - - I 4082 I 
1853 2021 2539 
- - 276 - 647 - - - 5483 
1854 1562 1058 - - - - - - - - 2620 
1855 ,2342 1055 , 3397 - - - ! - - - - -
I 
1856 1258 180 - - 65 - - 766 - - 2269 
, 
1857 2596 342 - - - - - - - - 2938 
1858 ' 1404 1484 - - 281 - - 53 - - 3222 
1859 3426 684 - - - - 699 - - - 4809 
1860 ' 5450 135 - - 625 - 1942 - - - 8152 
1861 373- 35 - - 40 - 3368 - - - 7180 
, 
1862 5625 29 - - 558 - 2590 - - - 8802 
1863 2354 - - 69 373 - 396 - - - 3192 
1864 27CJJ - - 4297 390 - 5CJJ - - - 7905 
1865 3216 118 - 2482 42 - 1691 - - - 7549 
1866 2526 134 - 757 - - 789 - - - 420) 
1867 39CJJ 304 - 365 - - - - - - 4568 
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TABLE 2 (i) CQ'ITINUED ••• 
- 2 -
IMMIGRANTS INTRODUCED BY THE H1MIGRATION DEPP.RTHENT 1895 - 1928 
I 
~ Ul P3 "d ~ ~ ro Ul fa o u ~ ro 'rl ~ OJ ro OJ ro ·rl 3 ;a r& ~;g 'Q .-I .~ ~:E .j...l ·H bI ~ ~ ~ ~ &~ ~ t3 6 a~ i u: ~ g :J< 
1868 ·2528 219 - 599 , 
- -
I 
- - 33a.i - -I 
1869 7168 240 - 980 
- - - - - - 8388 
1870 4943 454 - 631 - - - - - - 6028 I 
1871 ' 27c:£ 260 i - 591 - - - 3557 - - -
1872 3556 367 - 2697 - -
- - - - 6620 
Jan 1-
Jm 30 
1873 3656 26 - 2412 - - - - - - 6094 
1873 -
1874 ·8301 208 - 1692 - - 388 - - - 10589 I 
1874 -
1875 3887 164 
- 990 - - - - - - 5041 
1875-6 3834 100 - 414 - - - - - - 4348 
1876-7 3982 ! 90 - 606 
- - - - - - 4678 I I 
1877-8 8118 203 - 1066 - - - - - - 9387 
1878-9, 6426 293 - 1269 - - 515 - - - 8503 
1879-80 45C6 243 - 527 - - - - - - 5276 
1880-1 4355 216 - 623 - - - - - - 5194 
I 
1881-2 3166 182 - 326 - - - - - - 3674 
1882-3 3016 - - 875 - - - - - - 3891 
1883-4 2731 - - 1061 - - - - - - 3792 
1884-5 6209 - - 1123 - - - - - - 7332 I 
I 
1885-6 4796 - - 509 - - - - - - 5305 
I 
1886-7 3928 - - - - - - - - - 3928 
1887-8 2771 - - - - - - - - - 2771 
1888-9 
, 
3573 - - - - - - - - - 3573 
1889-90 3432 - - - - - - - - - 3432 
1890-1 5229 - - 267 - - - - - - 5496 
1891-2 5072 - - 707 - - - - - - 5779 
i 
1892-3 4693 - - - - - - - - - 4693 
1893-4 5932 - - - - - - - - - 5932 
1894-5 7114 - - - - - - - - - 7114 
1895-6 1882 - - - - - - - - - 1882 
1896-7 2408 - - - - - - - - - 2408 
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TJ'lBTE 2 (i) CXNTINUED •.• - 3 -
IMMIGRANTS INTRODUCED BY THE IW1IGPATION DEPARTMENT 1895 - 1928 
I'd '0 
r& ~ ~ I'd H til til I'd ~ ·rl el OJ U I'd ~ ;B r& ~~ ·rl rl ~ I'd . .-\ rl 0 ttl tJ1 5 J~ ~ 'H 19 ~ .fi ~ ~ ~~ rl ~~ ~ ~ 6 ~ g 
I 
11897-8 1202 - - - - - - - -
- 1202 
1898-9 2399 - - - - - - - - - 2399 
1899-00 4961 - - - - -
- - - - 4961 
1900-1 3801 - - - - -
- - - - 3801 
• 1901-2 4245 I - ! - - - - - - - - 4245 , , I 
1902-3 1947 - - - - - - - - - 1947 
1903-4 2967 - - - - - - - - - 2967 
I 1904-5 1314 - - - - -
- - - - 1314 
1905-6 2704 - - - - - - - - - 2704 
1906-7 2257 - - - - - - - - - 2257 
• 1907-8 1855 - - - - - - - - - I 1855 
1908-9 1799 - - - - - - - - - 1799 
1909-10 2508 - - - - - 219 - - - 2727 
1910-11 2173 -
- - - - 236 - - - 2409 
, 
1911-12 1768 - - - - - 200 - - - 1968 I 
1912-13 2206 - - - - - - - - - 2206 
1913-4 1346 ! - - - - - - - - - 1346 
1914-5 819 - - - - - - - - - 819 
1915-6 2~53 - .- - - - - - - - 2253 
1916-7 824 , - - - - - - - - - 824 
1918 - - - - - - - - - - -
1919 - - - - - - - - - - -
1920 - - - 923 - - - - - - 923 
1921 274 - - 136 - - - - - - 410 
1922 160 - - - - - - - - - 160 
1923 - - - 369 - - - - - - 369 
I 
1924 - - - 80 - - - - - - 80 
1925 - - - 85 - - - I - - - 85 
1926 173 - - 24 - - - - - - 197 
1927 - - - 40 - - - - - - 40 
1928 - - - 72 - - - - - - 72 
SourCE: Nath, DNarka A History of Indians in Guiana, London: 'n-lomaS Nelson and 
(1970) Sons, 2nd ?219 
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importation of labourers from Hadeira. The Portuguese proved W1able to 
stand the rigours of tropical labouring and their hiSh mortality rate led 
to a search for more suitable immigrants. India provided the main 
solution and Indian immigration became well established by 1850. Indians 
became the preferred type of immigrant, although Portuguese, Chinese and 
Africans were added in comparatively small numbers up until the late 
1860s.3 (see Table 2 (i)). Between 1838 and 1917, 238,960 Indians came to 
Guyana under indenture through the Immigration Department. From 1843 
until the cessation of indenture in 1917 the costs of immigration were in 
varying degrees met by the state. state willingness to meet such costs 
was ensured by the political dominance of the planter class in the local 
legislature. The Franchise Ordinance of 1849 had broadened the 
representation of interests in the constututional bodies through 
subdividing the colony into constitutencies, but the hegemony of the 
planter class remained intact. Qualifications for both elective and non-
elective members of parliamentary institutions were sufficiently high to 
ensure that only wealthy planters and merchants would be eligible. 
Further, since rural outnumbered urban districts the pre-eminence of the 
planting interest was assured. Even when by 1863 the College of Keizers 
was dominated by merchants the planter faction retained effective control 
since the qualifications for the College remained such as to ensure that 
members were required to have landed property, thus giving members who 
were primarily merchants a common interest with thf2 planters.4,S 
One contemporary report, from Sir 'i'Jilliam De Voeux, who had served 
as a Magistrate in Guyana and was a critic of the power of the sugar 
interest in the legislature, put it thus: 
I~rollope had termed the government of British Guiana a 'desvotism 
tempered by sugar'. It appeared to me rather a despotlsm of 
sugar •••••• and a sugar which in this, as in, som~ human 
constitutions, is apt to turn acid. Though the leglslatlve body, 
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the Court of Policy, had a bare majority of officials some even of 
these were permitted, as I think improperly, to own or be 
pecuniarily interested in, sugar estates, while the whole of the 
unofficial members owed their position and livelihood to the same 
product. Again the additional members, composing with the Court 
of Policy 'the Combined Court' which alone had the power of voting 
supplies, were nearly all either directly interested in sugar as 
managers of estates or were carrying on a trade which chiefly 
depended on it."(6) 
Another contemporary report for the same period comments on the effect of 
this planter control of the legislature: 
"But that our Government has been induced - I shall say beguiled -
almost to become a party to a particular manufacture, and suffered 
its council chamber at times to resemble the bureau of the 
merchant or the planter than an assembly of state, is sadly 
true ••• 1l (7) 
The planter interest also domina ted power bases outside of the 
legislature through representation on the statutory boards which had been 
established to take over functions formerly fulfilled by the plantations 
themselves, such as those for Sea Defence, Drainage, Vestries and Poor 
Law Boards. 
In addi tion to the poli tical power wielded through control of the 
legislature and other policy bodies, the planters als.Q had great social 
influence which extended to the Governor himself. As fe Voeux put it: 
" •••.••• the Governor, while of course bound largely to consider 
the sugar interest, required to be, in an exceptional degree, 
strong and upright, in order to act independently of that interest 
for the welfare of the unrepresented classes which are the great 
majority of the population. Unless almost superhumanly politic 
also his independence would meet with unmitigated abuse from the 
Press, he would have had a social life very far from agreeable and 
might even have failed to obtain necessary supplies." (8) 
Finally, the planters exercised influence at levels higher even 
than the Governor through their representation in the West India 
Committee, a powerful British based association of Hest Indian sugar 
interests which had as one function the lobbying of the Br i tish 
Parliament and the Colonial Office, often to 9reat effect. 
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Indentured immigration met the requiremer.ts for continued sugar 
production on a basis similar to slavery. The labourers were bolIDd for a 
fixed number of years, thus providing a secure source of labour 
independently of the free labour market.9 Only immigrants were 
indentured. 
In addition to meeting part of the costs of transporting immigrants 
employers were also required to provide for them free housing and medical 
facili ties. By an Ordinance of 1847, each estate employing indentured 
labourers was compelled to establish a hospital. Previous to this 
planters had been requested, rather than forced, to give medical 
assistance to immigrants. The belief that estate proprietors would 
interpret this request as in their best interest as procuring the health 
of labour they had acquired at some expense proved vain. 
Although the constitution of East Indian immigrants proved more 
suitable to plantation work than that of the Portuguese, mortality rates 
were still high, especially amongst the recently landed. The 1851 census 
indicated that of 3,985 East Indians landed by 1848 (when immigration was 
halted for three years), only 2,736 were still on the estates, 360 of 
those missing were officially counted dead and the remainder were 
considered to have taken to squatting and begging. This \-las contributing 
to the further demise of a group attested by the Chief Hedical Officer to 
be "daily dying in the colonial hospital. ,,10 
If the commitment made by the c.olonial government to ensure the well 
being of immigrants was to be kept and thus the supply to be continued, a 
superior arrangement had to be arrived at. There is no doubt that, apart 
from any question as to the morality of encouraging immigrants without 
undertaking care of their survival, another factor was at the forefront 
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of the decision to involve state intervention through legislation. It 
was important to forestall criticism from elements of the British public. 
As early as 1839 adverse reaction to the introduction of indenture as a 
means of securing labour for the Empire had appeared in the British 
Emancipator, the official journal of the Anti -slavery Society of Great 
Bri tain. This reaction, if it grew, threatened to impede negotiations 
for further labour supplies.ll Compulsion upon employees to protect the 
immigrant sector of the rural population Vlas initiated. Thus began a 
system which formed part of a complex web of social control. The element 
of control lay in the relationship between the hospital system and a 
legal system which provided for a compulsion to work. The labour laws 
under the Immigration and Masters and Servants Ordinances Here extremely 
rigid, allowing for prosecution of the indentured labourer who failed to 
show himself for work without reasonable cause or failed to complete the 
amount of work required daily by statute. Sucessful prosecution could 
result in imprisonment or in the forfeiture of wages. The draconian 
nature of these laws is evidenced by the number of prosecutions made 
every year; in 1901, for example 23% (3,424) of all indentured labourers 
on estates were prosecuted by their employers; 1,922 were convicted.12 
Tinker has described the system potently as: 
" ••••• operated by making the coolie live a life similar to that of 
a convict, or at any rate a prisoner on parole .•••• All the 
indented people were strictly confined to the limits of their 
masters' estates unless given permission to move outside under 
str ictly regulated condi tions." (13) 
One contemporary report suggested that t.he current boast of the planters 
was that if an indentured labourer was not at \-lork, then he vIas sure to 
, '1 "114 be found In hosplta or ]al • These two institutions did in fact 
relate in a system of total control. As Dr. Shier, Surgeon General in 
the 1870's put it: 
~11 
"As a matter of discipline, moreover the necessi ty of enter ing 
~ospita~s when a man leaves his work on the grounds of sickness, 
IS a slIght but useful check ufX)n malingering." (15) 
Free housing on estate land \-lorked in favour of the planters in tHO 
ways: firstly, the labourers were readily available for whatever work was 
necessary, but more importantly their containment on the estate made for 
easy surveillance. Thus the only Ireasonable cause' for absence from 
work was illness in which case labourers were expected to report to the 
hospital. The whole system of control was reinforced by laws relating to 
desertion. If an indentured immigrant was absent from the estate without 
leave for more than seven days, he could be arrested. The enforcement of 
these laws was accomplished in tvlO \'lays; firstly, estate employers were 
compelled, under penalty, to proffer charges against absconders so that 
warrants for arrest could be issued; secondly, the police had the powers 
to stop anyone suspected of desertion and call for the person to produce 
a pass or exemption from work. 16 
standards in the hospitals varied but, especially in the period 
before 1870, were low. Until 1873, the doctors supervising estate 
hospitals were on the estate payroll. It was therefore tempting for them 
to certify labourers as fit for work before they were fully recovered and 
to continually suspect malingering; to certify too many as unavailable 
for work through illness could incur the displeasure of the planters upon 
whom they were dependent for their employ.17 
Hospital inspection proceedures were poor. They were conducted 
ini tially by stipendiary magistrates.l 8 In 1859 an Ordinance (No.17) 
provided for a Medical Inspector paid from colony revenues. A Dr. Shier 
was appointed and his reports and oral evidence formed the basis for most 
of the commentary on the hospitals made by Commissioners who were 
appointed in 1870 to enquire into the treatment of East Indians in 
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Guyana. 19 One problem of ins~ction was that visits appear to have been 
announced and often specially prepared for. In spite of this the 
Inspector reported finding numerous breaches of regulations in every 
area, including provision of clothing, bedding, eating utensils, food, 
medicine and building standards.20 
It may seem paradoxical that the planters were apparently so 
careless with a commodity for which they bore much of the cost. It 
becomes more understandable when another feature of the system is 
considered. As responsibility for health care was borne by private 
enterprise it was considered relative to other forms of capi tal 
expenditure. Since the efficiency of medical science at this period was 
low, no clear relationship between good hospital facilities and improved 
production was demonstrable, thereby encouraging an evaluation of 
hospi tals in terms of thei r value as part of an apparatus of control 
rather than as they might contribute to a maximisation of labour output. 
Minimum standards were sufficient to fulfil this function. 
In addition, when estates were in financial difficulties the cost of 
medical care could scarcely be met especially in competition with other 
maintenance requirements of the plantation.21 Planters were encouraged 
in this a tti tude towards medical care by the Inspector, Dr. Shier, who 
took a sympathetic approach to estate owners and managers who had 
difficulty in complying with hospital regulations allowing 'makeshift' 
provision where it was claimed no better could be afforded.22 
The commisssioners were critical: 
''We find here the disposition, when retrenchments are required, to 
commence with the hospital; and that until embarrassed 
circumstance can be tided over the comforts and conveniences of 
th immigrant are postponed to the convenience of the proprietors 
_ ~ state of things that certainly o~ght not ,to be allowed. As 
s an estate gets into such straItened CIrcumstances as to ~~~~e~t the proprietors fulfilling all the requirements of the la\v 
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towards the immigrants, the latter ought to be removed from the 
estate."(23) 
There was legal provision for allocations of immi.9rants to be with-held 
from estates whose living conditions were not up to regulation standard. 
This proviso was not enforced as often as warranted, the Medical 
Inspector being sympathetic ~7hen estates requested time to improve their 
position. The Commissioners found many examples of gross overcrowding in 
hospitals where further allocations had been allovled and concluded that 
the Inspector had never "enforced an observation of his instructions by 
means of law.,,24 
Finally, it is possible that, at least in the early days of 
indenture, labour was viewed from a perspective developed during slavery. 
Substance is given to this suggestion by the finding of the Commissioners 
that, until prohibited by a Circular issued by the government in 1870, 
stocks, although decreed a 'relic of the old regime' were not only still 
to be found in many hospitals but on occasion used to deal with 
refractory or absconding patients.25 
Housing condi tions were found to vary considerably; although some 
estates had built cottages for estate dwellers, most labourers lived in 
old ranges two or three stories high, which were overcrowded, badly 
ventilated and had poor sanitation.26 The Inspector had recommended that 
the old barrack ranges be replaced by single story structures with 
parched earth floors. This had, however, s2ldom been accomplished by the 
time the Commission sat in 1870. The conclusion drawn in their report 
was that little had been done to improve the situz:tion. 
It is clear that the value of immigrant labour lay not only in its 
productive capacity but in the control it gave over the labour force as a 
whole through its effect on wages. Legislation guaranteed the same wage 
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for non-indentured labour as indentured labour. Initially intended as a 
protection for indentured labour, it had the effect of reducing overall 
\vage levels in the sugar industry since the increase in labour available 
as immigration continued made it possible to put down non-indentured 
labourers' wages and therefore indentured labourers' pay which was 
legally tied to it.27 In addi tion, the bound section of labour ensured 
that, when those tasks arose in the production cycle which did not allow 
for delay, there would always be available labour to carry them out. The 
evidence of an overseer to the Royal Commission of 1897 illustrates well 
this important function of indentured labour: 
"The supply of labour has no bearing on the sugar industry; the 
whole origin of immigration hinges on this point. You may have 
work and plenty of it for a black man and a coloured man, and they 
will not do it. In planting cane if you leave certain 
agricultural work over, your crop is ruined. Therefore it is 
absolutely necsessary that you should have botmd labour that you 
can conunand." ( 2 8) 
The costs of the 'welfare' system - heal th and housing - added to 
the cost of production in one way but were more than balanced by the 
value of the bound section of the labour force in modifying the free play 
of market forces in determining 'vage levels, in justifying the low wages 
paid to indentured labourers themselves, in assuring a constant labour 
supply and in the opportunities afforded for the surveillance and control 
of indentured labourers. 
The system of estate health care was modified following the 
Commission's report of 1871. Among the reforms \Yhich resulted from the 
Commission was the 1873 Ordinance which provided for the employment of 
estate medical officers by the Government rather than, as formerly, by 
the planters. Their salaries \vere to be met from general revenues and 
from a capitation tax on indentured labourers to be paid by the 
employers. As government employees the doctors were to care for the 
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estate population as a whole. They were given n~tice that they would be 
required to visit, supervise and attend all patients at rural local 
dispensaries serving the non-estate population as soon as a project for 
the establishment of these institutions was realised. Further, in order 
to meeet the "needs of the poorer classes of the community" rules were to 
be laid down to guide the treatment of these patients and be fixed to 
provide "advice and medicines for patients in the humbler walks of life, 
who whilst capable of defraying some small charge for medical treatment, 
are unable to pay the customary professional charges. ,,29 
The extended duties of the new Government Medical Officers were 
clarified by a further Ordinance (No.9) of 1886 which established a 
Government Medical Service and created the post of Surgeon C~neral. This 
move appears to have been motivated at least in part by the feeling of 
government that as since 1876, when the 1873 ordinance came into effect, 
the state was financing partially a medical system ,,,hich nevertheless 
still worked mainly in favour of the estate population, the situation 
would be rectified and the demand for more rural care met better by 
removing the Government Medical Officers from the administration of the 
Immigrant Department. The Governor wrote: 
"The whole rural population is therefore under the care of a 
government staff which is attached to the Immigration Department 
and whatever rules or regulations the government may try to 
enforce it is only natural that the immigration staff should 
consider their immigration work their chief concern and all else 
as a secondary concern." (30) 
The movement towards an integration of rural health services on the 
level of personnel was resisted both by planters and doctors. Planters 
who employed large numbers of indentured labourers stood to lose as the 
capitation tax could amount to more than the doctor's entire salary. 
Doctors were aware that in addition to greater professional regulation 
they could expect extra work ond possibly a loss of income.3l In spite 
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of the fact that it had been common practice to admit to estates 
hospitals unindentured labourers, doctors apparently were reluctant to be 
compelled to do so by law. Their reluctance \;as such that government 
app3.rently found it necessary to remind thEm of their new duties~ 
"It has been brought to the notice of the Governor that in some 
districts the Medical Officers have refused to give medical 
attendance as part of their duty, to the class of persons attached 
to the estates, other than immigrants, who, previously to 1st July 
1883, received medical aid from the medical attendant employed by 
the estate. 
The Governor directs me to observe that in making, in the year 
1873, the changes in the position of medical attendants of the 
estates, whereby they became District ~ledical Officers, it was not 
the intention of the Government to withdraw from the estates, or 
from the residents thereon other than immigrants, any part of the 
medical attendance previously given at the cost of the estates. 
The Governor, therefore, requests that you will understand that it 
is your duty to give the same amount of medical aid to persons 
attached to the estates within your district other than 
immigrants, as was given by the medical attendants to estates 
prior to the 1st July 1883." (32) 
Thus, in theory at least, the health of the whole labouring 
population was to be attended by the servants of the state. At the same 
time the cost of professional service to the planters as a whole Was 
minimised. Estate hospitals, remained reserved for those working on the 
estates. There does, however, seem to have been an improvement in the 
hospital provision on at least some of the larger estates following the 
appointment of a more efficient ins~ctorate. rr11e Governor reported that 
by 1897, forty of the ninety-seven estates' hospitals Here newly built.33 
Conditions in the Villages 
As noted earlier the basis of an independent peasantry was laid down 
with remarkable rapidity in the era immediately after emancipation. 
Farley quotes contemporary reports indicating that by the end of 1848, 
446 abandoned estates had been acquired, largely by joint purchase by ex-
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slaves, upon which 44,443 persons were settled. By 1851 village freehold 
properties numbered 5,672 in Demerara Country, 2,254 in Essequibo and 
3,265 in Berbice.34 At this time Crown Lands Regulations of 1839 ruled 
that lands could only be acquired in lots of 100 acres or more and gave a 
statutory price of 10 dollars per acre, thereby making it difficult for 
villagers to acquire land. 
Many of the villages established during this period adopted a system 
of co-operative self government under contractual 'Agreements' through 
which they regulated their affairs and collected subscriptions for common 
property, repairs to roads, bridges and canals.35 The degree of 
independence being exercised by the villages was intolerable to the 
planter government. In 1866 a Central Beard of Villages \:as set up with 
power to levy taxes in 'incorporated' villages that is, villages under 
its jurisdiction. Only eighteeen villages were incorporated by 1878 at 
which point the insanitary conditions of the villages were used as 
occasion to increase central control. A Central Board of Health was 
created with authority over the other two hundred villages. The Board 
was initiated under the Public Health Ordinance, a statute based on the 
new English Public Health Legislation. It viaS given the po\ler to raise 
local rates for the upkeep of main drains and outlets and authori ty to 
compel individuals to assume responsibility for drainage on land which 
they owned or occupied.36 Both the Board of Villages and the Public 
Health Board were dominated by the planter class.37 
In 1883 control of the incorporated villages was transferred to the 
Central Board of Health in relation to sanitation matters and the Public 
Works Department for roads and sea defence.38 A grant-in-aid of $25,000 
for village relief was offered in exchange for the loss of independent 
control. The assumption of central control resulted in some loans for 
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TABLE 2 (ii) 
TOTAL AND EAST INDIAN ESTATE AND 
NON-ESTATE POPULATION 1861-1891 
Estate 
Total East Indian_ 
Non-Estate 
'lbtal East Indian 
'lbtal Population 
'lbtal East Indian 
Year 
1861 
1871 
1881 
1891 
No. 
47,114 
67,859 
84,234 
90,330 
% of total 
population 
42.1 
44.8 
42.8 
46.1 
No. 
22,481 
44,539 
52,418 
71,772 
% of total 
population 
20.1 
29.4 
26.6 
36.6 
No. 
64,793 
83,633 
112,623 
105,613 
% of total 
P=lpulation 
57.9 
55.2 
57.2 
53.9 
No. 
2,984 
2,736 
14,470 
28,471 
% of total 
pc:pulation 
2.6 
1.8 
7.3 
14.5 
No. 
111,907 
151,492 
196 ,857 
195,9113 
SOurCE: Calculated fran data given in Foberts, G.W. and Jc::hnson, t-tA., "Factors Involved in Imnigration and 
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drainage pumps but the sum allocated to the villages \-las small, decreased 
by $10,000 in 1889 and a further $5,000 in 1890, and brought about no 
real improvement in the condition of the villages.39 
The condition of the incorporated villages, where taxation, through 
local rates, was higher, became \'lorse than in the non-incorporated ones. 
The services paid for were provided haphazardly and the burden of 
taxation fell heavily. The villagers) perception of the limitations of 
central assistance and control led to agitation for the resumption of 
self control. 40 This was acceded to finally in 1894 when elected 
councils were restored to the incorporated villages amalgamated now to 
number thirteen. 41 The other villages continued as Sanitary Districts 
under the control of the Centr al Board of Heal tho The condi tion of the 
villages was unimproved by this move as it was accompanied by a reduction 
of financial resources as funds from central goverrunent \Jere withdrawn 
and loans curtailed.42 Of the public money that \-las expended on public 
works in the 80's and 90's the major part benefitted not the villages but 
the estates.43 
The village population began to increase in the 1870's as a result 
of time-expired indentured labourers moving av,7ay from the estates and 
taking up residence in villages. This tendency was accelerated when the 
system of re-indenture - whereby immigrants received a 'bounty' upon 
renewing his contr act and extending the per iod of his indenture - was 
ended, reducing the numbers of indentured labourers from 38,318 in 1870 
to 15,251 in 1884, and resulting in the growth of immigrant village 
settlements.44 ,45 (See Table 2(ii» 
Both the early villages and the immigrant settlements faced enormous 
problems. A major problem derived from the difficulties posed by 
drainage on the coastal lands. To maintain prop:'r drainage was not only 
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expensive but also required co-or:erative effort as failure to upkeep or,e 
section of the system led to flooding in others. Often the villagers 
failed to organise themselves sufficiently to p:~ovide the labour needed 
for drainage tasks or to meet the other major resronsibility placed 
upon them, that of maintaining the roads running through the villages.46 
The most basic problem, however, was the villagers' inabili ty to rai se 
sufficient capital to finance the recurrent expenditures incurred in 
maintaining infrastructure.47 
Finally, in 1907, greater central control was reassumed by means of 
unifying legislation which divided the colony, including estates, into 
different kinds of units with responsibility for loral administration. 
These were the Urban Sanitary Districts coverint] the towns - Georgetown 
and New Amsterdam - Village Districts which included incorporated 
villages, County Districts covering other villages and lastly Rural 
Sanitary Districts which were basically plantation areas not included in 
any of the other units. 
Yet these administrative changes could not resolve the basic problem 
which hinged on the dependency of the whole economy on the sugar 
industry. As one Governor saw it: 
"In times of commercial and agricultural prosr:x=rity the village 
councils may perhaps be able to car ry out duties undertaken and 
inclined to enact liabilities incurrred, but during a period of 
depression, such as the colony is now enduring, they seem to lack 
the necessary energy either to perform those duties or meet those 
liabilities and unless as is the case in one or two instances, 
they have a leader chosen from a class above the majority of their 
members they fall into arrears in both cases appealing to the 
Goverment for assistance."(48) 
Conditions in the villages tended to vary with the state of the 
sugar industry for two reasons. Firstly, many villagers, both Africans 
and East Indians, supplemented their income from small holdings by 
working on the estates or were totally dependent on 'vages from estate 
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labour and thus were directly affected by th~ cyclical slumps which 
plagued the industry. In addition the paramount importance of sugar to 
the entire economy meant that falls in sugar receipts reverberated 
throughout the whole society. In this way the village economy was linked 
to the estate economy which in turn "'las determined by the international 
economy. 
Even the assumption of central control was no guarantee of 
improvement in village conditions for, as the Report of the Central Board 
of Health of 1907 claimed, the expense of maintaining roads and drainage 
was so high that to enforce the meeting of requirements in this area, as 
the Board was empowered to do, would mean 'the levying of an assessment 
beyond the villagers means, to meet expenses \-lhich the great majori ty 
would consider unnecessary.,49 
Whilst it is not possible to calculate se~~rate mortality rates for 
the villages from existing records, there is evidence that conditions in 
the villages by the turn of the century ,',ere so poor that the rate of 
natural increase was negligible, this being mainly a reflection of high 
mortality rates.50 For the period 1871 to 1880 a natural increase of 
0.15% (3,300) was recorded, and for the following decade one of 0.16% 
(4,200) .51 
The proportion of this tiny increase contributed by the villagers is 
not known but in 1892 a Dr. Godfrey was of the opinion that 'the 
mortality of the villages, taken as centres of population, "lOuld be found 
to be double if not treble that on the estates,.52 He added his view 
that there was little or nothing being done to improve the sanitary 
condi tions of the villages. 
One can only sp=culate the extent to which the lot of the villagers 
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would have been bettered had not immigration relieved the need to 
preserve the village population but as will })e sho'~m later, government 
interest in public health grew when indenture ceased. 
Non-Estate Medical Provision 
Non-estate medical provision advanced in an ad hoc manner in 
response to crises which from time to time threatened to engulf the whole 
population, Europeans included. This can be demonstrated by reference to 
the development of public health. 
A Board of Health was established for Georgetown in 1832 under Ord. 
20 of that year. The primary object of this Ordinance was to deal with a 
cholera epidemic. Further Boards were established for the three 
counties, Demerara, Berbice and Essequibo under Ordinance 32 of 1850. 
These Boards were united years later when cholera threatened again. 
Originating in England, the epidemic ravaged Barbados and Trinidad in 
1854. The anticipatory measures taken in Guyana, including refuse 
collection, lot cleaning, lime washing of buildings and tlle establishment 
of drainage systems, were successful in keeping the toll taken by cholera 
substantially lower than in the Islands.53 
The Health Ordinance of 1852 also provided for the establishment of 
rural dispensaries. These were to give free medicine and treatment to 
those who paid a local health rate or those who \"ere p:;lupers. The Court 
of Policy prevaricated in activating the clinics initially and action was 
forced only when a few months later a yellow fever epidemic struck. 
Powers were given for the establishment of dispensaries and the 
employment of doctors to man them. Yellow fever was particularly 
injurious to those newly arrived in the colony, which included not only 
East Indian and other immigrants, but also European overseers, managers 
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administrators and soldiers. The danger was such that sailors were 
afraid to dock in Georgetown Port. In 1840 69% of all European troops 
perished from yellow fever within months of arrival in Guyana.54 
By 1857 there were fifteen dispensaries financed in the first 
instance by central government but with monies recoverable from village 
rates. This arrangement was changed in 1864 when an annual vote of 
$3,500 was made by central government to be distributed amongst private 
doctors in payment for work done amongst the rural poor. The benefit of 
the vote to the villagers to whom doctors were theoretically available 
was negligible and to those in outlying areas non-existent, and was 
discontinued with the advent of government salaried doctors in 1876. One 
Governor's assessment of these methods of dealing with the health needs 
of the rural population was that they were ineffective: 
"I have in other desp;1tches incidentally adverted to the fact of a 
considerable portion of the poorer classes of the community being 
beyond the reach of medical assistance, except at a cost wholly 
beyond their means. C~vernor Sir. P. Woodehouse sought to remedy 
this in some degree, by the establishment of dispensaries in 
certain localities, but the plan failed to obtain the object in 
view. My predecessor, Governor Hicks, abolished the dispensaries 
and obtained an annual vote of $3,500 for medical aid for the poor 
in rural districts •••• 1 think the general opinion which prevails 
is it is more than doubtful whether the poor receive any 
substantial benefit from this vote, is not far from correct ••. (55) 
"The poor" consisted of the vast majority of the population. The 
degree to which the extension of the state paid doctors' duties to 
village dwellers actually improved their lot is questionable. The 
appointment of government salaried officers to the rural areas made it 
more difficult for private practitioners to make a living in the country 
areas, the attraction of which \vas limited already by the absence of any 
middle class.56 In addition doctors were still required to fulfil their 
duties on the estates and there is evidence to suggest that in 
apportioning their time they continued to give first importance to the 
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estates. Nearly twenty years after the insti tution of the new system, 
when giving evidence to a Commission of Enquiry, Dr. Law, the Surgeon 
General, rebuked a Dr. Winckler for suggesting that the raison d'etre of 
the Government Medical Service was to serve the putlic. Dr. Law 
challenged such a benign view and indicated that the 'essential element' 
of the service was rather the 'existence of the immigration system,.57 
Further although the intention had been to fix fees at a level which 
could be afforded by the 'poorer classes' soon even the smallest fees 
were beyond the rreans of rrany. 
The price of sugar slumped in 1873 and the effects of this were 
aggravated by three droughts betv.leen this date and 1880. The depression 
deepened through the 80s. Distress in the rural areas and the subsequent 
increase in demand for assistance under the Poor La\{ led to the setting 
up of a Poor Law Enquiry Commission in 1881.58 Much of the evidence 
given to the Commission was concerned with the lack of health facilities 
for the rural non-estate popUlation. Typical of the reports is the 
evidence of John Kiernan, a carpenter of Craig Village, who complained 
that medicines were obtainable only in Georgetown and that: 
"many people cannot call the doctor, even tl10se who are strong 
enough to work on the estates cannot call the doctor. I mean that 
they cannot afford to pay the doctor". (59) 
The Reverend J. Foreman and others testified that state employed doctors 
were I indifferent' to those not resident on the estates. 
There were hospital facilities at the county state hospitals in 
Georgetown, New Amsterdam and Suddie. TI1ese were often little more the 
depositories of people broken down by work and illness which had 
progressed to the incurable stage to die in. Tuberculosis was a growing 
problem: it was reported by the Resident Surgeon of the Public Hospital, 
Georgetown as causing 206 (27.J.%) of the 758 deaths in the hospital ir. 
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1886, an increase from 4.9% in 1846.60 The l-frican population was 
particularly affected and Dr. Rowland attricwted this to 'imperfect 
recovery from the attacks of the disease, the rEsult of absolute neglect 
or of unskilled treatment from the absence of rr.edical assistance, for 
broadly speaking the Negro race in British Guyana has been neglected 
since the time of emancipation in the matter of medical aid. The poor 
people of the country have been left to suffer repeated attacks of 
disease without educated help, ~~til with broken down constitutions they 
find their way to the urban hospitals to die of pthisis [T.B.] or other 
diseases that result from physical exhaustion,.61 
There is some evidence that, as well as catering for the sick urban 
poor and rural villagers, the public hospitals acted as auxiliary poor 
houses, sometimes admitting people who were considered to be 'not sick' 
but were lying in the streets suffering from debility due to 
starvation.62 The P.cting ~1edical Superintendant of the Berbice Public 
Hospital sJ.X)ke in 1881 of the hospital as 'a refuge for all the starved, 
debilitated and broken down coolies of the district •••• ,63 
The non-indentured labourers were not in law entitled to treatment 
in the estates' hospitals although in practice they often were treated, 
but in the straitened circumstances of the eighties it became: 
"in many instances ••••• the practice of sending into this Hospital 
[Berbice Public] dying and incurable immigrants from the Estates' 
Hospital. (64) 
It seems that this was the practice also in Georgetown for it was noted 
that in 1881 there were in the state hospital there 30 free and 11 
indentured labourers from estates. 65 
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The legal situation with regard to treat~ent of non-indentured 
immigrants and others in estates' hospitals and indentured immigrants ln 
public hospitals was that in the former case th~re was no obligation on 
the part of estates' management; in the latter case estate managers paid 
for their indentured labourers. In practice estate hospitals were 
sometimes open to non-indentured labourers too. In some cases all 
residents on estates were treated as admissable, in others non-resident 
workers were also admitted. D.W.D. Comins an official visitor to estates 
in Guyana and Trinidad in 1893, commented that in Guyana, unlike 
Trinidad: 
[althoughJ"unindentured immigrants are not by law entitled to 
admission into and treatment in an estates' hospital. •.•.•. this 
privelege has always been given to them by their employers, and 
not only to them, but also to other free labourers resident and 
working on the estates." (66) 
He concluded also, on the basis of a circular sent to ~1edical officers in 
1876 at the time when doctors became salaried state employees, that 
directives to continue to give medical aid to non-indentured labourers 
indicated that the extension of aid to this group was customary. 
Departmental Reports from the Immigration Department support this 
conclusion as does the following table: (see next page) 
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TABLE 2 (iii) 
Number .Qf cases ~ted .in Estate Hospj.tals, 1880-1889 
Year Indentured Unindentured Others 
Imnigrants Imnigrants 
1880 73,774 25,760 6,018 
1881 81,047 28,384 6,465 
1882 80,928 32,367 6,804 
1883 73,325 39,824 8,693 
1884 55,870 32,883 7,557 
1885 48,048 25,695 5,354 
1886 60,290 36,173 5,769 
1887 49,107 25,560 1,587 
1888 44,878 27,055 2,063 
1889 43,851 29,366 2,508 
Source: Comins. D.W., Notes on the Emigration of Indians to Trinidad 
and British Guyana, p.83 (67) 
Thus two separate sectors of health provision emerged during the 
nineteenth century, one concerned with estate labourers, the other with 
the rest of the population. The non-estate sector included the public 
hospitals in the urban population centres, the private doctors practicing 
in the towns and the meagre rural provision of rural dispensaries and 
government medical officers. The introduction of indentured immigrant 
labour removed the need for the preservation of the non-estate rural 
population whilst the provision of estate hospitcls provided a measure of 
control over indentured labourers. The creation of Government r-tedical 
Officers in effect removed part of the cost of production from the 
private to the public sphere Hhilst bringing small benefit to the non-
estate population. 
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Eoor Relief 
Poor relief, based on the English model, develo~:d early in Guyana, 
as indeed it did in the West Indies as a vlhole. The reason for this is 
to be found in the predominance of the institution of slavery. In other 
colonies plantations and mines existed as enclaves against a background 
of tradi tional society. Redundant workers could be returned to tribal 
villages where they would be absorbed, or rather reabsorbed, with greater 
or lesser difficulty into the traditional structure. Most Caribbean 
societies were entirely the creation of a colonialism; there was no 
traditional society to fall back upon. Slave society had been regulated, 
as had feudal society, by the precept that masters were responsible for 
their slaves. Abolition ended that responsibility and created a 
situation where large numbers of former slaves, through, age or infirmity 
would be thrown into destitution.68 
In 1839 an Ordinance (No.15) was passed, based on a draft prepared 
for the Colonial Office by England's Chief Poor Law Commissioner. By 
this ordinance members of families were obliged to assume the 
responsibility formerly held by the slave owner: fathers for children, 
husbands for wives and children for rarents. In cases where this was not 
possible the central government was to take financial responsibili ty. 
Poor relief was administered on a Parish level, with the Vestry, composed 
of clerics and landowners, acting a Guardians of the Poor. Three 
Commissioners controlled central administration \lith power to establish 
, d I' f 69 work hOllses for In oor re Ie • 
Thereafter, there were administrative changes but the essential 
structure remained with central control and local administration by 
representatives of the Church and the plantocracy. The village councils 
were not involved in the process at any level. The Poor Law Commission 
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of 1881 appears to have been set up largely as a resul t of tax payers' 
concern about the increase in demand for, hence the cost of, relief. 
Many of the clergymen giving evidence spoke of their belief that although 
work for the Creole population had decre~sed in recent years, the basic 
cause of the increase in pauperisation was indolence.70 The Reverend 
Foreman claimed that unwillingness to Hork for more than three or four 
days coupled with impecuniousness was to blame.71 The Reverend William 
Veness spoke of 'the habits of indolence and the licence' as the cause of 
the 'deterioration of the Creole population.,72 These attitudes 
reflected the class alliance of the cler~l and denied the hardship that 
existed both in the town and the rural areas as a result of a drop in 
sugar prices. 
There is evidence that the composition of the Local Boards affected 
the degree of partiality with which outdoor relief was distributed. At 
the Commission of Enquiry several clergymen gave evidence of the general 
belief that doles were awarded on a sectarian basis. The Reverend Downer 
contended that people who did not belong to the Church of England did not 
receive relief.?3 The Reverend John campbell said that 'people of other 
[than the Church of England and Scotland] denominations have no 
confidence in the administration of the poor flIDd''? 4 The zealousness of 
the established church was probably religious in part but another 
consideration is indicated by the Reverend Campbell's evidence that 
people were told they would not receive relief until their children were 
sent to the appropriate church school. The education system was 
administered by the churches and the strength and finances of the schools 
was improved by increased enrolment. 75 
The presence of estate owners on the Boards, in addition to their 
general social influence, accounts for the small number of East Indians 
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who received outdoor relief. v!itness after witress at the enquiry stated 
that the majority of applicants were Africans, that fe-,',' Indians received 
relief. The case of St. James Parish in Wakena2Jr. indicates the probable 
reason for this. The members of this parish vestry were 'Dostly 
planters' and one such claimed: 
"I have no coolies on my permanent list. The planters object to 
their being put on that list, because if they received five or six 
shillings a week, the free coolies and those \'lho were malingering 
on the estates would all make a rush for relief. Sometimes we are 
obliged to give them casual relief, as they sometimes fall down 
upon the road." (76) 
Planter representation on the Poor Law Boards allmved them to apply 
the poor laws partially to one section of the communi ty. There were, 
however, numbers of sick, old or destitute immigrants who had to be dealt 
with in some way. It seems that the Vagrancy LaVIS were invoked for the 
control of free immigrant labour. These were first enacted in 1856 and 
provided that anyone found wandering, loitering or begging, not able to 
give an account of himself or show means of sl1pfX)rt would be deemed 'an 
idle and disorderly f:€rson.' The f:€nalty on first conviction was a fine 
of ten dollars or two weeks in jail, with or without hard labour. 
Subsequent offences brought higher sentences on a sliding scale. The 
immigrant could, however, apply for assistance by presenting himself at 
the Depot in Georgetown.77 Here he would be examined by the doctor and 
either kept there in the Depot, which was in effect an auxiliary 
almshouse, or sent to the Almshouse.78 Immigrants from outlying areas 
would also be sent to Georgetown if they came to the attention of the 
Sub-Immigration Agent.79 If the labourer's physical condition allowed it 
he would be discharged after a time. If desitution appeared a permanent 
condition, he would be returned to India.80 
Local administration of poor law funds, vhich came from state 
revenue, often became the target of criticisms of extravagence. The 
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clergy dominating the vestries were thought by the representatives of the 
taxpayers and the officials to err on the side 0f generosity. A despatch 
from a governor to the Colonial office typifies this feeling: 
"I believe the greater part of this expenditure [on outdoor 
relief] to be unnecessary and the administration of it 
unquestionably tainted by jobbery and [illegible]. The control 
over this expenditure ought not to be in the hands of the clergy 
at all •••. i t exposes them to the temptation to encourage in the 
supposed interests of charity or religion, a lavish expenditure 
from the Public Treasury •••...• (81) 
This "lavishness" the Combined Court would attempt to curb when state 
revenues fell, by decreasing the Poor Law vote. ~vhen this occurred in 
1895, for example, the Secretary to the Governor urged the upkeep of 
strict limits on the welfare role of the state: He "pointed out ••• the 
wide differences between private charity and money provided by the State, 
and that it was essential in the case of the latter to restrict its 
expenditure within the narrowest limit consistent with hurnanity."S2 
The Poor Law functioned on the same lines as in England, with the 
same aim of taking 'no part in the upsetting of the natural law governing 
the survival of the fittest •..• ,83 Relief of the able bodied was 
exceptional and the wage structure of the sugar industry ~las protected by 
compelling East Indians to resort to the Almshouse or Depot if relief was 
sought, whilst the African population was afforded assistance under a 
harsh law administered variably. 
OONCLUSION 
Although the colonial ideology of t.~e period limited the role of the 
state, the conditions imposed by the immigration system forced the 
creation of a private, but state regulated scheme of health and housing 
for one section of the communi ty. The protection of the immigrants' 
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health through the regulation of medical and housing provision by the 
state was limited in its effectiveness: initially the inadequacy of 
inspection procedures in the system militated against the maintenance of 
standards especially as the medical personnel were on the estate's 
payroll and often saw their primary allegiance to their paymaster; later 
when the apparatus for state regulation was improved, standards on some 
estates remained poor due to the Inspector's basic syrn:r;:.athy with estate 
owners and the low priority accorded to health and housing by owners and 
managers particularly when the economic situation was poor. 
For the whole period the importance of welfare provision to the estates 
was primarily in the role it could play in the justification of the 
planatation system and indenture itself. The estates' contribution to 
immigrant welfare was held up as of benefit to the commLmity as a whole 
and the regulation of immigrant conditions could be held to mitigate any 
undesirable elements of indenture itself. 
Welfare provision was also useful in its contribution to control and 
surveillance with the free hJusing operating to keep labour close to its 
supervisors and the hospitals complementing the vagrancy laws and the 
jails in a total system of control. 
The well-being of the immigrant does not appear to have been a 
primary objective, although some individual owners and managers were of 
humanitarian intent. Before the 1870s when indentured labour was of 
some importance as a source of labour, the death toll a~ongst immigrants 
was high and apparently Ii ttle affected by the hospitals. After this 
date the preservation of immigrant life became even less important as an 
end in itself since the labour force had increased sufficiently to 
supply, even over-supply, the market. By t~e turn of the century, 
however, there were indications that the conditions on estates were at 
least considerably better, taken as a whole, than in the town and the 
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rest of the countryside. 
Provision for the rest of the community, the non-immigrant rural and 
urban poor, was limited on the one hand by the Colonial Office policy to 
regard the development of the colonies as not part of its role and on the 
other hand by a local legislature governed by planters who ruled in the 
interest of their class. The result was a residual, indeed vestigial, 
sta te system. 
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Ecot~ ~ SOCIETY, 1891-1930 
In this chapter the relative power of different sectors of society 
will be examined in order to analyse their comparative influence on 
social policy between 1891 and 1930. Policy in the period examined so 
far was determined through negotiations between the Governor and the 
representatives of the Imperial Government and the planters who had the 
majority in the legislative body. During the 1880's pressures for 
constitutional reform grew throughout the larger Caribbean territories.l 
In Guyana the movement was led by representatives of the emerging class 
of coloured and black professionals and the wealthy Portuguese 
shopkeepers.2 It resulted in constitutional changes which led to a shift 
in the balance of political power which, although initially more apparent 
than real, carne after 1916 to represent the influence of the nascent 
middle class. This influence, however, more often took the form of a 
lobby for increased state support for economic development than pressure 
for social amelioration and its impact was minimised by the 
constitutional position of the Electives, the prevailing administrative 
system and also by the class alignments of the newly important group. 
The limited developments in social policy which did occur were 
conditioned by the interests of the sugar industry which was often backed 
by the administration and, to a lesser extent, by the interests of the 
local business and professional classes. The masses, composed of the 
urban and rural proletariat and the peasantry, were comparatively 
disorganised and had virtually no access to the power structure. 
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Constitutional Deyelopment and the Balance Qf Political Power 
Constitutional changes in 1891 resulted in an enlarged Court of 
Policy of sixteen members instead of ten, with three extra official 
members and three more elected members. In addition the College of 
Electors was abolished and members were now elected by the whole 
electorate to represent five county and three town districts. The voting 
qualification was lowered from £125 to £.100 income per annum and the 
income qualification for membership of the Court of Policy was removed, 
although high property qualifications were added. These changes had at 
least the appearance of widening the franchise and making government more 
representative, but the creation of an Executive Council appointed by the 
British monarch, as an advisory body to the Governor widened the 
opportunity for sectional interests to influence policy through securing 
representation on the Council.3 
The effect of these changes \'las at first minimal. The size of the 
electorate grew but slightly.4 The composition of the elected element of 
the new Court of Policy, which together with the Financial 
Representatives formed the Combined Court, show that the planters' power 
remained intact for, of the eight members, five were white planters or 
planters' attorneys. By the election of 1897 however, the merchant group 
(three members) and the lawyers (five members) had begun to challenge 
planter supremacy in the legislature. The Governor reported to 
Chamberlain,then Secretary of State for the Colonies, that: 
tiThe formation of the legislature has considerably changed. In 
the Court of Policy the following gentlemen connected wi th the 
planting interest no longer represent constituencies: Mr. Holvell 
Jones replaced by f.lr. A.B. Brown, a native coloured barrister, and 
Mr. E.C. Luard by Mr. Ouckarna a native coloured gentleman, Manager 
of a clothing business in Georgetown, Mr. W. M. Payne, a 
Barrister, a native of Barbados, replaces Mr. N. McKinnon, Mr. 
W.S. Cameron, an Englishman, a Solicitor by profession and a 
partner of Mr. P. Dargan, has been returned in the room of Mr. G. 
Garnett." (5) 
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The planter interest was still well represented, however. Mr. 
l10rrison, a planter and manager of a sugar estate and l-1r. A.P. Mackey an 
English employee of Booker Bros. were newly elected and former members 
with interests in sugar still sat.6 
The professional and merchant group in the Combined Court continued 
to increase in succeeding years, although there is evidence that this 
development was not so much a result of the 1891 constitutional reforms 
but a reduction in the number of planters and attorneys offering 
themselves for election. Between 1885 and 1905 the economic problems of 
the sugar industry had put a number of local planters out of business. 
This accelerated a long-term trend towards absentee ownership, often by 
large United Kingdom based companies. Although the government was keen 
to have continued direct representation of the sugar industry in local 
politics, the companies preferred to exercise their influence 
unofficially and in other forms and discouraged such participation by 
their employees.7 
There was undoubtedly also an element of racial snobbery involved in 
the white planters partial withdrawal from the political arena. 
Clementi, Secretary to the Governor, wrote of the "timidi ty" of white 
creoles who had to "submit" themselves to a "black electorate II arguing 
that this state of affairs necessitated the introduction of a Crown 
Colony constitution. He further stated his belief that "the white 
population resent[ed] the position of inferiority in which the 
constitution places them and that most of the white politicians heartily 
dislike[d] the necessity of having to seek election at the hands of black 
voters. "a 
The planter representation in the elected sector of the Combined 
Court though reduced was not, however, absent there being individuals of 
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this group in the legislature continuously throughout the per iod. 9 In 
addi tion, there was a close relationship between commercial and sugar 
interests through common membership of the Chamber of Commerce, through 
social convergence and through individuals having involvement in both 
commerce and the sugar industry. To quote Lutchman: 
"One trend which emerges is that the very close alliance which 
existed between the sugar and commercial interests during the 
nineteenth century was still very much a feature of the society in 
the early twentieth century." (10) 
Another reason for the comparatively low direct representation of 
the planter interest in the legislature is to be found in the 
Consti tutional impotence of the elected element in the Combined Court. 
The creation of the Executive Council, which carne to be manned 
exclusively by Official members appointed by the Governor, effectively 
removed the ability of Electives to initiate and carry through policy. 
The superior numbers of the Electives gave them control over finances to 
the extent that their approval was required for budgetary allocations, 
but they were not allowed to introduce motions which required new or 
increased expenditure, this being a right reserved for the Governor and 
his Officials. As a consequence any project put forward by the Electives 
requi red the support of the Governor and the Off icials if it was to be 
put into effect. In theory the Combined Court's prerogative to withhold 
approval of the estimates of expenditure gave them some power over the 
policies to be followed. In practice the Electives seldom stood out 
against the Governor and Officials. The Daily Argosy commenting on the 
"arduous and protracted campaign" over the 1914 Estimates which resulted 
in the Electives achieving a small reduction in expenditure, put it thus: 
"Now as always the Government are able to carry what schemes it 
may please to submi t, since they can rely upon the support of a 
sufficient number of the unofficials to secure a majority. The 
occasions on which a decision is given adverse to the 
Administration are so rare that they leave no appreciable 
impression on the general trend of policy."(ll) 
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The system was one where, as the Commissioners appointed to make 
recommendations on the constitution in 1927 remarked: 
"The divorce of responsibility from power which is so marked a 
feature of the Constitution, places the Elected Members as well as 
the Governor in a false position. The Elected Members tend to be 
placed in a posi tion of a permanent opposi tion, unrestrained by 
experience and prospects of office." (12) 
Yet the system worked with deadlock rarely reached because the 
opposi tion was more apparent than real: as the Paily Argosy commented, 
"the Electives have never constituted themselves a parliamentary 
oPposition,il.3. In contrast with the monolithic position adopted by the 
official members, who were drawn from the Heads of Departments, the 
Electives represented a variety of positions conditioned by their 
individual identification with personal or sectional interests rather 
than any political orientation. As a consequence, whilst bitter debates 
in the Combined Court were by no means uncommon and some electives saw 
their role as an adversary one, on any particular motion the government 
could secure enough support from the Electives to have its policies put 
through. The Governor's ability to dispense patronage, in the form of 
honours for example, was instrumental in producing this complicity as was 
the co-opting of Electives to various committees, commissions and 
boards.14 
One effect of the imbalance of power between Electives and Officials 
in the Combined Court was that the Electives generally acted to reduce 
expenditure on the non-economic sector.l5 The reduction of expenditure 
was the only area in which they could exert and display any power. Also 
it was in line with their class interest to keep down public spending on 
the social sector whilst agitating for increased investment in 
development projects which would lead to increased production. Although 
many of the elected members were described as lawyers or of other 
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professional status, they often maintained a multiplicity of interests of 
a commercial kind. In the 1926 legislature, for example, sat A.V. 
Crane, a lawyer with land holdings, H.G. Humphreys a barrister with 
important connections with the diamond industry, P.A. Fernandes, 
barrister and estate owner, J. Gonsalves, solicitor and businessman, E.F. 
Fredericks, barrister and property owner and P.N. Browne, barrister with 
large commercial interests.16 
Elected members supported plans for interior and other development 
project~at least in part, because of the relationship such projects had 
to the forwarding of their own financial interests. The narrowness of 
the electorate meant that their constituency was composed of people with 
similar class interests to themselves and they \~ere under no compulsion 
to represent the working class, the peasantry or the unemployed. In 1909 
Gaskin proposed a rail way for the Courentyne area. Later F. Dias and 
J.S. McArthur put forward a project for a railway to the interior.17 
Santos, a major businessman, favoured drainage and irrigation projects for 
the Courantyne area to be funded by a loan taken by Government which he 
himself offered to put up.18 These and other projects did not 
necessarily relate to a member's interests in any direct way, although 
sometimes they did, but through the effect any development would have on 
the general performance of the economy. Development meant better 
business all round.l 9 
Schemes of this sort were generally turned down by the Officials on 
the grounds of their expense. There were other areas, however, where the 
Electives acted to reduce expenditure, often, as noted, in the social 
sector. The fate of the Labour Bureau is illustrative of this parsimony. 
In 1904 Governor Swettenham, himself inclined to the reduction of public 
spending, responded to the distress current in Georgetown caused by 
unemployment by requesting assistance from Britain in the setting up of 
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an office through which persons could be found jobs. Between April 1904 
and February 1906 there were 469 applicants to the Bureau and employment 
was secured for 189 persons.20 The Bureau's popularity and success grew 
as from April 1906 to January 1907, there were 930 applicants and 465 
jobs secured. Yet in February of that year Mr. Dias moved for the 
deletion of $720 allocated for the Bureau and the motion was carried.2l 
The official element was, however, often at one with the elected 
members in seeking reductions in expenditure. The particular balance 
seems to have varied with the approach of different Governors and 
different personalities in the elected section. Governor Swettenham, for 
example, was regarded by the press as having reversed the usual roles by 
seeking reductions in expenditure with such zeal that it provoked protest 
from the Electives. 22 His successor, Governor Hodgson was also, like 
swettenham, considered by the Colonial Office to be very concerned to 
keep the Colony's expenditure within strict limits.23 Within his period 
of office a small scheme for the feeding of destitute children in 
Georgetown was undertaken, administered by the Poor Law Commissioners. 
The project originated with the work of the Salvation Army officer. 
Demand had grown beyond the resources of the charity and a petition was 
sent to the Governor for assistance. This was granted on the basis that 
$300 saved from the vote for the poor that year could be used to finance 
l't.24 Fl' t fIt 'c tres The programme ree mea s were gIven a our, a er SIX en • 
ran less than a year before it was stopped. The grounds given were 
curious in that desperation continued over economic conditions which had 
hardly improved since the riots of 1905. Yet it was deemed by the 
Governor that "the experiment has demonstrated that poverty and 
destitution are not so rife in Georgetown as was supposed. ••• and that it 
is unnecessary for the Government to proceed further in the matter".25 
This was in spite of his opinion that the programme had had a good 
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effect. All this provoked a cynical comment from a Colonial Office 
official who implied that the motive involved in ending the programme was 
a desire to reduce expendi ture rather than the end of need; teachers' 
reports of better attendance and greater aptitudes for learning as a 
resul t of regular free meals were noted and the comment added "I don't 
see therefore that the experiment has proved a failure - so far as the 
children are concerned.,,26 Cuts made in 1900 produced opposition from at 
least two Electives, A.A.Thorne and P.N. Browne, against the closure of 
the Berbice Alms House and the reduction of doctors salaries from $750 
per annum to $400.27 In 1909 a Colonial Office Official, in commending 
the Governor's conservative approach to expenditure stated his view that 
''The Combined Court cannot be relied upon to practice economy". In 1913 
however, the regard for thrift, in some areas at least, appears to have 
been general again bringing a Colonial Office comment to the effect that 
"The subject of expense has become the obsession of this Combined 
Court.1l28 There is no sense in which either the Officials or the 
Electives consistently acted to promote expenditure which would increase 
the welfare of the people. Governors were constrained by a colonial 
policy which dictated that colonies should be kept strictly within their 
budgets. Electives were constrained by their desire to keep taxes down. 
Representation in the legislature continued, then, to be very 
limited covering, to the extent that politicians represented any sector, 
the interest of the black and coloured professional groups, the 
commercial and mercantile class and the ever present sugar interest. 
East Indians as a whole, the rural and urban proletariat and the 
peasantry were unrepresented. 29 
Theoretically the Governor and his officials represented those 
groups which did not have direct representation. This ideal was seldom 
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realised. The Officials were mainly members of the Colonial 
administrative service and so, not unnaturally, took their direction from 
the Governor. The Governor himself received instructions from the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies as head of the British Colonial 
Office, and in turn submitted reports, as did all other colonial 
Governors. Governors had considerable freedom to determine policy, 
however, and the Colonial Office's policy was generally to support 'the 
man on the spot', but this was exercised within the constraints imposed 
by the Office' overall plan for colonial development. This, until the 
1940's, was premised entirely upon the view that the colonies were to be 
ruled to the benefit of Britain. 
A general precept which directed Secretaries of State for the 
Colonies until the 1940's was that colonies should have only the services 
which they could afford from their own revenues. Grants-in-aid were 
given from time to time when a colony was in danger of financial 
collapse, as in the West Indies in 1895 when aid was given to the sugar 
industry, or when disaster of a natural kind struck. When a colony was 
in receipt of a Grant-in-aid it was required to cede financial control, a 
situation Governors generally wished to avoid.30 
Expenditure on the social sector was regarded as a IIregrettable 
necessity,j and "by and large there was little impetus in this 
direction'~ 31 Social policy originated largely from pressures exerted by 
constituencies in Britain, as did, for example, the rules and regulations 
controlling the conduct of indentured immigration, or from the 
application of measures originating in Britain to the colonial 
territories, such as public health legislation. This is not to say, 
however, that local pressures were unimportant in the practice that 
evolved from policy originating elsewhere. In the case of land 
settlement, for example, Chamberlain, when Secretary of State for the 
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Colonies, determined that encouragement should be given to the further 
development of the peasantry, but the precise form in which this policy 
evol ved, the particular use of land settlement that came about at the 
turn of the century, was locally determined. 
The unrepresented groups, the rural and urban proletariats, 
attempted to exercise their influence by making direct appeals to the 
Governor, or to the Secretary of State for the Colonies through the 
Governor, in the form of petitions and memor ials. These tended to be 
routinely disparaged, countered and effectively ignored especially where 
they contained criticisms of government policy. 
The other form of protest used by the working class was the strike. 
Strikes continued to be frequent in the twentieth century and became 
increasingly Political.32 The usual response to strikes and other 
disturbances was a display of state force. Attempts at conciliation were 
seldom made. The police were routinely used to break up strikes on sugar 
estates. When more general disturbances threatened a form of 'gun boat 
diplomacy' was used, as when in 1895 there were rumours of discontent 
amongst the unemployed in the city and on the estates - always seen as a 
dangerous combination.33 The Governor summoned H.H.S. Buzzard from the 
West India Naval Station to patrol the Demerara, which produced the II good 
effect always noticeable in the presence of a ship of war in this 
port.\l34 Similarly, in 1905 the widespread distress resulting from a 
slump in sugar prices led to riots in Georgetown and disturbances on the 
plantations of the East Bank, Demerara. The troubles occasioned no 
analysis of social conditions or consideration of the needs of the poor. 
Even the Mortality Commission, which was sitting at the time of the 
riots, attributed high mortality and disease to poverty caused mainly by 
laziness and indulgence. Calls from Elective members of the Legislature 
for a Commission of Enquiry into the riots were dismissed by the Governor 
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as a ploy by the anti-immigration lobby to attract the attention of the 
new Liberal Government in Britain which was thought to be less 
sympathetic to immigration than previous goverments.35 The main 
significance of the riots to the authorities seems to have been in 
the threatening possibility it augured of a combination of the rural East 
Indians and urban Africans for a universal demand for higher wages: 
I~e strikes that had occurred in Georgetown had had their effect 
upon the negro labourers on the sugar estates adjacent to the 
town ••••• if the strikes and disorders had spread to Sugar Estates 
in other parts of the Colony it would have been impossible for the 
Government to have garrisoned all the Estates, and a general 
rising on the plan that wages must be increased was one which 
under the circumstances could only be contemplated with 
horror. II (36) 
The conditions were not, however, favourable to concerted working 
class/peasant action. East Indians on estates were separated from the 
African proletariat by residence and conditions of work as well as 
culture and, in the case of immigrant labour, language.37 East Indian 
Creoles remained predominantly rural and a large proportion were resident 
on estates. The 1911 Census showed that 94% of East Indians lived 
outside urban areas, that is on the estates and in villages, and by 1908, 
that is after the movement of many ex-indentured immigrants to the 
villages, there was still a total of 79,149 persons resident on the 
estates as against 63,701 residing elsewhere.38 (See Table 3(i». Before 
the end of indenture the differences in conditions of work between the 
indentured and unindentured was a possible source of division amongst 
East Indians themselves. Whilst not indicative of fr iction, the fact 
that strikes were often led by indentured labourers does imply that they 
saw themselves as a group with different interests.39 But the more 
important perception of difference was between East Indians and Africans. 
Despite the entry of growing numbers of East Indians into Creole society 
through membership of the professions and the ownership of large urban-
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TABLE 3 (i) 
RESIDENCE OF EAST INDIANS, SELECTED YEARS 1897-1927 
Year On Estates Off Estates 
No. % No. % 
1897 69,473 59.5 47,297 40.5 
1908 69,149 52.0 63,701 48.0 
1917 62,400 45.2 75,740 54.8 
1927 56,875 44.8 70,142 55.2 
Source: Reports of the Immigrant Agent General. 
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Total 
No. 
116,770 
132,850 
138,140 
127,017. 
based businesses, East Indians on the whole felt themselves to be Indians 
rather than Guyanese. 40 Organisation amongst urban Africans was made 
difficult by their fragmentation into a number of occupations, with no 
large concentration in anyone occupation.41 
Before the 1930s, organisations were mainly social/cultural, urban 
based and often catered for a particular racial/ethnic group. Their 
membership was also largely middle class and where political causes were 
espoused these were usually limited to the promotion of politicians or 
sectional interests.42 
The Bri tish Guiana East Indian Association (B.G.E.I.A.), the main 
East Indian association, like many other associations of the period was 
probably limited in broad appeal given its narro\v membership and 
promotion of sectional interests. The Governor described it as: 
"entirely self-appointed and seems to be a kind of East Indian 
Chamber of Commerce. I am not aware if any Hindus belong to it. 
Possibly there may be one or two, but as far as I have come across 
any members ••••• They have been mostly Christians"(43) 
The Daily Argosy descr ibed it as: 
"a combination controlled by a few Georgetown lawyers and small 
merchants. II (44) 
There were also several African associations. The most important of 
these, the Negro Progress Convention, began in 1921.45 Its apparent 
intention was to improve the status of Africans in society, particularly 
in relation to their position vis a vis East Indians. The Daily 
Chronicle reported that it was formed to combat belief that Afro-Guyanese 
belonged to an inferior race. 46 There is some evidence that urban 
Africans were, by the 1920's, beginning to challenge the racial bias of 
colonial rule. The middle class stressed their elgibility for full 
membership of the governing class whilst at the same time affirming their 
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loyalty to colonial authority by claiming eligibility on the grounds of 
their education in British culture which, they argued, made them equal in 
wisdom and status to their English counterparts. On the whole they did 
not wish to change the structure but to have access to its higher 
positions. 
Although evidence is scanty, it seems probable that in the working 
class the response included racial and class hostility which could have 
formed some basis for a challenge to the colonial order. In the 
disturbances which took place in Georgetown in 1924 on April 1st, rich, 
white-owned homes were attacked and a number of incidents indicating 
racial hostility occurred.47 Garvey's militant United Negro Improvement 
Association had a base in Guyana and although small was deemed 
sufficiently influential by the Governor to warrant investigation as it 
was felt that the Association was stimulating race-consciousness and 
anti -whi te feelings.48 
The Negro Progress Convention's approach to the improvement of the 
conditions of Africans, however, indicated no hostility to whites or the 
colonial order. Insofar as any racial animosity might have been 
generated, East Indians rather than Europeans would have been the more 
likely recipients as it was with their group that comparisons were made. 
At a "monster meetingU at Danielstown in 1926 Mr. Egerton advised his 
listeners to "CUltivate thrift; to make it a rule of their life never to 
spend all they earned as only by saving can they become independent.n49 
The meeting was told further: 
"the negroes have been outclassed, while the East Indians on the 
other hand who came here as indentured immigrants and worked for 
small wages had raised themselves by thrift and industry and are 
today amongst the employers of labour. II (50) 
As can be seen the general thrust of the Association was directed towards 
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moral upliftment rather than social challenge. 
There were some other, apparently short lived associations like the 
New Negro Developnent Association but none had any real impact.51 Two 
land settlement organisations, described by the Governor as having been 
set up for the benefit of the organisers, do not appear to have 
flourished. The Chinese and Portuguese also had their associations but 
these were purely social and cultural in interest. 
Political organisation was rudimentary until the 1940's. Elected 
members of the legislature did not represent political parties with 
ideologies and programmes but both saw themselves and were expected by 
the administration to represent specific interests. As Lutchman says: 
"Because candidates emphasized their independent prestige and 
service to their particular constituencies, there was little 
interest in founding, or being part of, any political 
grouping."(52) 
On the two occasions in the 1920s that political organisations were 
formed, their aims were limited to enhancing the power of the elected 
element in the legislature. The British Guiana People's Political 
Association (B.G.P.P.A.) was formed before the 1921 general election, 
apparently to organise for the election of particular persons to the 
legislature. Thereafter it became a small pressure group consisting of a 
few middle class voters who called upon the Electives for more action 
towards the accomplishment of drainage and irrigation schemes.53 It was 
never a popular association, nor did it ever have a general policy or 
programme. 
The popular Party also arose in connection with a general election 
campaign, that of 1926. It was dubbed by the Daily Argosy 'the first and 
only organised party the colony has ever known' but in effect was 
concerned with the organisation of support for a faction of the Electives 
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who favoured a more aggressive approach towards development of the 
colony54 It was, however, thoroughly capi talist in outlook and 
represented no challenge to the prevailing economic system. It had no 
real points of contact wi th working people and could, as Lutchman puts 
it, have been labelled as the "light skinned men's rarty.,,55 
The trades unions were more important as vehicles of working class 
pressure for social reform. In 1906 Dr. Rohlehr, a disappointed 
candidate for the Government Medical Service, engineered the short lived 
Labour Union Scheme. This was the only early association which was 
organised for general labour; all the other small groups were concerned 
with skilled labour and were more like artisan associations than trade 
unions. 56 
The British Guiana Labour Union, legally incorporated in 1920 was 
more successful. Its membership was claimed by E.F. Fredericks, a black 
lawyer and sometime member of the legislature, to be 'the black masses', 
but its real imract was less widespread than this infers.57 The Argosy 
described the Union as consisting mainly of its President and 
Secretary.58 It did, however, play a role in organising labour 
especially on the wharfs, to strike for higher pay.59 It was important 
also insofar as it provided a base for a united front composed of both 
East Indian and African workers in a way that no other asociation, 
poli tical or social/cultural had. The success of the union in gaining 
East Indian confidence is indicated by the practice which developed of 
estate workers coming to Georgetown to consult with Critchlow, President 
of the Union, in the same way as they were accustomed to seeking the help 
of the Immigrant Agent when disputes with management arose.60 In 1924 
the Union sought a base in the sugar belt by capitalising on the general 
discontent resulting from a slump in sugar prices and the usual drop in 
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wages. The Union is also of interest as it adopted specifically social 
causes, this becoming a pronounced feature of union involvement in the 
thirties. As Mark says: 
''The historical tradition of organised labour [in the Caribbean] 
is that of social protest movement in which demands for welfare 
legislation, social equality and political rights are joined with 
and often indistinguishable from purely economic concern with 
wages and conditions of work."(61) 
One of the Union's first projects was to campaign against the high 
rents prevailing in Georgetown in 1920.62 The campaign was instrumental 
in bringing about a rent restriction order. Its list of social demands 
included, by 1930, national health insurance, infant and maternity 
clinics, the abolition of tenement rooms, an old age pension scheme, 
better housing, pure water supply schemes and a mosquito eradication 
campaign.63 
The violence of the 1924 riots in Georgetown provoked a strong 
public reaction and al though it was considered that the 'Centipedes' -
the unemployed and disreputable sections of city society - had been the 
perpetrators of the violence, not the Union men, the Union seems to have 
lost popularity.64 It continued to campaign for social improvements as 
well as industrial ones but its influence was limited except in the 
campaign for relief measures in the depression of the early thirties. 
The peasantry, composed largely of East Indian rice growers and 
African subsistence farmers of provisions and cane, was unorganised and 
had no representation in the legislature.65 On occasion an Elected 
~1ember would put forward proposals which might benefit peasant producers, 
but none saw themselves as a spokesman for the peasants. It should be 
noted, however, that many peasants living in the sugar belt provided 
casual labour to the estates and so were in effect 'part-time 
proletarians' and as such may have been influenced by the British Guiana 
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Labour Union. The village councils provided a limited avenue for 
political action for peasants in villages under local authorities, but 
the elected element of these councils seldom pursued any social goals, 
often being engulfed in rivalries and social striving.66 
St.mJrI\ary 
Political power was exercised by the Governor. Although the elected 
element of the legislature could propose schemes it could not initiate 
them. Its constitutional position predisposed it to the minimisation of 
social expenditure as did its class allegiances. Governors were 
constrained to act within the confines of an imperial policy in which the 
role of the state was considered to consist mainly of maintaining law 
and order and did not encourage development of any kind using state 
revenues, local or imperial. The sugar interest remained the pre-eminent 
one in society through its presence in the legislature (although 
reduced) , but more importantly because it was championed by the 
administration and possessed a strong lobby both locally and in Britain. 
Working class agitation for improvements usually took the form of 
industrial action and petitions. Neither form of protest produced any 
significant concessions. Unity amongst the proletariat was militated 
against by a number of social and cultural factors and the peasantry 
remained unorganised. 
Economic Develqpments 
In this section, developments in the sugar, rice and mineral 
extraction industries will be discussed. Their importance for social 
policy relates to the general proposition that social policy evolved to 
serve the needs of the predominant sector of the economy. Between 1890 
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and 1930 the diamond and gold industries developed as an important avenue 
for Africans and the rice industry greYl as an adjunct to sugar, which in 
spite of a continuing decline in prices, remained the pre-eminent sector 
in the Guyanese economy. The analysis is aimed at demonstrating the 
impact these developments had on social structure and labour requirements 
which in turn affected the direction taken in social policy. 
The Sugar Industry ~ the Deyelqpment Qf the Rice Industry 
After a brief rallying of the economy in the late 1880s, the price 
of sugar again began to declfine so that by 1895 the average price 
obtained per ton was £9.12d., a drop from the 1880 figure of £22.6d. per 
ton (see Table 3(ii)). The slump produced acute distress throughout the 
labouring class of society. The estates cut back on the use of labour 
from outside the estates, preferring to give what work there was to the 
resident labour on the estates. The acreage under sugar "'JaS reduced from 
76,930 in 1880 to 66,908 acres in 1896.67 
The Immigrant Agent General Reports from the period 1895 to 1901 
state that it was "impossible under such conditions to find full 
employment for the unindentured immigrants, more especially for those 
residing in the villages •••• "68 
Through abandonment of CUltivation and amalgamation, the number of 
estates dropped from 113 to 1880 to 45 in 1905.69 Wages on estates 
dropped, which led to a series of disturbances and strikes protesting 
against low wages. In the firDt three months of 1895 alone, there were 
riots at Success, a strike at Zeelandia and strikes at several East Bank 
, 1 d' P . de 70 Demerara estates, Inc u Ing rOVI nee. 
The increase in unemployment and underemployment resulting f rom the 
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TABLE 3 (ii) 
SUGAR EXPORT PRICES PER TON 1880-1940 
£ . s. 
1880 22 6 
1881 21' 17 
1882 20 17 
1883 22 4 
1884 14 II 
1885 14 8 
1886 13 1 
1887 13 7 
1888 14 17 
1889 16 II 
1890 13 12 
1891 14 4 
1st Jan. to ) 
31st March ) 11 2 
1892 ) 
1892-93 13 8 
1893-94 14 11 
1894-95 12 3 
1895-96 10 7 
1896 9 12 
1913 12 12 
1914 14 14 
1915 21 6 
1916 20 13 
1917 21 6 
1918 22 0 
1919 29 16 
1920 50 1 
1921 18 9 
1922 16 10 
1923 25 13 
1924 20 11 
1925 14 8 
1926 14 18 
1927 16 14 
1928 14 16 
1929 12 6 
1930 9 17 
1931 9 6 
1932 9 16 
1933 9 8 
1934 8 19 
1935 8 5 
1936 8 2 
1937 8 15 
1938 8 11 
1939 9 11 
1940 10 8 
Source: Extracted from Nath, D., op.cit. Table II p.25 
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slump did not abate the planters' demands for indentured labour, even 
though the ability of some to afford it is dubious. The key to this 
apparent paradox is that the planters continued to see indentured labour 
as necessary to the maintenance of the wage structure. Cane cutters 
could and did try to maximise their earnings dur ing the short reaping 
period by holding out for higher wages.7l Indentured labour was 
necessary to keep wages down. Planters and officials agreed that: 
"The position is that the sugar industry cannot be carried on 
without either legally indentured gangs or with a wage population 
controlled by a strict land rnonopoly.I1(72) 
A Royal Commission on the Sugar Industry in the West Indies, 
reporting in 1888, had accepted that indenture remained important to the 
estates' labour supply and that sugar VIas vital to the economy of the 
West Indian colonies.73 The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Chamberlain, also saw the sugar industry as important, but his concern 
about the colonies' ability to finance rera.triation passages should the 
industry fail brought him to threaten to reduce immigration 
permanently.74 Also, the Royal Commissioners had recommended a cautious 
approach to further immigration, suggesting it should stop until the 
economy showed improvement. The planters, however, mounted a strong 
lobby to have indentured immigration continued. 
The whole question became controversial when an anti-immigration 
campaign led by Patrick Dargan, a local politician and lawyer, between 
1903 and 1906 orchestrated anti-immigration sentiments harboured by both 
the working class and elements of the bourgoisie. A media campaign and 
public meetings were organised by the Elected Members of the legislature 
who argued that the immigrants were a tax burden as a result of state 
financing of the Immigration Dep;trtment and the cost of the health system 
to the colony, whilst they were of little value to the economy as 
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consumers.75 A petition presented to the Governor signed by 5,750 
persons, whom he at least though were members of "the labouring classes", 
complained that: 
"despite the continued amalgamation and abandonment of sugar 
estates, the Government persists in annually introducing more 
indentured immigrants .•• and in opposi tion to the wishes of the 
native labourers who are taxed for the introduction of these 
immigrants to compete on unfair terms against them, and to 
continue to oust them fran the labour market."(76) 
It was believed, at least by the Governor, that anti-immigration 
sentiments underlay the 1905 Georgetown riots. He wrote to the Colonial 
Office: 
"With regard to what is underlying the recent promulgation of 
grievance, I have no hesitation in saying it is the immigration of 
East Indians." (77) 
The Sugar Producers' Association lobbied strenuously for continued 
immigration and were supported in this by the Governor. In 1898 the 
Governor backed a request from the planters for 3650 immigrants, claiming 
that railway works and rice cultivation were drawing labour away from the 
estates.78 There had in fact been some movement of labour into rice 
CUltivation but this had been encouraged both by the government and the 
planters. Both were concerned that unemployment and low wages would 
encourage time-expired immigrants to claim their right to assisted 
passage back to India which would represent a burden on revenues and a 
loss of labour of possibly huge dimensions, and so encouraged them to 
take up small holdings on their own behalf. 
The Combined Court requested the Governor to initiate enquiries into 
the best means of encouraging time-expired immigrants to commute their 
right to a return passage and settle permanently. Three steps resulted. 
Firstly, the price of Crown Lands was reduced drastically to encourage a 
growth in the numbers of peasant proprietors. This led to the expansion 
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of lands cUltivated and especially to that under rice, the crop 
tradi tionally grown by Indians and the most usual major agricultural 
product of the villages they had settled since the 1870s. Although 
Indians and Africans were both free to buy land, most of the acquisitions 
were made by Indians, possibly because developments in the gold industry 
had contributed to a decline in African interest in land and agriculture. 
By 1903, East Indians held 23,787 acres of land including 15,669 in the 
Demerara region. (See Table 3(iii)). Many Africans sold out family 
lands to Indians in this period.79 Secondly, land settlement schemes, 
which are discussed fully elsewhere, were started. Thirdly, the estates 
themselves increasingly let estate lands to labourers at a low rental to 
encourage them to remain on the estates. The lands were let for the 
purpose of rice and provision growing. 
Although the reaping season for sugar coincided with the harvesting 
of rice and some estate managers complained that labourers were leaving 
estate work for the rice fields, it was found by others that if there 
were no rice plots the unindentured would leave the estates to look for 
work elsewhere when estate work was short, and sometimes relocate 
permanently.80 By 1904, 8561 acres on estate lands were under paddy. 81 
Other estate land was let out to unindentured labour, with the same 
purpose in view, i.e. the retaining of labour, for the growing of cane to 
be purchased by the estate at a fixed pr ice. 82 A further rationale for 
the encouragement of rice growing by estate labourers at this juncture 
was that it made low wages more tolerable by contributing a staple to the 
family diet. The Immigrant Agent General reported: 
"Prices continued low during the year ••• But although earnings were 
correspondingly small, I do not think the people were more badly 
off than when better rates of wages prevailed. The crop of rice 
reaped in the latter part of 1897 was a large one, and on some 
Estates the Immigrants stored up in their rooms enough to last 
them a year. This rice, it shOUld be mentioned, was grown at no 
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TABLE 3(iii) 
CROWN LAND HELD BY AFRICANS AND EAST INDIANS 
AT DECEMBER, 1903 
"B lacks" East 
No. Acres No. 
Demerara 144 3,999 262 
Barbice & Cahje 232 11,471 53 
Courantyne 12 475 57 
Essequibo 262 8,878 43 
Pomeroon 182 8,826 25 
832 33,649 440 
Indians 
Acres 
15,669 
2,729 
3,403 
1,376 
610 
23,787 
Source: Enclosure to Acting Governor to Secretary of State 
23rd April 1906. 
Further corresponde~ce Relating to Disturbances in 
Note: 
British Guiana. Cmd. 3026, 1906 
The amount of land held by Indians in Demerara and 
Courantyne is significant as this is prime agricultural, 
well drained and irrigated. 
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fUrther cost t~ themselves than their labour on Sundays, holidays 
and day~ on WhlCh they obtained leave from the Estates. Paddy can 
~ ob~alned at 4/6d. to 5/- a bag, and a bag will last a man and 
h:s,wlfe nearly ~ month so that it will be understood the cost of 
llvlng was materlally lessened this year."(83) 
Planter opinion about the development of a rice industry was mixed 
but the view that it was compatible with sugar prevailed. Government's 
view of rice as a beneficial development was in line with Chamberlain's 
directive that settlement of land in small holdings in the West Indies 
should be encouraged.84 However, the administration had no intention of 
abandoning their support of the planters to develop a peasantry 
independent of the estates. Planters and officials alike saw rice as a 
means of retaining labour for the estates and of supplementing sugar 
wages. The Immigration Agent General summed up the position thus: 
"I am glad to be able to report that the rice industry is being 
extensively developed. Large tracts of land in different parts of 
the colony are now planted with rice, and there can be little 
doubt that the industry is a source of great benefit to a large 
proportion of the unindentured East Indian population, providing 
them as it does, with the means of earning their livelihood when 
.the labour market is slack. II (85) (Emphasis added) 
As a result of the new Crown Lands policy and the leasing of estate 
lands for rice growing, the acreage under paddy grew quite rapidly from 
6,778 acres in 1898-1902 to 58,046 in 1918-1922.86 The development of 
the rice industry also contributed substantially to the growth of East 
Indian villages; in 1897 there were 47,297 East Indians living off the 
estates, whilst by 1908 there were 63,701.87 The growth in rice holdings 
did not, however, mean that the village dwellers were independent of the 
estates, for in many areas, especially in Demerara, they were too small 
to provide a livelihood and consequently it was usual to continue to seek 
employment on the estates to supplement incomes.88 Drainage and 
irrigation problems impeded production in some areas and there is some 
evidence that plans to improve it were hindered by the planters who did 
not want the rice industry to expand to such an extent as to make 
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labourers independent of estate work.89 
The state of the sugar industry remained parlous until the outbreak 
of war in 1914 halted supplies of beet sugar and placed a premium on West 
Indian cane sugar. The industry had received help from the British 
Treasury in the form of grants-in-aid, local tax concessions and improved 
conditions of sale after 1907, but prices had remained low. Drought in 
1912/3 produced poor crops, less work, lower wages and general distress 
in the labouring classes. There were riots at Lusignan in September of 
1912 and Rosehall in March of 1913. In the latter disturbance thirteen 
were left dead, including five shot by the police. 90 At Lusignan a 
worker was shot dead by the estate's manager. 9l In the disturbances 
which followed the post-war slump the official reaction was conditioned 
by the policy regarding the role of the colonial state; law and order had 
to be maintained and other functions of the state were residual. Strikes 
on the estates and elsewhere were dealt with not as industrial disputes 
but as civil disorders. Typically the labourers would leave the estates 
to march to Georgetown to present their case to the Immigration Agent. 
They would be stopped on the road by the militia and the police and 
shooting might follow.92 Until the late 1920s the colonial regime did 
not attempt to deal with social unrest by making concessions or through 
ameliorative policies, but relied instead on the use of force. 
!he ~ ~ Indenture 
Supplies of indentured labour from India were suspended in 1916 as a 
result of criticism of the system from several sources, including 
Ghandi's South African campaign. The rising tide of anti-emigration 
feeling in India was instrumental in the introduction of the 1917 Indian 
Immigration Bill. This ended indentured emigration, which became "one of 
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the casualties of the Great War".93 vlith the termination of all existing 
indentures in Guyana in December of 1919, the planters, \!i th the support 
of the Government, began to negotiate for the re-opening of Indian 
immigration to Guyana on the basis of free labour. Preparations had 
already been made to finance unindentured free immigration with the 
raising of a duty on sugar by Ord.23 of 1917 to form a Colonisation Fund. 
Planter interest in additional labour was sharpened by the coincidence 
between improved sugar prices and reduced labour supplies. The sugar 
industry had survived the crisis of previous years, albeit with many 
individual casualties, by keeping wages low. Their ability to do so had 
rested on the low availability of cultivable land and the effect of 
indentured labour on wages. The rice industry had, however, reduced 
labour supplies and now the benefits of indentured labour \-lere to be lost 
at a time when the demand for labour was higher than for many years 
previously. The Immigration Agent General reported: 
"Comparisons with previous years' statistics sho\v earnings rising 
from 1913-1917 while the percentage of labourers materially 
diminishes; yet during these years the demand for labour, has been 
constantly much more than supply." (94) 
In August 1918 the British Guiana Sugar Producers' Association 
(B.G.S.P.A.), the local employers' association, \-!rote requesting the ~'7est 
India Committee to take up with the British Government the possibility of 
introducing Chinese labourers presently in Europe on the vTestern Front as 
immigrant labour, saying: 
"The urgent need of labour is becoming more apparent every day and 
if the introduction of these ~ople is possible efforts should be 
made to secure them." (95) 
The Colonial Office did not support this application for labour, 
preferring to wait until the possibili ty of procuring labour from the 
preferred source - India - had been eY.hausted. Further it was considered 
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impolitic to introduce a third race into Guyana, although there was 
already a small Chinese population from an early wave of indentured 
immigration, and also unwise to interfere wi th the agreement that had 
been made with the Chinese that they would be returned to Chinese ports 
after their period of service. 96 
, Another B.G.S.P.A. request passed on to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies through the Governor concerned the possibility of securing 
Javanese labour. 97 This was also rej ected by the Colonial Off ice. In 
rejecting proposals for the introduction of Chinese and Javanese labour, 
the Colonial Office demonstrated sensitivity to the problems which could 
have arisen if a racially different group was added in numbers to the 
population, a sensitivity which the planters did not show. 
The Colonial Office had its own suggestion for improving the labour 
supply. This was to send as immigrants to Guyana unemployed coloured 
labour presently resident in Britain. The planters were not, however, 
interested simply in labour but in cheap labour and black labourers from 
Britain would not be suitable as they would probably have high 
aspirations and expectations. Nor did the local government regard the 
plan any more favourably. To introduce such an element could, it was 
felt, be politically dangerous as the comparative sophistication of urban 
life in Britain was estimated to be likely to lead such immigrants to 
express dissatisfaction, possibly by combining with the newly formed 
Labour Union. 98 
The first offical colonisation proposals, known as the Nunan-Luckoo 
scheme, aimed at securing labour supplies for the sugar industry rather 
than population for other developments. Although the proposal included 
a clause giving immigrants the right to apply for land on arrival, this 
land was unprep:lred and "it was not anticipated that penniless men with 
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families would wish to take up or would be in a position to take up 
unprepa.red Crown Land at the moment of their arrival.,,99 The 
government's intentions in putting forward the Nunan-Luckoo scheme are 
argued quite clearly by the Governor's remarks following the 
circumstances arising out of a second deputation to the Colonial Office. 
On this occasion the proposals put forward included an offer of prepared 
land for immigrants. The Governor reported he vias unable to disguise 
from himself that after this nevi offer, the plcUitE;rs IIdistinctly cooled 
off" and was provoked to the reassurance that: 
"If it is worth\rlhile embarking on this scheme at all, I do not 
think a temporary setback in the price of sugar should influence 
your minds ••• lt is quite true this is a scheITe for free imported 
labour ••• but we all understand at the outset that the bulk of 
these new immigrants would be absorbed by the Sugar Estates and if 
the Sugar Estates do not \vant the labour then it is a pure waste 
of time for Government to put up an eXl-"'€nsi ve scheme for the most 
important industry in this Colony."(IOO) 
East Indian opinion appears to have been split. The British Guiana 
East India Association, representing merchant interests, itself sent a 
deputation to London to encourage the resumption of immigration. A 
splinter group, calling itself the East Indian League charged, however, 
that the B.G.E.I.A. was not representative of East Indians' views and 
that additional immigrants, in augmenting the estates' labour supply, 
would have a detrimental effect on the existing East Indian 
population. IOl 
The world recession effectively put a stop to all schemes for large 
scale immigration whether for colonisation of new lands or to augment 
estate labour supplies, except for proposals in 1934 and 1948 to settle 
refugees in the interior at no cost to the state.l02 The Government 
agency which had been operating in Barbados to introduce SI:1all numbers of 
labourers fram the island was closed down from 1929.103 
The immediate effect of the end of indenture \/as that labourers were 
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in a better bargaining posi tion. The wage increase that resul ted was, 
however, soon wiped out by war-related price increases. Their advantage 
was further neutralised by the reduction in demand for labour produced by 
a severe drought in 1924/5. 
As far as social provisions on the estates are concerned, the 
important thing is that there were no immediate effects. It seems that 
the planters took a long view of the labour position for they continued 
to maintain the hospitals and provide housing although their legal 
obligation to do so ended with the end of indenture. In the event of 
labour supply being reduced, for example by mass abandonment of estate 
work for the rice fields or in other developments, each planter 
considered that his estate would be at a competitive disadvantage if it 
could not offer the facilities to which people were accustomed, even if 
at a low standard. If an ill-equipped hospital seems a curious incentive 
to labour it should be noted that for much of the rural non-estate 
population medical facilities were non-existent and the endemic malaria 
made free treatment at any standard attractive. 
Minerals ~ Interior Development 
Although sugar was to remain the dominant sector of the economy, the 
growth of the gold and diamond industries from 1884 and more particularly 
from 1891 began, from the opening years of the century to encourage the 
official consideration of other developments in Guyana. The Auditor 
noted in 1907 that "outside capital is being attracted to the vast 
natural resources of the country; and there is a prospect of a prosperous 
time for British Guiana.,,104 Since colonial policy in this period was 
that neither imperial nor local state revenues should be used on any 
large scale for development investment expansion relied, in the absence 
of sufficient local capital, upon the attraction of foreign capital. 
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This was certainly required for the opening up of the hinterland areas in 
regard to which exr;ectations of great mineral wealth \olere harr.oured by 
many. The attracting of this capital became linked in the minds of the 
local middle class, many of whom had made money from gold and diamond 
ventures, \&lith th,e building of a railway to the interior and the building 
up of the population. Members of the legislature, notably r,lessrs. Garnet 
and Dias who both had substantial business interests, r~gan to campaign 
for a hinterland railroad and a committee to investigate the feasibility 
of the proposal was set up in 1912.105 
The arrival of Sir Walter Egerton as Governor gave the local 
interior developIT.ent lobby hopes of increased official support as he had 
formerly held position in Nigeria and had been associated with railway 
building there.106 The project gathered momentum and by 1914 was 
receiving official support. The Governor dubbed it as of 'paramount 
iml)Ortance' whilst adding the proviso that hinterland development should 
not be allowed to drain labour from the coast.l07 A Government mineral 
exploration expedition was set up during Egerton's governorship. His 
early transfer from Guyana was through by some locally and in Britain to 
have resulted from pressure exerted by the sugar lobby. 
Railway plans faltered when the Secretary of State turned dO\lln the 
railway scheme as a project for development with British Treasury funds 
on the grounds that the interior of Guyana was neither a new territory 
"in which civilised administration must of necessity be established from 
without at the expense of the power which has assumed responsibility," 
nor did it contain a large fopulation of "uncivilised tribes ll, the other 
condition prompting imperial railway building.lOa 
Treasury loans could not be made lmder the Colonial Loans Act given 
the existing consitution as any large loan was made only when the 
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Treasury had control over a colony's finances. The suggestion was that a 
change in the constitution to give the officials greater financial 
control would remedy the situation. This proposal was supported by the 
Governor, but the Electives were split on the issue and it was finally 
dropped. I09 
The railway question re-emerged in the post-war period, pursued by 
the pro-development faction of the Elective element, especially those 
identified with the Popular Party but also linked closely with the 
interests of Bri tish and American capi talists in minerals, especially 
diamonds. A railway to the hinterland was promoted as essential to the 
fulfilment of Guyana's development potential. For example, F. Webber, a 
member of the legislature, in addressing the Labour Group of the Empire 
Parliamentary Ass~ciation in London, r~rtrayed the future which awaited 
the colony if a railway connecting its zones and continuing to the Amazon 
were to convert it into one of the "world's great highways", saying: 
"A great continental highway of this kind is not only a dream but 
a practical possibility which once achieved would convert British 
Guiana from being a neglected heritage of the Crown into a proud 
continental Dominion, carrying millions of people and importing as 
much goods from the United Kingdom as New Zealand, or any of the 
Australian states, increasing employment at horne and opportunity 
abroad."(llO) 
The Colonial Office received many applications for leases on large 
areas of land from potential investors, who usually promised a railway as 
part of their development plans.lll Amongst the applicants was De 
Beers, the South African diamond company. The Colonial Office was wary 
of De Beers and other applicants who were suspected of being 'fronts' for 
them, fearing that they would not actually mine the diamond fields but 
lock them up to prevent any big find upsetting world prices.112 By 1927 
it became clear that there was no big diamond pipe and De Beers lost 
interest, but in the interim the development of the hinterland had been 
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effectively blocked, as the British Government refused to allow the 
building of the railway except by the state at the same time as refusing 
to make any imperial investment. 
The pro-interior development lobby was by no means anti-sugar. As 
has been indicated, the official concern was that if interior development 
was to occur it should not be allowed to interfere with the supply of 
labour to the sugar estates. The Electives, many of whom had some 
connection with the sugar industry were, in the main, at one with the 
official view that sugar was essential. In their address to Major Wood 
on his visit to Guyana in 1921/22 as Under Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, for example, they asked for imperial support of the ailing 
industry as they did again when addressing Governor Denham on his 
assumption of office in 1930: 
"The sugar industry of the Colony, which is its main financial and 
industrial support, faces the alternative of complete extinction 
unless assistance in some shape or form is extended to it by the 
Governrnent." (113) 
None of the initiatives towards interior development produced any 
substantial results, and no real development or diversification of the 
economy occurred bet\veen 1895 and 1930, except in the rice sector. The 
antipathy of the planters, a colonial policy which restricted imperial 
treasury investment but discouraged and sometimes disallowed foreign 
(non-Empire) investment, the paucity of local state revenues and private 
capital together locked Guyana into a path of non-development with the 
sugar industry retaining its paramouncy. The Elected Members saw it 
thus: 
"The Colony has been sacrificed upon the alter of Imperial 
necessities and even made the plaything of the whims and caprices 
of various officials at the Colonial Office and the Crown Agents 
for the Colonies."(l14) 
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The proposals for interior development to be achieved by local 
labour had no direct effect on social policy aimed at preserving existing 
population. The interest in sanitary and other measures which, as will 
be shown, it generated were more designed towards increasing the 
population and improving its health in order that Guyana's image abroad 
be changed from that of a country of disease and death to one of a 
heal thy place to which labour could be attracted and which, therefore, 
constituted a good investment prospect. The question of preserving 
existing population arose only when the cessation of Indian immigration 
threatened a long term labour shortage for established industry. 
SUMMARY N:m OONCLUSIONS 
The decrease in the number of indentured immigrants and the eventual 
end of indenture together wi th a decline in world sugar prices, varied 
only in the war-boom years, placed further strains on the economy of the 
sugar industry. These difficulties were overcome and, with the support 
of the administration and the Electives, the industry survived. 
A local development lobby, composed largely of those with business 
interests seeking further investment opportunities, arose in the first 
decade of the century and became more vociferous over the next two 
decades. The optimism it generated \lIas at times fostered by the local 
administration but was finally thwarted by a colonial policy which 
dictated that local colonial development be sacrificed to wider imperial 
interests. 
In the final analysis, the developments of the period, both 
constitutional and economic, were in a sense abortive and produced no 
real change in the balance of power or the general characteristics of the 
economy. Yet, whilst sugar remained the single most important export and 
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largest employer, the growing rice industry was seen as having important 
potential effects on the availability and independence of labour. Also 
the new climate regarding the country's development potential together 
with the curtailment of immigration produced incentives for a change in 
attitudes towards the preservation of population which, as will be seen 
in the following chapter, had important effects on social policy. 
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lliliD SE'ITLEMENr AND HEATLH POLICY 1890 -= 193Q 
This chapter focuses on developments in tHO areas of social policy, 
land settlement and health, bet\<7een 1890 and 1930. These sectors of 
policy have been selected for discussion as they were the aspects in 
which the most crucial developments occurred during this period, 
developments which arose out of the changes in the socia-economic context 
examined in the previous chapter. 
Land settlement policy between 1890 and 1940 had two phases; in its 
early form it developed in relation to the sugar industry's need to 
retain labour and cut costsi in its later form it formed part of 
population policy based on colonisation plans. In neither case was the 
establishment of an independent peasantry from the existing population a 
primary aim. 
In the first phase of land settlement projects local people were 
placed on prepared land which was part of estate land which had gone out 
, 
of cuI ti vation and had been bought by government.-'- This had been done on 
an earlier occasion, in 1881 at Plantation H'uist Dieren \-lhen concern had 
arisen over the numbers of East Indians claiming repa.triation as soon as 
it was due to them.2 As has been shown, this concern gre\l and led to the 
investigation of ways to deal with the problem. The drop in sugar prices 
had forced a number of smaller proprietors out of business between 1880 
and 1904 so that by the latter date the share .of estate ownership 
belonging to large companies had risen from 47.25% in 1880 to 70%.3 The 
properties that were not bought up remained as problems in the drainage 
ill 
system and since this necessi tated action of some sort it ',las seen as 
convenient to acquire them for the settlement of time-expired immigrants 
who could be induced to accept land and renounce thei r claim to return 
passage to India. 
In 1897 Plantation Helena on the vlest Coast of the Berbice River was 
partitioned by the government and offered to immigrants with a view to 
achieving lithe settlement of the East Indian on the land, and the saving 
of expenditure on their return passages.il4 Three hundred immigrants 
received allotments of prepared land.5 Further schemes were set up when 
government acquired Plantation Whim (on the Courentyne, Berbice) and Bush 
Lot, (West Coast Berbice) in 1898 and Mar ia' s Pleasure, (Essequibo) in 
1902. 
Planter response to the development of settlements was mixed as some 
considered that labour would be drawn away from the estates. The West 
India Committee voiced concern about the use of the fund set up to 
finance immigration for the purpose of land settlement.6 On the whole, 
however, land settlements did not prosper. The settlers were often ill-
prepared and their agricultural problems were compounded by drought. A 
supervisory post attached to the Immigration Department was created and a 
slight improvement noted but the settlers problems were increased when, 
in 1900, Whim and Helena were declared Village Settlements 2nd therefore 
liable to the levying of taxes. At this point the settlers were not 
self-sufficient and still worked on nearby sugar estates.7 
Doubts about the financial gains being achieved by inducing 
immigrants to forgo return passage and accept land began to be voiced: 
the Governor pointed out to the Secretary of State that when free 
passages were available only a small proportion of those eligible claimed 
them.8 Also the conditions regarding return pas~ages had changed. The 
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Colonial Office had requested that the Indian Government accede to the 
abolition of free return passages because of its fears regarding its 
liability should the sugar industry collapse. This requ2:t vIas refused 
but an alternative proferred: that immigrants themselves pay a portion of 
the fare.9 In Guyana the planters were induced to accept the cost of the 
remainder upon the promise that 2,400 indentures for Guyana per annum 
would be allowed. IO The reduction in planter and state responsbili ty 
sapped government enthusiasm for land settleme~ts. Their relevance to 
the problem they were originally created to deal with diminished as it 
was considered that the imposition of part of the cost of the passage 
upon the immigrants themselves made it "difficult to doubt that the 
change [would] effect a material diminuation in the numbers seeking to 
return~,ll In addition the settlements were proving unsuccessful in 
another way. Drainage problems had been insuperable in some areas and 
many families had moved away leaving, Except in the larger settlement 
Whim, only a small proportion of the original settlers. In other areas 
settlement was never completed. The settlers were in such difficulties 
that rate collection raised insufficient to cover administrative costs.12 
Land settlement in its original form was abandoned and when other estates 
were acquired by government, lands were leased or sold in the usual 
manner, that is on the same basis as other government-owned land, to all 
caners. 
Land settlement policy during this period was, then, largely a 
result of conditions in the sugar industry and was developed as a support 
to that industry. This is not to say that this was the only view of land 
settlement current or that the policy went unchallenge~ A scheme for 
the settlement of the unemployed on land drained and prepared for them 
was put to the Combined Court in 1906 by Elected ~1ember Patrick Dargan, 
one of the lawyer politicians \'/ho emerged in this period. His proposal 
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was that the settlers be put in houses built with government finance and 
given an income on the basis of work done on the land to allow for their 
sustenance while crops were maturing. The Governor's response to the 
plan was unenthusiastic, his complaint being that such a project would be 
too expensive as the settlers would ask the government for schools and 
hospitals. Nevertheless, a proposal for an inquiry into the feasibility 
of the project received sufficient support in the Combined Court that a 
small local Commission sat.!3 It received evidence to the effect that 
villagers would plant more if they had more security of tenure, if they 
had some form of support whilst crops gre\v and if drainage was 
improved.14 ,15 As a result the Combined Court voted $6,000 for a 
settlement scheme to be administered by the Department of Lands and 
Mines. An area in the Pomeroon was selected which, it was proposed, 
settlers would drain and empolder, receiving a wage whilst this work was 
done.16 This plan does not seem to have corne to fruition and there were 
no further government land settlement schemes until the late 1920s. 
In the p2riod ooder discussion Africans supplied much of the labour 
for cane-cutting and there is little doubt that one reason for the 
government's reluctance to develop land settlement or encourage the 
development of existing village agriculture was the fear that an 
indep2ndent, successful African peasantry would adversely affect labour 
supplies to the estates. There had already been one accelerated movement 
of Africans away from the estates (in the 1880s) as a result of 
retrenchments due to the economic crisis and the lure of the gold 
fields.17 It could be argued that the cost of such schemes during a 
period of low government revenues was prohibitive. Yet both local state 
and imperial funds were allocated to the maintenance of the sugar 
industry.18 State aid to immigration from public revenues continued, the 
special industry 'acreage tax' helped finance immigration costs and from 
1 1! 
1912 the estates' responsibilities for sea defenc;e were reduced. Hence 
the failure to support the development of non-estate agriculture (except 
rice) through land settlement or indeed any other means cannot be 
ascribed simply to the colony's poor financial position, but was rather 
the result of a failure to countenance the use of state revenue In any 
major way except in relation to the sugar industry. 
It is also worth noting that the debate about land development 
during this period was coloured by anti-African sentiments expressed 
especially at the official level. These carne to the fore particularly 
when immigration was being considered. Governor Swettenham, in writing 
to the Secretary of State, contrasted the East Indian as a "thrifty and 
useful colonist" with the African who "instead of being on strike for 
higher wages has for the most part renounced wages altogether, when 
coupled with continuous labour".19 He called' ridiculous' the claim of 
anti-immigration memorialists that the 'emancipated negro (described by 
Earl Grey in 1849 as being in a semi-barbarous state) is more civilised 
than the coolie with his two or three thousand years of civilisation,.20 
The next Governor, Hodgson, expressed similar views stating that he 
was not hopeful of any land settlement scheme which "for its success 
imposes on the negro the necessi ty of 9i ving continuous labour~' 21 He 
took the position that if Africans wanted assistance in agriculture ~1ey 
should enter into indenture contracts like East Indians so ~at "we shall 
be able to say we shall not want so many immigrants from India, we will 
take you instead, draft you to estates where you will have houses, 
hospitals, doctors and every convenience, and at the end of your term of 
I d ' ,,22 indenture you will have the same privilege as the East n lanSe 
Chamberlain was similarly inclined to disparage Africans' ability to 
develop the land. Wr i ting in connection with a r ai] 1,\7 ay proposal he 
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stated: 
" ••• these facts coupled with the failure of the coloured 
population to develop and maintain the cotton and coffee 
industries make it impossible for me to approve a policy which 
would make these extensive territories a close preserve for those 
who have not yet shown that they are able or desire to make use of 
them."(23) 
The early land settlement schemes were established with short term aims 
and thereafter left to sink or swim without much attention from 
government. They served the purpose of inducing some time-expired 
labourers to give up their claim to return passage, but were not 
significant in producing an expansion of peasant proprietorship. 
Land settlement re-emerged in the 1920s along with plans for 
'colonising' the country, particularly the interior, with immigrant 
settlers.24 It was first mooted as part of the colonisation proposals 
which followed the cessation of indenture. The problem with such 
proposals was that they raised the question of the settling of local 
people which, it was felt, would aggravate the shortage of estate labour. 
The Commissioner of Lands and Mines concluded: 
"To make the offer of prepared land with its generous condi tion 
applicable to local workers would be impracticable as it would 
inevitably lead to the withdrawal of a proportion at least of the 
labour (almost wholly East Indian) already settled on the estates 
and thus the scheme which was or iginally planned to augment the 
supply of labour for the sugar plantations would tend to increase 
the existing shortage" (25) 
Any proposal to settle new immigrants without similar consideration 
of local people was opposed by the British Guiana East Indian Association 
which took the position that reSL~,?nts should receive the same facilities 
as newcomers.26 Elements of the elected body of the Combined Court also 
favoured the settlement of local people or surplus population from the 
west Indian islands. In July 1926, for example, the Combined Court 
passed a motion that possibilities for the settlement of locals on the 
threatened Plantation Anna Regina be investig3ted. During the debate th2 
Court was reminded that 826 adult East Indians were booked to return to 
India by the S.S. Chenals. This was seen as a reflection of the 
precarious nature of employment in agriculture. Further, mention W3S 
made of a "tide of people" leaving the colony annually for America. 
Settlement of locals was urged to stem this tide and provide for the 
unemployed.27 It is doubtful, however, whether the Electives 'vlould have 
stood out against land settlement in association with free immigration 
projects as many of them also perceived increased population through 
immigration as essential to development, but no source of immigrants 
deemed suitable by both the Government and the Colonial Office was 
secured to test this proposal. 
The appointment of Guggisberg as Governor gave imretus to the lobby 
in favour of increasing population through colonisation and land 
settlement. He felt that there were investment possibilities in bauxite, 
diamonds and gold and in hinterland development as well as in the sugar 
and rice industries and that the necessary foreign capital could be 
attracted if conditions were right. One of these conditions was the 
provision of sufficient labour which present levels of population 
increase could not provide but which immigrant colonisation could: "That 
is the situation with which British Guiana is faced today; Bankruptcy or 
Colonisation~,28 He took up colonisation as a personal crusade and 
pursued land settlement in spite of the opposition of the sugar interest. 
A committee was set up to investigate areas which would be suitable 
for colonisation. The first area to be considered was the North West 
District, an interior location sparsely settled. This was rejected as 
unsui table for various reasons including cost and isolation. Bush Lot 
was the other area considered and a conversion to rice was proposed, 
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al though sufficient land was to be reserved for the grow ing of ground 
provisions and vegetables by the settlers.29 Whilst arrangements for t~e 
Bush Lot settlement were being made the adjoining estates, Anna Regina 
and Richmond, were offered for sale by their owner s. These properties 
were purchased, using the Colonisation Fund which was j ustif ied by the 
consideration that the extension of the project vlOuld contribute to Bush 
Lot's success.3D These three estates were all in the Essequibo. Further 
estates had been purchased earlier in a similar ~anner on the West Coast 
Demerara (Hague Plantation, Hindsor Forest and La Jalousie). The 
ultimate aim of the purchase of these lands \vas to settle immigrants on 
. 
them; Bush Lot was settled as 'the first model settlement .... for the 
purpose of giving intending immigrants a clear demonstration of the 
conditions under which they could obtain and work land in the COlony.'31 
It was occupied by seventy-five families. This produced the opposition 
of the sugar interest. The Governor complained, with reference to the 
Bush Lot scheme: 
"Already mendacious statements have ap}?2ared in the Local Press 
which are calculated to prejudice the scheme. This I believe, is 
in no small way due to the action of certain members of the sugar 
planting section of the communi ty who are hostile to any 
settlement scheme which they fear will affect the labour supply of 
their sugar estates." (32) 
It was not, however, the Governor's intention to damage the sugar 
industry; as he noted, the Bush Lot Settlement residents would be free to 
work on sugar estates and the long term purpose of the schemes was to 
attract and settle additional potential labour.33 Indeed, the previolls 
Governor's original plan for colonisation sf€cifically stated that it s 
should not interfere with the level of labour available to the sugar 
industry. It also proposed an 'unlinked labour' scheme to go along with 
colonisation aimed at increasing labour to estates.34 The letting out of 
lands on the settlement schemes 'das lll1dertaken to keep them from lying 
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idle until the immigrants arrived for unworked lEI.c1 would represent 
lost rent and prove problematic to the drainage of adjoining lands.34 
Immigrant colonisation schemes for the coastland were finally 
overtaken by the depression. Public opinion was h0.rdening against the 
introduction of immigrants at a time when unemployment was steadily 
growing. The Reverend Claude,a local Church leader, led a demonstration 
and delivered a petition protesting against /'colonisation whilst the 
people are starving~,36 Some Electives advocated the settlement of 
unemployed people rather than immigrants and one, I-lr. Brassington 
proposed the use of the Colonisation Fund for a settlement in Wakenham, 
Essequibo to this end.37 The British Guiana Labour Union (B.G.L.U.) also 
called for the settlement of locals as did the Bri tish Guiana Peoples 
Association, an association bringing together the representatives of a 
wide range of colonial organisations including the East Indian 
Association, the Negro Progress Convention and the British Guiana Hiners 
Association. At one of the Association's first meetings it was 'decided 
to have a prosperous peasantry as the back bone of the Colony38 towards 
which goal settlement of locals on the land was to play a major role. 
Al though the introduction of immigrants to the coastal areas had 
become impolitic, the Governor (Denham) continued \'lith plans for settling 
the interior. In 1931 he made enquiries of the Colonial Office as to the 
possibility of obtaining Chinese settlers for the development of the 
North West District since East Indians, the preferred group, were 
unobtainable and news of the distress in North China suggested securing 
settlers from there.39 The North West District, three hundred miles from 
Georgetown was eminently suited for agricultural development. Previously 
coffee had been grown there, but low prices had led to its decline so 
that its main settlement Maburuma was now little more than 'a hill 
station for government employees.,40 The Governor claimed that 
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unemployment in the colony would not be reduced by the settling of locals 
in the area as Africans were not 'born agriculturists' and preferred work 
in the gold and diamond fields, whilst for the East Indians "there is 
always some work to be found for them on the estates and rice fields and 
they would not willingly leave these districts nor again would it be 
sound policy for them to do so either in their Ovln interests or those of 
thei r employees. ,,41 He specif ically rej ected, then, the settlement of 
the local IX>pulation in potential development areas, even at a time when 
there was acute unemployment. Interestingly he endorsed and reiterated 
the established view of the Bush Lot Settlem~nt stating that it was 
"intended merely to be a model of what could be done and not to relieve 
local distress. ,,42 A number of Chinese were brought to Guyana but the 
exper iment was brought to an abrupt halt tdhen they proved not to be the 
agriculturists expected and tended to stay in Georgetown. 
After hopes of state-aided immigration had faded the Governor 
continued, with the concurrence of Official and Elected members, to look 
for further sources of population uhich could be secured cheaply, 
although by 1934 the object was specifically colonisation of the 
hinterland rather than labour for the estates. An opportunity presented 
itself in 1934 when the League of Nations was seeking a place to settle 
Assyrians who had been living in Iraq and had become subject to attack by 
the Iraquis since the end of the British Mandate there. Assyrians were 
reputed to be hardworking agr icul tur ists sui ted to settlement on land 
such as that offered by the Rupununi savannahs.43 A pr02Jsal that Guyana 
should be put forward to the League of Nations as a rossible place for 
Assyrian re-settlement was advanced by the Acting Governor to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. 44 It was also put to the 
Legi sla ti ve Council al though, typically, this body was not to be given 
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all the apposite information. As the Acting Governor put it: 
"No ,mention need be made of the fact that other Nations have 
hesl t,a ted t,o tak~ ,th:~e peopl~, not I think to di f f icul ty 
experlenced ln asslmllaLlng them lnto the Iraqui community." (45) 
To accomplish settlement it was proposed that the Rupununi Company \lhich 
owned some of the best land and assets in the savannah area should be 
bought out with F. Dias, a local merchant, and merrl:ers of the Executive 
Council acting as a front so that the asking price would not be inflated 
t h r 0 ugh the sell e r I s k no\,} 1 e d g e 0 f go v ern e men tin t ere st. 46 Th e 
Legislative Council unanimously supported the p:oposal for Assyrian 
immigration, the only proviso being Lhat the immigrants should not be 
allowed to drift to the coastland and so add to the unemployment. 47 
The plans were aborted, hm"ever, when a committee of the League of 
Nations set up to investigate the proposals made its report. It had 
concluded that as the Rupununi was a cattle rearing area and the 
Assyrians knew nothing of this occupation any attempt to settle them 
there would be "disastrous ll• In addition, the cattle stock was 
considered to be poor and the problem of flooding in the rainy season 
great. 48 
That land settlement was never seriously considered as a solution to 
t.he problems of unemployment nor as an avenue to economic diversification 
was undoubtedly due to the power of the sugar lobby to influence official 
policy. It is worth noting that its influence was increased by its 
continuity and stability which contrasted with the constant change of 
government policy makers. Between 1922 and 1928, for example, Guyana had 
five Governors which made it difficult for the administr&tion to follow 
through any new policy directions. The Elected ~1embers complained that 
the effect of this constant change was to produce discontinuity and 
hamper progress: 
121 
"The administrative policy which year by year is made to depend 
upon the personal lead, initiative and direction of each new 
Governor serves, in the interval that elapses between the 
departure of every retiring Governor and the arrival of a new one, 
as a bar to progress."(49) 
Each new Governor, charged the Dail~ Chronicle, was subject to the 
blandishments of the sugar lobby with the result that his independence, 
if not compromised, was forfeited to the subtle pressure the lobby 
exerted: 
''The moment it becomes known that Sir So and So has been appointed 
Governor of British Guiana, he is deluged with invitations to 
social functions where he comes into contact with the parasites of 
the West India Committee - an organisation which should be the 
means of offering first aid to Governors in determining the 
welfare of the country; but alas! We know to our bitter cost what 
has invariably happened. The unfortunate victim has SUGAR thrust 
down his throat to such an extent that he comes to this Colony 
prepared to see no good in any other product •••• "(50) 
Land settlement was not a policy the sugar industry cared to support 
any longer in the new situation where labour supply \las less certain than 
it had been formerly and, as a consequence, any project which could 
contribute to a labour shortage was considered something to be resisted. 
Although in the late twenties land settlement was enthusiastically 
supported by the administration it was connected with hopes of hinterland 
development by immigrant labour and was not thought of as an alternative 
to unemployment or casual labour on the sugar estates on the coast for 
the local population. 
Health Policy 
Policy in health matters during the period 1890-1930 continued to be 
generated on an .ad.hQ.Q basis. The general tendency on the part of both 
Electives and Officials was to keep down expenditure. Action \'las taken 
either when initiated by the Governor at the behest of the Secretary of 
State or when an epidemic threatened to engulf all sections of society, 
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al though concern about low levels of natural i..'1crease beginning aroW1d 
1905 generated a greater interest in the heal th of the masses. In all 
cases, however, expenditure vias directed at containing or eradicating 
specific illnesses rather than at improving the general level of health 
of the population, and insofar as the labouring classes were concerned, 
the types of illness selected for attention were those which were 
considered to impair the workers' ability to produce. 
The liortality Commission 
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into General and Infantile 
Mortali ty gives evidence of the state of the nations heal th and heal th 
provision in the early 1900s5l The Commission was a result not of 
internal agitation over social conditions, but of the British 
Government's concern about population levels in several of its colonies, 
and was patterned after the Commission of 1905 vlhich was set up in 
Britain to investigate British Poor Law. 
Guyana's mean mortality rate for the years betvleen 1900 and 1904, 
compared unfavourably with that of other colonies; of those surveyed only 
Mauritius had a higher rate. (See Table 4 (i) T next page) . 
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TABLE 4(i) 
Crude Death Bate in Several Colonies ~5-1905 
Cuba 
Hong Kong 
Jamaica 
Surinam 
Trinidad 
Barbados 
British Guiana 
Mauritius 
~ J2egth B.a.te 
~ 1000 r()~llimL 
16.6 
20.9 
22.2 
22.5 
23.5 
24.9 
26.9 
36.2 
Source: Report of the Commission of Enquiry into General and Infantile 
Mortality. Georgetovm, Government PrintenJI 1907. 
In Guyana, the rate for East Indians was lower than for Africans, 
(see Table 4 (ii)) and the Commissioners were of the opi:lion that "the 
relatively low general mortality among the East Indian immigrants is 
largely due to compulsory sanitation on the sugar estates."52 It should 
be remembered, however, that the age distribution of the East Indian 
population \'las skewed by immigration. When it took a more 'natural' 
shape in the post-immigration period the East Indian death rate became 
higher than the African one. 
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rT17InTJ;' A ( •• ) ~ .. 11 
Crude Death ~ b: Ethnic Grmm 1895 ::::. llM 
Europeans 
"Coloureds" 
East Indians 
Africans 
11eQ.n Death Bate 
~ 1QQ population) 
19.6 
22.1 
26.2 
30.3 
Source: Report of the Commission of Eqnuiry into General and Infantile 
Mortality, op.cit. 
The generally high mortality rate was partly a function of high 
infant mortality. The difference in infant mortality between the maIn 
racial groups accounts for mnch of the difference in overall mortality 
rates. It is of interest to note that the posi tion of East Indians had 
improved slightly, with a reduction of infa~l.t mortality from 182 per 
1,000 in 1885 to 171 in 1904, whereas for Africans the rate showed little 
improvement moving from 249 per 1,000 in 1885 to 243 in 1904.53 
Presumably the sanitary improvements on the estates which were lowering 
overall mortality rates were irnJ;orta.nt in prodl:cin'j a lowering of infant 
mortality. The same differences between the races are reflected in the 
mortality of infants under one year of age: beb'leen 1885 and 1904 the 
death rate per 1000 in this group was 279 for East Indians as compared 
with 354 for Africans.54 
This difference between the races may also 1=>2 accounted for in p:lrt 
by the fact that most estates allowed the grazing of cattle on estate 
lands by estate residents for a fee and East Indians therefore tended to 
be the cattle keepers and so had easy access to milk for children and 
nursing mothers. 
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There were also differences in infant mortality rates as between the 
country and the town. 'lbe mean mortality rate for 1895-1904 was 298 per 
1,000 in Georgetown compared to 160 r::er 1,000 in the country. Tne Report 
noted that due to boundary changes in 1903 the fi<Jures for Georgetown may 
have been inflated but nevertheless called the urban rate livery 
excessive'~ The high urban rates '.'lere attributed by one person giving 
evidence to the Enquiry, a Reverend Darby, to the yard system of housing 
occupied by most Georgetown residents ~dh2re ovcrcrov.1 ded tenements with 
atrocious sanitation were built around a central court forming "sinks of 
death and certainly sinks of immorali ty'i. 55 Excreta disposal in 
Georgetown was achieved by the use of cesspitu which \y'2re periodically 
emptied by the optimistically named 'odorless excavator' which discharged 
into the river near its mouth at ebb-tide. The cesspits were w1lined so 
that t-he soil became saturated. Nothing much had changed since 1898 when 
a resident gave this description of the situation: 
"The house drainage is poured into cesspJols, which are unlined, 
so that it soaks into the ground. These pits are rarely emlxied, 
and when this is done, another pit is dug in the compo ill 1 d, and the 
filth from one poured into the other. In this way the whole city 
is becoming a mass of cess pools, 'vhich it Hillbe dang,,=rous to 
disturb."(56) 
Even after the 'odour less excavators' \vere purchased in the same year as 
this report, it was stated that the: 
"the filthy habit still prevails of emptying their contents into 
the river, causing frightful stenches and malodorous deposits."(57) 
Generally the high mortality rate in the colony was attributed to 
"the absence of adequate measures of sanitation, O'Jer crowding in rooms, 
in ranges of tenement rooms, and in tenement housE'S, the carelessness 
with regard to medical attendance, and FOssibly, in some of the country 
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districts, to inability to obtain it leading to the employment of quacks 
an,j the abuse of patent mC(lici.n2s •.• 1158 l·~:_th r~J(;rd to inro.rltil:: 
mortality the principal cause W3S deemed to be the neglect of breast 
feeding, often due to a physical degeneration of the mother caused by 
malaria. Malaria was recognised as the primary cau[Oe of infantile and 
adul t mortali ty. 
The following recommendations ba.sed on th? Commission's Report were 
put before the legislature in 1907: 
that milk depots for testing and sterilising be established. 
- that quinine and other anti-m~larial measures be taken. 
that anti-syphilitic legislation be enacted. 
that two or three ci ty dispensaries 8.nd three village dispensar ies be 
established. 
that a Medical Officer of Health for Georgetown be appointed, with his 
only task to be to improve sanitation. (59) 
These measures were aimed at the control of malaria, tuberculosis, 
typhoid and hookworm, primarily. Malaria and hookworm were particularly 
pronounced in the country areas, although malaria took its toll in 
Georgetown also, whilst tuberculosis was more particularly an urban 
disease • 
.TIl!;. campaigns = lil Hookworm 
Hookworm had been identified as endemic amongst estate Indian 
populations throughout the empire.60 Its significance was two-fold. 
Firstly, hookworm infestation induced a form of anaemia and malnutrition 
which adversely affected fecundity and fertility. It contributed to the 
production of the negligible rates of natural increase which had begun to 
cause comment and concern in Guyana. Secondly, it produces a 
considerable weakening of the body a~d general debility. ~1e Governor 
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noted, when conveying a report on the causes of hookvlorm related diseases 
to the Secretary of State, that 'the matter is very important, as, owing 
to the disease the labour strength of the est~tes is very seriously 
affected. ,61 
Hookworm enters the body through the soles of the feet when they are 
in contact with soil contaminated with faeces. The Medical Inspector's 
guidelines on the establishment of latrines on the estates were not 
generally heeded and he commented ruefully: 
"Cur ious as it may seem it is undoubtedly hard to convince some 
men as to the necessi ty for providing any accommoda tion of this 
kind for thei r labourers." (62) 
He adduced two reasons for their reluctance; some could see no 
iltangible advantage" and felt that since labourers had so far done 
without such "luxuries't they could continue to do so and the "medical 
fad li could be ignored. Others would have complied but for the cost 
involved in the installation of latrines at a time when the low price for 
sugar was putting several estates in a critical position.63 
By 1908 the Governor was reporting to the Secretary of State that 
within the three years previous, 23 estates had been r;rovided with 
latrine accommodation, "in the face of considerable opposition", 
presumably from estates on the grounds of cost, and there vlere still nine 
estates with no latrines at all and another where the provision was 
"practically useless".64 He decided against taking the Surgeon General's 
advice that estate owners should be leg.:llly cOYnp2l1ed to provide latrines 
as he felt that the estates at fault were on the whole those 'Ion the 
borderline between stopping or proceeding with cultivation:' and that it 
was more important that labourers "continue to be provided with work on 
the estates than protected from a partj_cular di sease ... ,,65 The closure 
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of some of the weaker estates around this per iod in time improved the 
overall performance of the estates in this area. (See Table 4 (iii)) 
TABLE 4 (iii) 
Nt.nnbe t:. .of.Q.Uililr. R sta te..s. 1839-19 QQ. 
Year Number of Estates 
1839 222 
1891 101 
1911 44 
1921 44 
1931 38 
1948 24 
1960 19 (15 Bookers Sugar 
Estates Ltd.) 
Source: Nath, D. op.cit, Table '10, (1839-1948) Smith, R.T. op.cit. 
(1960), p.59. 
In the case of hookworm then, the movement against L~e disease was 
initiated by the imperial government and enacted in Guyana by the 
Governor. It was directed primarily at L~e estat2s because of imperial 
concern about the low productivity and fertility levels of imported 
labour. The programme could not however be confined to the estates. As 
the Governor himself noted in 1908: 
" ••• if compulsory action with regard to the provision of proper 
latrine accomodation is to be taken in connection \-li th the sugar 
estates, it should be taken in connection with the several 
villages of the Colony, because it is quite clear that the remedy 
would be incomplete if such action were taken in one case and not 
the other."(66) 
Improved sanitation in the villages abutting the estates was an 
essential part of control on the plantations but since there was to be no 
compulsion of anti-hookworm measures on the estates, it \vas concluded 
that it could not be enforced in the villages where people were not 
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lteducated up to the point where they would asse:1t to compulsion~,67 
Although the improvement of latrine provision on the estates was one 
of the reasons generally attributed to the comparatively iIT.proved rates 
of natural increase amongst the East Indian population, hookworm vias 
still rampant. A doctor reporting on his medical district for 1912 
stated that hookworm related disease and malaria were the two chief 
reasons for the deterioration of the East Indian race: 
"Anyone who has closely observed the East IndiC::;1 in thl s colo:,y 
knows there is a marked differenc,= in the physique between the 
immigrants and those born here •.•. The effect of local rearing 
tenos, therefore, to physical deterioration, to the production of 
a light weighting thin-boned and delicate featured nan, having 
less capacity for prolonged, hard muscular effort. Of the factors 
concerned with the production of this physical deterioration the 
two most important are, undoubLedly, malaria fever and 
anchylostomiasis." (68) 
Clearly, the hookworm situ~tion had not been controlled by this 
date. Eradication efforts were finally extended to the villages 
adjoining the estates when the <Jovernment accepted the assistance of the 
International Health Committee of the Rockefeller Institute. 
In America, the Rockefeller Foundation had been interesting itself 
ln the health of the American people in so far as it contributed to 
higher production and economic development. Hock\'lOrm had been found to 
be prevalent in the southern states and dubbed the 'lazy germ' due to its 
debili tating effect. Rockefeller was interested in finding new fields 
for industr ial development in the Uni ted States and launched an anti-
hookworm campaign in the southern states in an effort to prepare them for 
profitable exploitation by northern c3pital.69 He then turned his 
attention to foreign areas with the similar aim of developing public 
health programmes which would produce healthy, more productive labour 
forces suited to work in United States-backed industrial enterprises. 
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Guyana was reported to be the first overseas territory in which the 
International Health Committee operatedJO \',]hilst the preci2c reason for 
the choice of Guyana is not known, American capitalists had been showing 
interest in the rice industry and in mineral development.?l The 
discovery of bauxite deposits d'Jring the early years of the nineteenth 
century enhanced American interest. A United States based company was, 
by the outbreak of war in 1914, leasing all the available ore bearing 
land.72 
Action was taken first on the pla:1tations, but in Harch of 1914 a 
dispensary for the treatment of hookworm related diseases was opened by 
Dr. Howard the Rockefeller Insti tute representc:ti ve at Peter' oS Hall, a 
large village near Diamond Estate ,,,here investigations had shown "more 
than six out of every ten people .••• have this disease and [that] many of 
these people are sickly and unable to work or enjoy life because of 
it. ,,73 
.The ~igns =- (ii) 11alaria 
Malaria, the biggest scourge of the population as a ,,,hole, was also 
subject of a campaign initiated by the Colonial Office, and it too had a 
recognised economic dimension. As noted, the Mortality Commission had 
determined that malaria was the major cause of death. Arising directly 
out of the Commission's recommendations were regulations including: Ord. 
13 of 1907 which provided fer the enforcement of proper lot drainage in 
Georgetown, another ordinance of the same year compelling the screening 
of water vats and other vessels, and the 1910 Mosquito Ordinance 
providing for action to be taken against those who wilfully bred 
mosquitos on their premises and for the right of entry to property for 
inspection purposes. The effectiveness of these ordinances, was, 
however, limited. The Gover~ent Bacteriologist reported in 1912 on the 
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results of a mosquito survey of the city carried out the previous year 
saying: 
"It is obvious •••• that the whole city of GeorgetoHn is by 
ignorance and apathy permitted to remain a vast breeding place for 
countless hordes of disease bearing mosqui tos; that these 
mosquitos must affect most gravely the high mortality of the city, 
and remain as a severe threat to its health, and finally, that 
ample opportunity and ample powers exist for remedying this, 
inconceivable and extraordinary state of affairs."(74) 
It would appear that measures requiring no or Im'l capital expenditure 
were more often enforced. In 1909, albeit two years after the relevant 
ordinance was passed, 1700 vats were screened as a result of livery 
vigorous actiorl,.75 Quinine treatment was another comparatively cheap 
remedy for malaria, which also did not require any action to be taken by 
landlords. This was administered through post offices from 1906 and 
'systematically to the coolies in the estates coolie quarters as a 
preventati ve against this all p2rvading cause of disease' by Government 
f.1edical Officers on all the estates.?6 Finally, in 1908, following an 
epidemic the previous year which had claimed nearly two and a half 
thousand lives, Georgetown "suffered a panic assault on its trees and 
lily bedecked canals~,77 
It was generally recognised in medical circles that drainage was of 
major importance in the control of the malaria carrying mosquito.78 But 
it ws also reckoned that the elimination of the mosquito was 
impracticable as agriculturists, by which we may understand estate 
owners, wouldl'protest they are being ruined if too stringent public 
health principles were enforced ll• 79 Hethods of plantation agriculture 
changed the natural regimen of \later on the land producing mosquito 
breeding conditions over large areas. 
The problem in Georgetown lay in the high proportion of rented 
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properties owned by landlords of influence including members of the 
Municipal Council responsible for the enforcement of public health 
ordinances. To get drainage requirements enforced unwilling landlords 
had to be dealt with, and since these landlords uere often ultimately 
responsible for enforcement this aspect of public health usually fell by 
the wayside. One commentator noted that lithe vant of money is by no 
means the only difficulty in the way of our carrying out anti-malarial 
measures in Bri tish Guiana; almost if not qui te as great a drawback is 
the opposition one meets with from people in the most influential 
quarters!180 Sanitary inspectors were according to press reports, 
powerless to enforce regulations on the property of the wealthy and 
influential. 81 
The imperial government's concern with malaria was increased by 
Britain's interest in new tropical colonial expansion and in supporting 
developments in the Panama Canal Zone. Sir Rupert Boyce had been 
dispatched by Chamberlain to Barbados in 1909, in order that he might 
investigate an epidemic of yellow fever there, as the disease was one 
proving devastating in Panama. He later took on the examination of 
tropical disease in other Caribbean territories including Guyana. 82 
Olamberlain also made requests to Governors for reports on anti-malarial 
work carried out in their territories.83 
It seems that, in spite of official support for malaria control the 
only real initiatives were carried through on some of the estates which 
responded to the Government's p:-essure fer improved conditions. Boyce, 
visiting Diamond Estate, remarked on the contrast between the screened 
barrels he found there and the many uncovered water containers to be seen 
in Georgetown. 
The estates, particularly Davsons - the other large eXTOtriate-owned 
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concern apart from Bookers - continued to interest thems~lves in the 
reduction of the diseases most responsible for loss of man-hours and 
expense to the estates through medical costs. Between 1934 and 1937 work 
VIas carried out on the transmission of malaria by Dr. G. Giglioli, at 
that time a Dawson employee. This work was follovled by tV/o years of 
malariometric studies. In 1939 the estates again collaborated with the 
Rockerfeller Foundation, this time in the setting up of a Malaria 
Research Unit. The enterprise also had government support. Dr. Giglioli 
became Director of the Unit and proceeded with work which eventually 
resulted (in the late 1940s) in the virtual eradi~1tion of malaria.84 
.Tl1e. campaigns Jiii) -TuberculQais.and Typhoid 
Al though tuberculosis and typhoid cases were to be found allover 
the colony, the concentration of these diseases vias found in the city. 
Tuberculosis is generally associated with poverty and overcrowding but 
can spread through contaminated milk and contagion. The Mortality 
Commission Report had noted the increase in the disease over recent years 
and recommended control of the supply of milk and a reduction in 
overcrowding. Whilst tuberculosis posed some threat to the middle class 
and its representatives in the legislature, it was not of epidemic 
proportions as was typhoid, small pox or yellow fever on occasions. Nor 
did it threaten labour supplies as did malaria and hookworm. The 
campaign against tuberculosis if it can be called such, began in 1907 on 
the initiative of the Surgeon General and was taken up as a state and 
municipal supported voluntary effort.8S The British Guiana Tuberculosis 
Society was formed and propaganda work begun.86 The Society seems to 
have had little impact and presumably folded as in 1916 another society 
was formed.87 
Typhoid epidemics had struck GeorCJetu.~n from time to time and tended 
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to produce action ei ther in the form of neH legislation or the 
enforcement of old legislation, all of which was generally short term in 
effect. The stumbling block, as in the case of malaria control, seems to 
have been that the landlords' representation on the Town Council ensured 
that no measures that would require an outlay of capital exrenditure on 
land or housing were made compulsory. ~ nai~ ~I~ reported that In 
1912, two years after recommendations for typhoid control were made by 
the Surgeon General, "in the matter of compulsory E:tructural regulations 
the Town Council has absolutely declined to move. ,,88 The death of the 
son of an influential citizen in 1912 provoked rumours of an outbreak of 
epidemic proportion and prompted a panic re-examination of ci ty 
sanitation and water supply.89 ~ DailY. Argosy- launched a campaign to 
clean up 'Garbage Town' as Georgetmvn was dubbed. The Mayor of 
Georgetown came out in favour of reforms. 90 A bye-law against the 
keeping of rubbish in yards \vas passed.9l There was a character istic 
flurry of activity but with little lasting effect. An Ordinance of 1907 
had provided for supplies of pure drinking water throughout the populated 
area of the colony, but it was never properly executed; one contemporary 
view was that "the majority of inhabitants are absolutely unaware that 
such laws do exist~,92 The activities of 1912 do not appear to have 
improved the situation for by 1917 the city's water supply was still 
judged to be "very mediocre".93 On the estates "the chief source of 
water supply [was] usually water obtained from some conservancy aback of 
the estate and conveyed to the various yards in op=n trenches.,,94 In the 
villages the water situation \vas even worse; it was reported that "there 
[was] not a village in the colony which possesses a decent supply of 
water for drinking ••••.• The usual state of affairs ••••• takes the form of 
an open trench some little distance from the village and of course liable 
to all kinds of pollution •• 1,95 
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The action against typhoid and tuberculosis contrasts interestingly 
with that initiated in response to malaria and hookworw.. There were no 
directives from the Colonial Officei no interest was shovln by the 
Rockefeller Institute. Tuberculosis was left to voluntary agencies, 
albeit with state support. Typhoid continued to be deal with haphazardly 
in response to intermittent crisis. Neither of these two illnesses had 
the long-term debilitating effects on the estate populations that malaria 
and hookworm were recognised to produce. This substantiates the 
contention that government and estate efforts were concentrated on health 
problems which affected labour supply and productivity, more particularly 
that of estate labour. Nevertheless campaigns, limited al though they 
were, were indicative of an increased state involvement in the health of 
the nation which was prompted by the findings of the t-1ortality Commission 
and fuelled by an expansionist imperial policy. 
Medical Provision 
The Mortality Commission had recommended that dispensaries be 
established in the rural districts. The number actually started was kept 
few by the reluctance of the Governor and/or Electives to vote the 
necessary finance. 96 Where they were established it tended to be in 
diamond and gold mining areas where they were considered to constitute 
incentives to labour. In February of 1912, for instance, in one sitting 
of the Combined Court, the Electives challenged the cost of the 
Georgetown Hospital and urged that it be reduced and also moved a 
resolution for the establishment of Government l1edical Stations in 
outlying districts in the gold and diamond areas in which many of them 
had a financial interest.97 The Governor refused to support the 
resolution on the grounds of cost. Dispensaries were set up, however, in 
the early twenties when the new atti tl}(!e towards preserving life and 
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health were developed as a large, healthy labour force carne to be seen as 
an inducement to investors. Leguan received a dispensary in 1924 and the 
diamond fields several more in 1923.98 
~1edical attendance to the villages remained, in the main part, 
confined to that which could be secured from the Goverment Medical 
Officers whose primary concern remained with the estate workers. The 
gross poverty of the villages offered no attraction to private 
practitioners of whom, in 1919, there were 17, 16 of whom were stationed 
in Georgetown or New Amsterdam.99 The Mortality Commission Report had 
attested to the difficulty a private practitioner would have in securing 
a living in the villages by its mention of the manner in which patent 
medicines and 'bush' or local remedies and traditional healers were 
resorted to. The position was exacerbated by frequent shortages of 
doctors from within the Colonial Medical Service. Doctors preferred more 
lucrative postings elsewhere in the empire. There were local men who 
were qualified; as early as 1895 a Dr. Rohlehr petitioned the Secretary 
of State alleging that the poor state of medical provision outside of the 
estates could be altered by the apr~intment of local men to the service. 
The Surgeon General attached to the petition a scathing response, stating 
that to him it seemed that Dr. Rohlehr wanted only 'natives' appointed 
and that "it is open to these gentlemen to supply the wants of medical 
aid in districts in which he states thousands of labourers are employed, 
but there does not appear any necessity at present for government to 
. d th ,,100 appoInt an pay em. 
The race consciousness of the administration did not change in the 
ensuing years. A Dr. Sharples, reported to be of mixed African and 
European descent, applied in 1914 for the post of Government Medical 
Officer, but was turned down by Governor Egerton on the ground that he 
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might be placed in a medical district where he Hould 1:x; the only doctor 
creating a situation where everyone would be dependent on him including 
white people "who objected to t>eing treated by a medical officer who is 
not of their own race~lOl When in 1914 war m30e the recruitment of 
doctors from Britain impossible, the Surgeon General recommended the 
recruitment of 'members of the white race' from India.l° O The 
administration also considered changing the law regarding the 
registration of doctors so as to allow (white) American doctors to 
practice, a course which drew press criticism against such a plan whilst 
there were British subjects qualified and suitable in, to use the 
Colonial Office's phrase, 'every respect but colour' .102 
Finally the use of local men in the government service became 
inevitable and in 1916 the Officer Administering the Government, 
Clementi, found himself forced to recommend Dr. Sharples, making it clear 
that his recommendation was "based upon the supposition that you will not 
find it possible to obtain the service of a qualified medical 
practitioner of British Race for the vacancy which has occurred.,,103 The 
most senior posts in the nursing service were also filled by Europeans as 
far as was possible. The consequences of this policy for the health of 
the masses and for the development of a local professional class was not 
considered, attitudes of racial superiority apparently taking precedence. 
Tha End Qf Indenture ~ Estate Health 
By 1917 as well as having an inadequate water supply Georgetown 
still had no enforced housing regulations and had lIan utterly inadequate 
system of sewage disposal mainly consisting of midden pi ts!,104 The 
villages showed no changed since 1914 when the Surgeon General reported 
that most were II in a grossly unheal thy condi tion." On the estates, 
however, some improvement appeared to have taken place. The Surgeon 
138 
General stated that : 
"The .su~ar estates in general ,Present a great contrast in sanitary 
condItIons when compared wIth the villages. One finds well 
drained yards, a gr~at reduction in mosquito breeding places, 
absence of all thIck bush and the universal provision of 
latrines ••• " (105) 
The Immigrant Agent General gave details of the improvements made after 
noting that the hospitals were well maintained, clean and orderly: 
"New separate Dispenser quarters have been built at Albion and 
Enmore, flush closets connected to septic tanks are in use at 
Albion, Enmore, Lusignan, Ogle and Houston. The dispensary has 
been enlarged and much improved at Blairmont, there are new 
bathrooms at Uitvlugt •••• " 
He noted further that: 
"very few hospitals are not now supplied with trained and 
regstered female nurse midwives. Many estates have a second such 
midwife resident in the yards." (106) 
The explanation for this level of activity in sanitary matters and 
concern for the conservation of infant life is probably partly to be 
found in the growing concentration of the estates in the control of the 
larger companies which could command larger resources and which were also 
possibly influenced by ideas about worker health developing in England, 
(see Table 4(iii)). Of equal significance is the increasing need felt by 
the managements to conserve labour in the sense of attracting a 
sufficient workforce to their estates, which were increasingly in 
competition with each other for free labour as the number of indentured 
labourers dwindled. This continued to be a motivation for many years; as 
when Dr. Giglioli was employed by Davson's estates in 1933, he attributed 
his appointment to the "specific purpose of attracting workers to take up 
residence on these estates .. ,,107 By 1917, when indenture ended, several 
estates were already employing free labour only. These found it in their 
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interest to maintain their hospital accomodation and treatment facilities 
even though they were no longer legally obliged to do so.108 In addition 
many estates made "s:p?cial efforts .•• to form settlements of labourers in 
parts other than the customary ranges and yards" thJt is on estate land 
additional to that usually used for living quarters.l09 
The war in Europe produced an increased demand for caribbean sugar 
as European beet supplies became unavailable. The estates claimed there 
was a shortage of labour to meet the increased demand. The figures for 
numbers of those employed in the field for the period 1916-1920 are not 
available but the average figure of 18,529 for 1921-1925 denotes a drop 
from the average figure for 1911-1915 of 20,257 which does indicate that 
a real shortage was experienced.110 Additional evidence of a shortage of 
labour in this period is found in the reported increase in the use of 
machinery to offset the decline in available labour.lll Finally, the 
Immigrant Agent General stated in 1917 that the demand for labour had 
outstripped supply since 1913. The effects of the cessation of indenture 
and the subsequent removal of many labourers from the estates to the rice 
fields were aggravated by the high mortality rate of East Indians during 
the flu pandemic which hit Guyana in 1918. The Immigrant Agent General 
reported that: 
"In the December epidemic, all races of the community were 
affected, but the East Indians suffered in far greater degree, 
and their mortality rate during the last quarter of the year was 
more than double that of the other sections of the 
IX>pulation. " (112) 
The severe effect which was felt on some estates is indicated by the 
mortali ty rate at Plantation Hara where 112 deaths \'lere sustained in one 
month, out of a IX>pulation of 539.113• 
1917 passed and the estates continued to provide medical facilities 
for resident labour. This contrasts with the situation which developed 
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ln Trinidad where the estates population was much smaller and labour 
difficul ties not so marked; the estates' hospitals were offered to the 
government which declined and the hospitals were subsequently 
dernolished.114 The Guyanese estates took a different course in order to 
retain the labour of workers who might have been attracted away to the 
rice fields, other estates or alternate employments.IIS Giglioli stated 
that in addi tion to the difficulties which would have been involved in 
moving large numbers of people to new accommodation in a period of 
recession, the "chronic labour shortage related to the miserable health 
condi tions prevailing throughout the Colony" was instrumental in the 
decision that estates should retain their responsibilities in the area of 
heal th and housing.l16 
Improvements in conditions on the estates continued in the 1920s but 
the economic stagnation of the period highlighted the weakness of the 
system. Figures which allow for a comparison between bigger, presumably 
economically stronger, estates and smaller, presumably economically 
weaker estates, suggest that sanitation and health provision on the 
larger estates was considerably better than on smaller ones. Using a ten 
year average to 1932 Giglioli calculated that on ten '12rge' estates with 
a population of 3,317 persons the death rate for malaria in those over 
the age of five was 139 per thousand per annum, whereas for the ten 
'smaller' estates it was 272 per thousand per annum. Birth rates, death 
rates and infant mortality rates varied similarly as can be seen: 
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TABLE 4{iv) 
Average Birth, Death.and lnfQilt Hortality Fates frY 'Large' Nld 'Small' 
Whole Colony 
10 larger estates 
10 smaller estates 
Estat~~ 1922-1932 
Crude 
Birth Rate 
32.0 
30.2 
31.4 
Crude 
Death Rate 
26.4 
18.9 
25.9 
ILfant t10rtality 
per 1,000 births 
167 
146 
167 
Source: Giglioli, G., Health, Sanitation and Vital Statistics on Sugar 
Estates. Legislative Council Paper 6, 1932. 
The larger companies like Davsons, which was by 1932 employing its 
own medical officer, were able to mount health campaigns similar to those 
of the early 1920s. They still, however, concentrated on specific 
diseases which were thought to relate to labour production levels and 
justified campaigns with economic rationales. The; hookworm campaign, for 
example, reduced the rate of infestation drastically: from 73.4% of the 
Davsonestate's residents being affected in December of 1933, to a 6.2% 
rate in April of 1934. The worth of the campaign '.-las demonstrated by the 
savings made on the medical bill for the estates ~lhich it effected: on 
one estate, Blairmont, for which detailed data were kept, it was shown 
that, whilst the initial stages of the campaign were costly, by the third 
year of its operation, annual expenditure on drugs and medical supplies 
was much reduced.117 
Whilst the level of provision of sanitary and medical facilities on 
the estates could be expected to vary according to the ability and desire 
of management to so provide, the public heal th ordinances should have 
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secured at least a minimal level of sanitation on them. There is 
evidence, however, that on some estates coneli t:c,ns that fell far beloYl 
that allowed by law were allowed to continue by an insufficient or 
inefficient inspectorate. C.F. l'mdrevls, \'Jell kno'.m for his association 
vlith Ghandi, and champion of the right of Indians throughout the Empire, 
visited Guyana in 1928. He was very familiar with estate conditions 
elsewhere, having visited Fiji and Natal amongst other places. One 
outstanding feature of his descriptions of his visit is the extent to 
Ylhich conditions on estates dep2nded on management, and the high level of 
variation found between estates. He also noted his incredulity that 
sanitary ins~ctors could sanction some of the housing conditions he saw 
and questioned government 1s inactivity in pressing for improved 
standards.118 He also pointed to the difficulties which arose Hhen 
estates were controlled by absentee directorates as it Has Ilnot easy for 
an absentee landlord to appreciate practically and instinctively the 
economic results which sanitary and housing improvements might 
produce.1l119 His view of the hospitals was generally favourable, 
considering them to compare well with establishments elseYlhere but his 
condemna tion of sani tary conditions especially \lith reg~\rd to housing, 
was outright: 
"I have hardly ever seen housing conditions for the lalxmrers on 
estates belonging to companies working under modern industrial 
condi tions so bad as these old, insanitary "ranges" (120) 
It is worth quoting in full his description of one estate on the Hest 
Bank Demerara in order to present a clear picture of what poor conditions 
could be like: 
"The people were in a ragged condition and they looked unhealthy. 
The ground was very low and the monsoon conditions had already set 
in which turned much of the low-lying land into a bog. The 
labourers' quarters, called "ranges", ,where the peo12le ~~,:,ed, 
appeared to me to be worse than anythlng I had seen In Fl]l ?[ 
Natal. The houses looked very insanitary and filth was In 
evidence on every side. ' (121) 
143 
Official recognition of the low standards on many estates is 
implicit in a statement made by the Governor in 1928 to the effect that 
estates had been unable to secure labour from the \'lest Indian islands 
because of lithe bad reputation in the islands of housing and health 
conditions in the low lying alluvial belt where the sugar estates are 
situated:,122 Nevertheless, the overall situation marked an improvement 
over that obtaining at the beginning of the century. The end of 
indenture produced no radical departures in estate medical policy. 
Estates continued to provide services for resident labour, although no 
longer legally obliged to do so. Stan&~rds varied considerably between 
estates but generally the estate sector compared favourably with tm·m and 
village. 
"Population .QI. Bankruptcyll - Ik..Fillh i.'.ill:.e jn ~llage .ill1d .T.Q)yn 
There were also developments producing a greater concern for the 
conservation of population off the estates. TIle 1911 census revealed the 
crucial role immigrants had played in maintaining populations levels. 
The Governor commented: 
"the fact which stands out most vividly from this report is the 
absolute necessity of East Indian Immigration to British Guiana. 
Without such emigration the ~pulation would have dropf-€d by 9.8% 
in the last twenty years. Wi th it the increase has been 
6 • 3 6 % " (123) 
To the pro-sugar lobby the low rate of natural increase argued for 
the continuation of immigration.124 To those interested in other kinds 
of development in the interior or in other, industri~l projects it 
indi ca ted also the necessi ty of preserving exi sting popula tion and an 
enhancement of the natural population growth. Iierchants and businessmen 
were concerned to keep up ~pulation levels to balance taxes and provide 
m3rkets. 125 
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An indication of this new concern is indicated by the support given 
to the Baby Saving League. This was founded and p3tronised by Lady 
Egerton, the Governor's wife, in Georgetown in 1914 and extended to New 
Amsterdam later in the same year. By the end of 1917 there were eleven 
branches and eighteen clinics giving assistance to mothers and babies up 
to two years of age and providing trained midwives. In addition the 
League paid for one of the four lady Health Visitors for Georgetown 
working under the Medical Officer of Heal the The League operated on a 
quasi-voluntary basis with most of its funding provided by central 
government.126 
The work of the Baby Saving League was considered II a major factor 
in the decrease in infant mortali ty, II from the early twenties and did 
produce a much reduced rate of infant and maternal mortality in the cases 
it dealt with.127 The success of the League and the ready support 
obtained from the Combined Court was assured by the sponsorship of the 
Governor's wife but the speech given by the Surgeon General at the 
opening of the New Amsterdam Branch is representative of a new attitude 
towards };X)pulation preservation that was developing: 
" .... if you are diminishing every year the number of people you 
clothe and feed, well, that means diminished prosperity and 
spells, in my opinion, bankruptcy."(128) 
In similar vein, the Governor stated that in view of the cost of 
indentured labour and the small population that made such augmentation 
necessary the saving of infant lives was of considerable importance if 
looked at from the "merely monetary point of view!1129 
The legislation aimed at the control of malaria, typhoid, 
tuberculosis and hook\vorm provided a legal framework for the general 
improvement of sanitation in the colony. The appointment of a Medical 
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Officer of Health in Georgetown in 1911, as recom~,c~ce~ by the Mortality 
Commission, followed by the creation of a Public Health Department 
(albeit initially without an establishment) in the following year 
provided the machinery for advance. In addi tion, Ord. 40 of 1918 made 
I 'compulsory the supply of water to properties in the city of Georgetown. " 
No real improvements in the city and villages were evident until the 
1920's, however, when the cessation of indenture made the population 
problem more acute and the goverment espoused the colonisation project. 
Public health became a two-fold issue: firstly that of preserving the 
present population in the face of labour shortages and secondly that of 
promoting Guyana as a country able to guarantee colonists a healthy 
environment and investors an adeqlBte supply of labour. 
A Combined Court Memorandum presented to the Governor in 1919 
proposed health measures as essential to the conservation of the labour 
supply. It also related improved water supplies and sani tation to the 
likely success of efforts being undertaken to secure more immigrants 
suggest.ing that: 
"It would •••• be sheer folly, indeed it would be immoral, to take 
steps to introduce immigration in large numbers into British 
Guiana without at the same time taking the steps necessary to keep 
them alive and in good health." (130) 
The official view was similar, stressing the role of improvements in 
attracting colonists. The Secretary to the Governor stated that 
"Improved sanitation is the p:1ramount need," and also that "Colonisation 
and improved sanitation must go hand in hand~,131 In 1924 a plan was 
produced for the improvement of water supplies in rural areas: small 
villages (population below 300) were to be provic1ed \li th storage tanks, 
medium villages (population 300-800) were to have purifying plants to 
treat bush water; large villagos (population over 800) Here to have one 
or more artesian wells sunk.132 There were already eighteen wells 
146 
provided by the state but these had not been functioning \'lell because of 
blockage with sand.133 The 1924 plan proposed sixty six further artesian 
wells, four purifying plants and four tanks. TI1e plan for artesian wells 
proceeded slowly until taken up as projects developed with loans from the 
Imperial Treasury in the 1940s.l34 
In Georgetown an ordinance (No.40 1918) was passed to make 
compulsory the supply of water to houses and tenement yards. The sewage 
system was improved by the installation of a II se\vage disposal plant on 
the septic tank principle to replace the old, costly and insanitary pail 
system'~ 135 In the twenties a Georgetown Improvement Scheme was launched, 
to be mainly concerned with drainage and sewage disposal. Parts of the 
system were put into effect in 1929 following a malaria epidemic in the 
previous year, and the whole work was completed .in 1930 at a final cost 
of $5,000,000.136 The initiative for the scheme came from the 
administration which was concerned wi th colonisation prospects. The 
Governor remarked in 1928 that whilst the cost of improving standards in 
the coastal area had proved heavy both for the state and the estates yet 
he fel t the work had to go on for "the improvements made in the last 
seven years must be continued if immigration is to be renewed on the 
scale requi red.,,137 The plan won support from the municipal i ty whose 
citizens' interest in sanitary improvements had been stirred by the 
recent epidemic. It was funded in the first instance by a loan from 
state revenues, 50% of which was to be repaid from municipal rates. The 
landed interest in the city acted true to form after the project was 
completed, however. They lobbied, unsuccessfully, as the Georgetown 
Property Owners Asociation, to have the project adopted as a 'Colonial 
Question' and so be paid for mainly by the State.138 The Improvement 
Scheme had an immediate effe,t onthe heal th of the ci ty dwellers; the 
death rate in the city fell as tr:: scheme progressed: 
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"Parts of the system were put into operation in 1929, and the 
whole of the works were completed in 1930. In 1926 the death rate 
in the city was 28.0 per thousand; in the three following years it 
was 24.5, 27.9 and 24.5 respectively; in 1930 it was 22.3 and in 
1931 it dropp=d to 18.5."(139) 
A further development of consequence in this period was the 
transference, in 1934, of powers for the regulation of public health from 
the Local Government Board to a newly created Central Board of Heal tho 
Hitherto public health was represented on the Local Government Board only 
by the Government Medical Officer of Health who sat as an ex-officio 
member. Under the new regime public health VlaS accepted unequivocally as 
a state function although Urban, Village and Country Districts remained 
the relevant authorities for the administration of local public health. 
The success of these measures in city, village and estate can be 
gauged from the decrease in child mortality and death rates for the whole 
colony from the 1920s. (See Table 4 (v)) • The whole period from 1920 to 
1940 was, as will be shown in the next chapter, one of economic 
stagnation, hence it is reasonable to argue that improvements in public 
health rather than in consumption patterns account for these developments 
in population trends. Although medical and sanitary provision on the 
estates varied and was in the remaining rural and urban areas limited 
both in coverage and scope, the population data suggest that the action 
taken against specific diseases and the improvements in water supply and 
sanitation together produced greater natural increase than hiterto in the 
history of the colony. 
SUMMARy AND CONCLUSION 
The period 1890-1930 saw a growth in interest in colonial 
development on several fronts: locally, the business class, and at times 
the administration, favoured measures which ',lould increase business 
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TABLE 4:v 
Average Crude Birth, Death and Infant Mortalit~ 
Rates, 1911/15 - 1931/5 (per 1,000 population/births) 
Infant Mortality 
Years Birth 
---
Death (per 1,000 births) 
1911 - 15 32.0 27.0 190 
1916 - 20 27.8 33.1* 189 
1921 - 25 31. 7 24.7 176 
1926 - 30 32.0 22.2 159 
1931 - 35 32.2 20.9 144 
Sources: Report of the Surgeon C~nera1 1936, Government Printery 
Georgetown, p.32 (infant mortality) and Mandle, J., 
op.cit. Table 23 p.81 
* This figure reflects the effect of the influenza pandemic in 
1917-18. 
Note: The 1937 figures for Guyana were B.R. 35 per 1000 D.R. 21.9 
per 1000 Infant Mortality 121 per 1000. In England and 
\vaIes ,they were B.R. 14.9 D.R. 12.4 Infant Mortality 58. 
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potential and attract foreign capital; imperial policy also moved towards 
a more developmentalist position generally, although this did not 
necessarily result in support for specific development projects or indeed 
development in a particular colony. 
The climate produced had effects on both land s'2ttlement and health 
policy in that both were geared to\vards attracting migrant labour and 
foreign investment. Estate managements \'lere affected both by directives 
prompted by Colonial Office interest in labour productivity and, in the 
post-indenture period, by their concern to attract labour in a situation 
where labour deficits could occur. 
Policy in land settlement and health remained essentially .ad .hQQ and 
also quite insulated from mass involvement or inputs. But whilst land 
settlement policy had only a slight impact on land tenure and the 
viability of the peasantry, health policy both on the estates and 
elsewhere, limited though it was, did produce a real improvement in 
health. 
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nlli TRANSITIONAL YEARS 
Between 1928 and 1940 there were several developments a 
consideration of which is necessary to the understanding and analysis of 
imIX'rtant new policy directions taken in the 1940s. The period is termed 
transitional because in it began trends which would emerge more fully in 
the forties: firstly, a pattern of under-employment of labour in the 
sugar industry developed; secondly, the old precepts guiding imperial 
invol vement in colonial development began to be eroded with the 
introduction of the first Colonial Development Act; thirdly, the latter 
part of the period saw a rapid development in the trade union movement. 
These developments occurred against a background of economic and 
consti tutional stagnation which is taken as the context for the 
discussion. 
1he Effects ~ the Depression 
The world economic recession of the late twenties and early thirties 
had important effects on the local economy. The prices for all the 
country's main exports continued to fall, with immediate effect on wages. 
Plantation Anna Regina stopped planting in 1928, Marionville in 1929. 
The factories on both estates were dismantled. Other estates, Cove and 
John, and Ogle, were reported not to be planting and were expected to 
wind up.l Actual unemployment amongst estate workers was kept down by 
the estates' policy of reducing the amount of work available to each 
worker whilst maintaining the number of persons employed. The rationale 
was that labour lost during the crisis might be permanently absorbed into 
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other employment, most probably the rice industry, which would result in 
a shortage of labour when demand increased.2 The Governor remarked: 
I~e estates realise the urgent importance of keeping the labour 
together as far as possible and are, therefore, employing as many 
labourers as they can, though generally reducing wages all 
round."(3) 
Figures relating to East Indian labourers for the estates submitting 
returns to the administration for the period 1928-1930 give evidence of 
the trend (see Table S(i)). 
The general impression given is that whilst the number of labourers 
employed changed slightly, the wages paid were considerably reduced. 
This can be seen in Table SCi). In addition, a contemporary estimate 
based on the same data s that from which the Table has been drawn, 
concluded that whilst the percentage reduction of labourers employed in 
1930 January to June as compared to the same period in 1929 was 0.7, the 
reduction in wages was of the order of 3.S per cent. In the period July 
to September 1930, the reduction compared to the corresponding period in 
1929 was 4.8 per cent in labour as against 17.8 per cent in wages paid.4 
The Immigrant General reported in 1931 that any decrease in persons 
employed occurred amongst the non-resident population, so that as far as 
East Indian resident labour was concerned a fair level of employment was 
maintained despite the depression and the uncertainty of the sugar 
market.S That the proprietors wished to keep labour attached to the 
estates as provision against better days is borne out by their 
willingness to maintain hospital facilities although no longer legally 
requi red to do so, so that even while the cr isi s was 
"inducing many estates to represent thei r inabili ty to continue 
the maintenance of their hospital and medical services •••• though 
they generally recognise(d) that to seek relief from these charges 
might seriously prejudice their position with their labour ••• "(6) 
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TABLE 5(i) 
Average Number of East Indian Labourers Employed Weekly by Suaar 
Estates and Wages Paid, 1928-1930 
Year 
--
1928 
1929 
1930 
Jan-June 
1930 I 
Ju1-Sep. 
Source: 
Note: 
No. of I Average No. Total Average Weekly 
Estates Employed Paid in Wages tvage per Head 
Weekly 
$ $ 
32 21,613 2,253,571 2.00 
32 20,760 1,978,480 1. 83 
31 21,446 977,429 1. 75 
31 19,010 356,392 1. 44 
Adapted from C0884/13 West Indian 218 
Confidential Correspondence relating to the 
West India Sugar Situation, Enclosure to Item 74. 
The aggregate figures for 1930 are not strictly 
comparable to those for 1928, 1929 as only 31 
estates submitted data as compared to 32 and the 
months Oct - Dec are not included. 
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It was also recognised that if unemployment amongst East Indians became 
very high it might lead to large numbers emigrating and being lost to the 
estates altogether. 7 This fear \-Jas fostered by the fact that many 
immigrants had an entitlement to government-assisted passage to India. 
It was estimated in December 1933 that of a total East Indian population 
of 135,114, no less than 18,310 persons were so entitled.8 Since this 
number represented a cost of 15,014 full passages, neither the 
administration nor the taxpayers wished this burden to be added to the 
state's financial obligations. The result of the estates' policy was 
not, then, serious unemployment amongst estate workers, but rather 
drastically increased under-employment. 
The reduction in estate wages was only made supportable by a change 
in estate policy with regard to allowing labourers to cUltivate other 
crops - provisions and rice mainly - on estate lanes let for that 
purpose. Previously proprietors had rented out lands more selectively, 
but now it was felt, that in order to keep labour near the sugar fields, 
opportunities to augment their wages had to be given. The Governor 
remarked: 
III am glad to repor.t that the East Indians are in every way 
showing themselves ready to take up more land for food provisions, 
and with the co-operation of the estates, which was at one time 
lacking, the back lands are now being put under CUltivation. The 
estates have realised they have to afford opportunities for their 
labour to augment their resources. II (9) 
Government anxiety about unemployment lay elsewhere. Gold and 
diamond mining had also been hit by the recession and it was estimated 
that by February of 1931, nearly 1,000 people had left the diamond fields 
and by May, 1,659.1° The irregular nature of this work made accurate 
figures impossible, but a rough indicator of the fall in employment in 
aold and diamonds is given by the numbers of persons passing annually 
.,; 
through Bartica, the village nearest the mineral fields through which 
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entry to them was made: in the year ending February 1928 the number was 
20,083: at the year ending February 1929 it was reduced to 16,118 and by 
February 1930 it had fallen further to 12,627.11 The unemployed diamond 
workers were seen as a particular threat, partly as they were nearly all 
Africans and were not likely to find other sources of employment and 
partly because II they represent a body of men who are a positive source of 
trouble and discontent unless they are kept employedr12 presumably due to 
the spirit of independence fostered by their job, but more importantly 
because they tended to gravitate to Georgetown where there was a "large 
loafing population",13 and were considered likely to contribute to the 
groundswell of discontent. The British Guiana Labour Union and the 
British Guinana Workers' League were at this time organising protest 
marches and demonstrations and generally mounting agitation to secure 
action from the Government to relieve the unemployment situation.14• The 
situation was seen as particularly dangerous as in addition to the 
disquiet and demonstrations in Georgetown, the estate population was 
considered to be "inflamed generally~,15 Also, there was a new 
dimension to the unemployment of this period in the large number of young 
people without paid employrnent.16 
The state was unable to deal with the crisis by an increase in 
welfare spending since its sources of revenue were limited and all 
dependent, directly or indirectly, on export prices. The fall in duties 
received from the export of sugar meant a loss of government revenues and 
a consequent cut back in public works. The completion of the sewage 
works programme in Georgetown threw a further two hundred out of 
employment. High urban unemployment and a reduction in wages on the 
sugar estates placed a strain on the commercial sector. The social 
services suffered alsO. The grant for education for 1928-30 was cut 
resulting in the laying off of 400 teachers and the closing of twenty six 
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schools.17 Outdoor relief payments ,,,ere reduced from 19.34 cents per 
diem per caput in 1929 to 16.81 cents in 1930.18• A Committee was set up 
to consider means of cutting back further on Poor Law commitments to 
produce a saving of $20,000 in 1930 over the 1929 estimates.19 This 
Committee, though recognising the distress caused by current conditions 
nevertheless recommended a further reduction in doles of 12% in Demerara 
and 10% in Berbice. 
The state had been faced with the problem of controlling the 
r~pulation whilst in the grip of severe economic depression before, and 
the dependence of the economy on sugar had always meant that a crisis in 
sugar reverberated throughout society so the situation was not a new one. 
What was considered different was the attitude of labour. As the 
Commissioner of Lands and Hines remarked in 1933: 
'The outlook and attitude of labour had changed very much in this 
Colony in recent years and the writing was on the wall for 
everyone to see'. (20) 
The reaction of the British Government to the threat of civil 
disturbance was fairly swift. Under a bombardment of memoranda and 
telegrams from the region's governors, the Secretary of State realised 
the seriousness of the situation for the future of British interests in 
the area. He wrote : 
' •••• unemployment is now there, and in a negro population without 
any Poor Law it is a very short step to firing the canes and 
looting the stores. We must let the Governors start their Relief 
vlorks. ' (21) 
With the local governments in the West Indies virtually bankrupt, it 
became essential for the imperial government to provide funds for relief 
or risk total breakdown. It was decided to give free grants rather than 
loans as it was considered that the West Indian colonies \-!ere so deeply 
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in debt that this was the only feasible course.22 £ 125,000 were allotted 
to Guyana in toto, with £35,000 of this available to be spent in 1930. 
Of the total, £40,000 could be spent on the improvement of conditions on 
sugar estates giving in effect a large subsic1y to the sugar industry. In 
all, during the period from 1930 to 1~39, £264,493 was given from 
imperial funds in the form of grants and £549,500 as loans. This amount 
was received as aid in meeting usual budgetary commitments but included 
in addition funds for unemployment relief (1930-1933) and on a very 
limited scale, resources development. (1935) 23 (See Table 5 (ii». 
The measures adopted for the relief of unemployment were 
conservative and small scale and could have no real impact on the 
situation. However, they included providing work for as many as possible 
on public works, mainly roads, on three day shifts at fifty cents a day 
and providing passage to the gold anc1 diamond fields. 24 A government 
Labour Bureau was set up to assist in the finding of work. Feeding 
schemes were started; one in 1933 gave tickets fer a daily meal to the 
unemployed to be tendered or iginally at a soup ki tchen then later at a 
. 
food centre at the Alms House. 25. The Food CentrE: was closed in June 
1933 but re-opened as a Breakfast Centre "consequent upon the common 
outcry of the unemployed for assistance arising out of continued economic 
and financial depression and having regard to all the pressing 
circumstances.,,26 Tickets were given to those registered at the Labour 
Bureau. From 1936 applicants were subject to a means test.27 
The parsimonious approach adopted was a far cry from that called for 
by the Trade Unions. In 1931 the British Guiana Labour Union was 
pressing for the giving of financial relief to the unemployed.28 'ltlere 
was however, no deviation from the principle of refusing outdoor relief 
to the able-bodied. 
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TABLE 5 {iiL, 
Grants and Loans from Imperial Funds and Colonial 
Development Funds to British Guiana, 
From C.D. Funds 
From Imnerial Funds* 
(in aid of expenses 
of administration) 
1930-1939 
£ Grant £ Loan 
103,964 193,674 
264,493 549,500 
* includes 1930-1933 unemployment relief and 1935 funding 
for resource development. 
Source: Adapted from Nest India Royal Commission Report, 1945, 
Cmd.6607, op.cit. p.73 
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The general economic climate began to improve slightly from 1934, 
with exports showing an increase from a value of $10.5 million in 1935 to 
just under 15 million in 1940.29 This did not hOvlever signal any general 
improvement in the condition of the workers. The sugar industry, by this 
time composed mainly of the large concerns with Bookers pre-eminent, had 
introduced technologies which allowed for greater yield per acre.30 In 
1937 an International Sugar Agreement, limiting the sugar production of 
signatory nations, was conclude~ These factors together put a premium 
on raising yield and cutting costs. As will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter 7, the sugar producers of Guyana began to tend towards the 
achievement of this aim through a reduction in the work force through 
mechanisation. By 1938 it was "evident that the supply of labour in the 
sugar industry exceeded the demands" and that "it was not possible for 
all employers to provide the workers with an adequate amount of 
work ••••• "; further, it was "evident also that ovling to the limitation of 
production imposed by the International Sugar Agreement and the natural 
increase in population, under employment would increase ....... 31 
The drop in the mortality rate which had begun in the t'flenties was 
beginning to have an effect on the labour supply. The population which 
had risen by only 1,650 between 1911 and 1921 had increased by 13,242 
between 1921 and 1931, with the increase of both decades contributing to 
a growth in the amount of labour available in the 1930s if not yet 
producing a pronounced additional pressure against employment 
availability. (See Table 5 (ii.i) ) . 
Low earnings and irregular employment led to a spate of disturbances 
on the sugar estates with riots on several of them in 1935. Conditions 
in the villages were also severely affected by the recessio~ Because of 
the interdependence between many of the villages and the sugar estates, 
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TABLE 5 (iii) 
POPULATION INCREASE (1891-1911) - (1931-1941) 
Year Population 10 year Difference 
1891 278,328 
+ 17,713 
1911 296,041 
+ 1,650 
1921 297,691 
+ 13,242 
1931 310,933 
+ 43,286 
1941 354,219 
Source: Calculated from figures in Nath, D. op.cit. Table 4a 
p.230-231 
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the non-estate rural population was also adversely affected by the low 
sugar wages. In addition, the fortunes of rice had also sunk with export 
earnings reaching an all time low in 1933.32 The Immigrant Agent 
General noted that: 
"Wi th regard to the condi tions of East Indians of the labour ing 
class employed elsewhere than on the sugar estates, these have 
naturally been very adversely affected by the low price obtaining 
for ric e ••••• II( 3 3 ) 
The area under peasant cash crops appears to have declined between 
1930 and 1940, indicating poor prices for produce.34 In 1930 peasant 
proprietors in Canals Polder had 2,000 notices for rates served on them 
and they attributed their inability to pay to the poor market for their 
crops.35 Further, the International Sugar Agreement damaged peasant cane 
farmers as they were forced by the estates to which they sold their canes 
to limit their acreage to that already under CUltivation at the 1st June, 
1937.36 
Conditions in the villages of Essequibo County were even more 
desperate. The sugar estates of the area had been reduced from eight at 
the beginning of the century to one in 1935. This last one,Hampton 
Court, was closed by 1937 at which time the District Commissioner for the 
area attr ibuted the increase in pauperism in the area to the fact that 
"since the closing down of the sugar estates there has been little or no 
work for the population," which had lead to steadily worsening 
conditions.37 A public works programme for flood relief and prevention 
financed from Grants-in-Aid relieved the situation in some villages.38 
The overall situation in the villages, however, remained unchanged.39 
lhe First Colonial Deyelqgment ~ 
In addition to sums derived from the Grants and Loans-in-Aid, the 
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resources of the state were bolstered further throughout the thirties by 
a total of £103,964 in grants and £193,674 in loans from a Colonial 
Development Fund.40 This Fund was created by a Colonial Development Act 
of 1929. Under the terms of the Act, £1 million per annum was to be made 
available to colonial governments in the form of grants or loans. The 
Act was claimed by its proponents to have had a dual object - "the 
development of the colonies and the promotion of trade in or with the 
Uni ted Kingdom. ,,41 
The general colonial policy was to insist upon stringent local 
budgeting whilst propping up administrations financially and applying 
funds to limited development programmes, particularly those concerned 
with infrastructure. Over all the colonies the main expenditure of 
Colonial Development Funds was on Internal Transport and Communication, 
to which 30% of the total went. 
Although the unemployment problem in Britain rather than the 
stimulation of colonial economies \vas the main reason given for the Act, 
it was welcomed by all parties as "a long overdue contribution by Britain 
to the economic development of her colonial dependencies".42 However, 
the limits in the amount made available and the narrow terms under which 
money could be disbursed made it probable that neither of these aims 
could be met. It was more significant in that in principle at least it 
was aimed at development rather than the propping up of ailing 
industries. In the case of Guyana transfers from the British Treasury 
had formerly been almost exclusively to aid the sugar industry. The 
development potential of the Act was, however, limited as the projects 
for which funds could be applied for \-!ere restr icted to those a 
government could expect to finance running costs out of normal revenues. 
Hence there was no real 'departure from the old principle that a colony 
should have only those services which it can afford to maintain out of 
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its own resources,.43 
Funds were used mainly for drainage and irrigation projects, the 
improvement of sugar estate housing and the improvement of rural water 
supplies. The guiding principle for development announced by the 
Governor was that "care must be taken to see that the measures devised 
for industrial expansion do not prejudice or injure established 
industries such as sugar and rice!,44 In sending his proposals for 
projects to the Secretary of State he stressed that it was not "intended 
to undertake the responsibili ties of the Estates ••••• not to find an 
outlet for surplus estate labour except insofar as during the present 
season the number of unemployed in the neighbourhood of estates is likely 
to be very considerable". The sum of £100,000 asked for under the head 
'Improvements in Labour and Other Conditions on Sugar Estates' was 
however, the largest. Spending under the following heads was envisaged: 
construction of light railways, reclamation of land, drainage 
improvements and irrigation improvements.45 The sugar estates benefitted 
substantially from funds allocated to them and from spin off from 
drainage and irrigation schemes for other agricultural crops. They also 
received relief when the export tax on sugar was suspended in September 
1930.46 The actual effect of the application of Colonial Development 
Funds, new principles of colonial policy nothwithstanding, was more to 
assist in the modernisation of the estates than the country as a whole. 
The process of the determination of social policy remained much the 
same as it had in the 1920's. The manner of the Colonial Development 
Act's implementation in Guyana demonstrates the relative importance of 
different groups in directing policy. Requests for funds were to be 
submitted by Governors to the Colonial Office. In drawing up a 
development plan the Governor of Guyana consulted with the British Guiana 
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Sugar Producers' Association and the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce.47 
He did not put proposals before the Legislative Council, and the Elective 
members were not consulted at all.48 
The Governor's independence of the views of the Electives was a 
result of constitutional changes brought about in 1928 which had reduced 
the power of Elective representatives in the legislature. The Court of 
Policy was abolished in 1928 and a new Legislative Council replaced it. 
This was composed of the Governor (with casting vote only), the Colonial 
Secretary and Attorney General as ex-officio members, eight nominated 
officials, five nominated unofficials and fourteen elected officials. In 
this assembly, the official component, although now in the minority, 
continued to control policy because of the allegiance given to it by the 
nominated unofficials. These were men chosen by the administration for 
their "reliability"; for example, the nominated unofficia1s in the 1928 
Legislature were all men connected with big business and/or sugar.49 
The abolition of the Court of Policy did, in effect, remove the 
Electives' power to, as a body, limit state expenditure, a power they had 
held since the consti tutional reform of 1891. Al though, as has been 
shown, the Electives rarely set themselves up as a united opposition to 
the Off icials, they nevertheless had consti tutionally held a posi tion 
where, through their representation in the Court of Policy, they could 
upset the administration by refusing to vote funds for the various tasks 
of state if they so desired. In actuality, the constitutional change did 
not much alter the position. The Electives continued to play thei r 
accustomed role in relation to the administration, nei ther bemoaning 
their loss of fiscal power unduly nor exercising their new majority 
against the officials. As Raymond Smith has described them, they were: 
"educated gentlemen for the most part, identifying themsel vses 
with the existing English rulers, and arguing their fitness to 
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govern on the grounds they constituted a Europanised elite." (50) 
The causes of the change in the Consti tution are complex and full 
discussion of them is beyond the scope of this work. 5l Of great 
iml)Qrtance, however, was the desire of the officials, the sugar interest 
and those interested in investment in Guyana, to have the financial 
control of the colony entirely in the hands of the administration 
unimpeded by the Electives. In speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute, 
London in 19,27, Governor Rodway stated with regard to consti tutional 
changes and in relation to the existing situation: 
''There is ••••• an element of insecurity which cannot fail to serve 
as a deterrent to prospective investors .••• " (52) 
Similarly, in addressing the West India Committee, members of a 
British Parliamentary Commission appointed in 1926 by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to investigate the constitutional question 
reported that whilst there \'lere plenty of potential Bri tish investors 
interested in Guyana, they would need to be: 
"satisfied with the financial position of the Colony and that the 
real essential government of the Colony is in the hands of the 
government and not in the hands of an elected majority." 
The high level of unemploy~ent in the early thirties seems to have 
dampened popular enthusiasm for trade union activity. However, an 
addi tional general union, the Br i tish Guiana Workers League (B.G.W.L.) 
was created by ~ Thorne, a former member of the legislature. Although 
the union was not registered until January 1931, by April of the previous 
year it had active branches in North Essequibo, Batchelors Adventure, 
Beterverwating, Anne's Grove, Grove and Mahaica, all predominantly 
African areas, as well as Georgetown.54 At this juncture Thorne was 
adopting a radical anti-sugar position unlikely to find favour \'lith 
either the official or the unofficial sections of the legislative. l't 
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one of the B.G.W.L. meetings, for example, he gave an address in which he 
asked: 
'\ •••• when the sugar planters were making their piles in the 
colony, did the people benefit in any way? When sugar magnates 
prospered, did the people prosper?" (55) 
The significance of rhetoric of this kind was increased as the 
B.G.W.L. moved into the sugar belt, but the climate of the early 1930s 
was not conducive to the strengthening of trade union organisation. 
Neither the B.G.W.L. nor the British Guiana Labour Union (B.G.L.U.) was 
powerful enough to do more than mount limited campaigns and fulf il a 
lobbying role. They did, however, provide the base from which a radical 
critique of the plantation economy and the society it created emerged in 
later years. Thorne's rhetoric has been noted. In addition the B.G.L.U. 
lobbied, from the early thirties, for universal suffrage and also began 
to ally itself with socialism.56 The B.G.L.U. also peti tioned the 
secretary of State for the introduction of a compulsory old age pension, 
a scheme it had advocated from its earliest days.57 
The late thirties, however, brought a burst of trade union activity. 
In the period 1937-1938 seven unions were formed.58 The most important 
of these was the Manpower Citizens Asociation (M.P.C.A.) which organised 
sugar workers. This organisation was formed at a time when 
dissatisfaction on the sugar estates was high. The M.P.C.A. was 
important for trade unionism firstly because of the large membership it 
attracted. Between 1938 and 1943 its membership was around 20 ,000 making 
it'a giant among pygmies,.59 Secondly, the size of the group of workers 
it represented and the importance of their industry to the colony's whole 
economy made the union's potential power much greater than that of other 
unions. In addition the Similarity of conditions of life and work 
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amongst estate workers was perhaps more likely to produce class 
consciousness amongst this group than any other. Finally, the H.P.C.A. 
was important because it began to develop a position which was not only 
critical of conditions on estates but challenged the structure of society 
itself. 
SUMMARy RID CONCLUSION 
The world recession had a great impact on the economy of Guyana 
particularly through its effects on the price of exported commodities. 
There were immediate repercussions in relation to state funded welfare 
provisions with cut-backs throughout the social sector. 
The slight recovery in the second half of the decade was 
insufficient to produce any significant improvement in the condition of 
the masses. Nor could the Colonial Development Act, limited as it was 
both in terms of the finance it made available and the conditions under 
which grants and loans were made, provide sufficient impetus towards 
either economic development or social amelioration. The condition of the 
workers as a whole remained unchanged. 
The effects of stagnation in the economy began to be exacerbated by 
an increased population, a product, largely, of developments in public 
health, especially post-1920. In addition, constitutional changes 
minimised the effectiveness of the elected section of the legislature 
which, although it had never formed an entirely coherent or popular 
political force, had hitherto represented at least a possible avenue of 
influence for some sections of the local population in relation to 
government finance. 
The result of these conditions in the economy was labour unrest and 
increased labour organisation through trade unions. 
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The impact of the working class and the peasantry on the 
oeternlination of policy remained minimal however, in spite of increaseed 
union activity, but the long recession, increasing population pressure 
and changes in the sugar inoustry produced spontaneous struggles through 
the region which, as will be seen in the next chapter, at last produced 
a response from the colonial state wi th potential for a real change in 
social policy. 
175 
1. C.O. 884/13 (32) Governor to Secretary of State. 28th July, 1930. 
2. Bookers, for example, continued to recruit labourers from Barbados, 
securing 36 males and 30 females for service at Plantation Skeldon. 
Report of the Immigrant Agent General, 1930. 
3. c.o. 884/13 No.74. Governor to Secretary of State 5th december, 
1930. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Rer::ort of the Immigrant P.gent General, 1931. 
6. Ibid. 
7. C.O. 884/13 West Indian 218 (93) Governor to Secretary of State, 
May 4th, 1931. 
8. C.O. 114/219 Report of the Immigrant Agent General, 1935. 
9. C.O. 884/13 Governor to Secretary of State, May 4th, 1931. 
10. C.O. 884/13 W.I. 218 (82) Telegram Governor to Secretary of State, 
4th May, 1931. 
11. C.O. 114/209 Report of the Economic Investigation Committee, 
Legislative Council Paper 5, 1930 
12. c.o. 884/13 ~7.I. 218 (93) Governor to Secretary of State, May 4th, 
1931. 
13. Ibid. 
14. On February 5th 1930 for example, an unemployment demonstration, 
several hundred strong wus led by Rev. Claude Newton Smith, reputed 
chaplain of the British Guyana section of the Church Army of the 
U.S.A. in conj unction with r.'1r. John Gr iff i ths of the B.G.L.U. Daily 
Chronicle, February 5th, 1930. 
15. C.O. 111/686 Governor to Secretary of State. Telegram. August 22nd, 
1930. 
16. c.o. 884/13 (32) Governor to Secretary of State, July 28th 1930. 
Reference is made to the report of a committee which had considered 
the causes of unemployment and which estimated 8,000 persons were 
unemployed of which ntmlber half \'Jere thought to be young people. 
17. C.O. 114/209 Legislative Council Par:er No.5. Rer::ort of the Economic 
Investigation Committee, e.0. 111/685 Annual Education Rerx>rt 1929. 
18. c.o. 114/210. Report of the Poor Law Commissioners. 1930. It was 
reduced further to 15.33 cents in 1933 and 15.79 cents in 1935. 
19. A saving of $14,952,99 was effected. Ibid. 
20. C.O. 114/215 Legislative Council Paper No.8, 1933 
176 
21. C.Q. 111/689 (75086) Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
Treasury. 28th August, 1930. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Report of the Royal vlest India Committee. Cmnd 6607. London: 
H.M.S.Q., 1945, p.73. 
24. C.O. 884/13. (93) Governor to Secretary of State 4th May, 1931. 
25. Report of the Poor Law Commissioners, 1933. 
26. Report of the Poor Law Commissioners, 1935. 
27. Report of the Poor Law Commissioners, 1936. 
28. Daily Chronicle, 26th Feb, 1931. 
29. Spencer, Q.A. Memorandum on the Financial Position of British Guiana 
1920-1946, Georgetown, The Daily Argosy, 1946. p.27. 
30. C.Q. 114/227 Report of the Department of Labour and Local 
Government. 1938. 
31. Ibid 
~ 
32. Hanley, E.R. 'Rice, Politics and Development in Guyana' in Ox¥'l, I. 
et.al., (eds) Beyond ~ Sociology ~ Development, Economy ~ 
Society in Latin America ~ Africa, London and Boston. Routledge, 
Kegan Paul 1975. 
33. Report of the Immigrant Agent General, 1930. 
34. See Mandel, op.cit. pl16. Table 36. Total area under coconuts, 
ground provisions, coffee. 
35. Daily Chronicle, Feb. 7th. 
36. C.Q. 114/226. Report of the District Commissioner, East Demerara, 
1937/ 
37. e.O. 114/226 Quoted in the Poor Law Commissioners Rer:ort 1937. 
38. e.Q. 114/219 Report of the District Commissioner, Berbice 1934. 
39. C.Q. 114/219 Report of the Local Government Board, 1937. 
40. Colonial Development Advisory Commi ttee 11th Report, Cmnd. 6298. 
London: H.M.S.Q., 1941, p.8. 
41. COlonial Deve10pnent Advisory Committee, 11th Report. Crnnd. 6298. 
London: H.M.S.Q., p.8. 
42. Wicker, E.R. 'Colonial Development and v!e1fare, 1929-1957. The 
Evolution of a Policy', Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 17, No.4. 
1958. 
177 
43. Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare. Cmnd. 6175. 
London: H.M.S.O., 1940, para. 6. 
44. Legislative Council Paper No. 10, 1935. 
45. C.O. 884/13 West Indian, No. 32, Gov. to Sec. of State, 28th July, 
1930. 
46. C.O. 884/13 West Indian, No 53. Colonial Office to Treasury, 29th 
August, 1930. 
47. Daily Chronicle, January, 29th 1928. 
48. A motion was passed by the Legislative Council, to send a telegram 
to the Secretary of State requesting that no funds for British 
Guiana be passed until the council had had the opportunity to 
express its opinion on the proposed scheme. Daily Chronicle. 
January, 30th, 1928. 
49. Lutchman, H. From Colonialism to Co-operative Republic. Puerto Rico 
Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1974, p.57. 
50. Smith, R.T. British Guiana, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 
p.56. 
51. See Spackman, A., 'The role of Private Companies in the Politics of 
Empire: A Case Study of Bauxite and Diamond Companies in Guyana in 
the Early 1920's. Social ~ Economic Studies, Vol. 24. No.3. 
1975, pp. 341-373 for one view. 
52. West India Committee Circular. 'The Future of British Guiana'. 
Address to the Royal Colonial Institute, 1st December, 1927. 
53. West India Committee Circular, July 14th, 1927. 
54. Daily Chronicle, April, 23rd, 1930. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Mr. Critchlow, President of the B.G.L.U. visited the USSR and was, 
by all accounts, impressed by what he saw. See Ashton, C., A 
History Qf Trade Unionism in Guyana. 1900-1961. New Guyana Co., 
Ltd., Demerara 1964. p.76. 
57. This petition is referred to in C.O. 345/26 (94344) 1932. The 
Colonial Office copy of which has been destroyed. 
58. C.O. 114/227 Report of the Registrar of Trade Unions, 1938. These 
were: The Manpower Citizens Association (1937) B.G. Seaman's Union, 
Transport Workers Union, B.G. Post Office Workers, Subordinate 
Hedical Employees' Union, B.G. Congress of General Workers, 
Subordinate Government Employees Assocition (1938). 
59. Ashton, C., op.cit. p.85. 
178 
0IAPl'ER SIX 
WELFARE RID DEVEWPMENr 
The effects of the economic depression were still manifest in the 
late thirties and led to disturbances throughout the region. In Guyana 
the period was characterised by frequent strikes on the sugar estates 
aimed against low wages, poor working conditions and insecure employment. 
The level of discontent can be gauged from the strike figures for 1938 
which indicate that on one estate alone there were 37 strikes and this 
estate - Leonora - was by no means exceptional.! In this chapter the 
response of the imperial government to these manifestations of worker 
disaffection is examined. The new ideological and practical approaches 
to colonial economic and social development is described. This is 
followed by an analysis of the way in which, in Guyana, the new 
"development and welfare' philosophy became translated into a policy 
producing some "welfare" but little development. 
The Royal west India Commission 
The possibility of insurrection in the Empire on the eve of war with 
Germany was sufficient to cause alarm in Britain. A Commission was 
appointed in August 1938 to investigate social and economic conditions in 
the West Indies, chaired by Lord Moyne. The Commissioners duly reported 
but their findings were not made public until the end of the war as it 
was considered against the public interest to issue so condemnatory a 
report at a time when Britain was anxious for the support of its Empire 
in pursuit of its war aims. 
The si tuation was, however, urgent and seen to requi re immediate 
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action. A major finding of the Commission was that condi tions in the 
West Indies were EO poor that there was "a pressing need for large 
expenditure on social services and development which not even the least 
poor of the vJest Indian colonies can hope to undertake from their own 
resources". 2 
The Report was influential in the formulation of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, 1940, \'lhich Act incorporated many of its 
recommendations but which covered the whole of the Empire, not only the 
v-Jest Indian colonies. The Act marked a final departure from the long-
entrenched principle, already somewhat eroced by the Colonial Development 
Act of 1929, that a colony should be financially self-sufficient and have 
only the services it could afford. It was also indicative of an 
important development in colonial ideology. Lora Hailey had noted in his 
influential 'African Survey' that a new 'ylelfare' approach to colonial 
development was required in the re-interpretation of the old doctrine of 
'trusteeship', thereby allowing for an increase in state involvement In 
development acti vi ties. 3 
In the early forties the concepts of 'welfare' and 'development' 
became linked. Social development came to be seen as the basis on which 
and through which economic development was to be built. Finance put into 
welfare programmes was intended to have a 'pump-priming' effect on the 
economy which, it was hoped, would generate further development. 
The new colonial ideology was perceived as requiring a broadening of 
state functions from simple concerns of law and order to ones of active 
intervention in the economy and the promotion of social welfare. The 
Governor of Guyana saw it thus: 
"What has developed in these last few years is a complete re-
orientation of colonial policy. The older one was that Government 
"las mainly concerned with the elementary needs of public order and 
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administration of the law, the prevention of abuses and matters of 
that kind, coupled with a desire to promote advance by gradual 
stages in the direction of self-government. The idea of 
Government responsibility in economic development or in social 
services generally was at that time completely in the background. 
Today, parallel with developments in the United Kingdom and other 
advanced countries, a far more positive view of the state has come 
into being ••• and it is now generally admitted that a primary 
obligation is the extension of social services and the ratio of 
the general standard of living. This has brought with it the 
admission that the state institution assume control over the 
organisation of industry and the use of capital or land." (4) 
Social developm,ent was to be elevated from a residual acti vi ty 
pursued with what local revenues could be afforded when primary state 
functions had been met to a major arm of colonial policy. In fact, as 
has been shown, the colonial state had long concerned itself wi th more 
than the maintenance of law and order. The state had continually acted 
to create or support conditions for the continuance of estate production 
based on cheap labour. In its assistance to and sanctioning of the 
movement of large numbers of immigrant labourers to the estates of 
Guyana, in its restrictive policies militating against development in 
areas which would result in competition for labour against the interest 
of the sugar lobby, in its appointment of taxes and duties which 
continually worked in sugar's favour, the state assumed a role, though 
indirect, of involvement in the economic sphere. ~fuilst many governors 
and the British administration as a whole were not in sympathy with the 
'saccharine oligarchy', by the end of the nineteenth century the West 
India Committee and other vested interests had entrenched the principle, 
never seriously challenged throughout the rest of the colonial period, 
that Guyana could not survive without sugar. 
The 1940 Colonial Develqpment and Welfare Act 
The 1940 Act, however, represented a further stage in the 
development of direct state intervention in the economy. Under its terms 
fifty million pounds were made available in the form of loans and grants 
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for development and welfare programmes in the colonies as a whole. This 
was to be expended at the rate of up to five million pounds per annum in 
the furtherance of any project likely to "promote the development of 
resources of any colony or the welfare of i ts ~ople." 
These terms were much wider than those of the 1929 Act and allowed 
for the financing of operating as well as capital charges, although they 
still presented many limitations. Initially funds were allocated on an 
annual basis and were non-accruable. Limited infrastructural 
development, scarcity of technical skills and war-time material shortages 
made it diff icul t for many territor ies to absorb the funds which were 
available to them. The administrative system gave responsibility for the 
execution of the planning function to the local level, to administrations 
ill-equipped and inexperienced in planning functions. T. Simey, Social 
Welfare Advisor to the Comptroller of Colonial Development and Welfare in 
the West Indies charged that: 
"The machinery was unwieldy. Decisions on policy were only 
achieved after many interests had been consulted and those finally 
made were perforce based on so long a succession of compromises as 
to inhibit energetic executive action. 11 (5) 
Crown Colony constitutions together with limited franchises effectively 
removed any possibility of mass participation in the decision-making 
process. 
The emphasis in the caribbean as elsewhere was, initially, much more 
on 'welfare' than 'development'. This tendency was especially pronounced 
in the first five years of the Act's operation. This was in line with 
the analysis of West Indian problems made by the Royal Commissioners. In 
his assessment of development and welfare in 1945-6 the then Comptroller, 
Sir John McPherson, recognised the significance of the Moyne Report, as 
the West Indies Commission Report became known, in directing attention 
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and action towards welfare rather than strictly developmental projects: 
"In the vlest Indies, moreover, though the importance of economic 
development was recognised, the Royal Commission's recommendations 
had placed special emphasis on the need for expenditure on 
improved social services."(6) 
Whilst recognising that both rural and urban under-employment and 
unemployment raised difficulties, the general tenor of the Report was to 
lay primary blame on social and administrative factors. Insofar as the 
economy was considered a causative element in producing distress in West 
Indian society, the Report stressed redistribution as the panacea rather 
than enhanced production through an altered economic system. 
Although the Report was in some senses remarkable - it was for 
example the first of the commissioned reports to cover such a wide area 
of concerns - it exhibited a reformist, moralist concern with the moral 
and ethical fabric. The church was to assist in a 'moral resurgence' 
upon which material betterment was seen to be mainly conditional.? 
Considerable attention was given to the regularisation of sexual 
relations and the strengthening of the family unit. The emphasis was 
placed upon the stabilisation of the family as a weapon against poverty. 
After practical steps for the removing of the evils of improvidence, 
theft, promiscuity and inefficiency are considered the Report states: 
I~ut in the last resort the success or failure of any programme of 
social reform and betterment will depend on a definate and 
prolonged effort on the part of West Indians to help themselves 
even while accepting help. The material betterment of the West 
Indies must be accompanied by, and is to a large extent 
conditional on, a moral resurgence among the people themselves. 
We do not believe the mere removal of the causes of poverty, 
uncertainty and casualisation will of itself suffice to remove the 
evil consequences of these evils •••• "(8} 
A predominant attitude in colonial circles at this time was "that 
the economic situation of the West Indies depends in the final analysis 
on the awakening in the mind of the worker of a willingness to do more 
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work. ,,9 The provision of social services was to strengthen moral fibre 
and act as an incentive to greater efforts at work as well as to 'prime' 
the economic 'pump'. This perception of West Indians as, in effect, 
work-shy and lazy was simply in the tradition of, to use Simey's phrase, 
"the old staple diet of the West Indian political warrior, Natural 
Indolence." (10) 
The Commissioners placed their faith in the development of an 
independent peasantry, the foundation of which would, they felt, assist 
in reducing unemployment and at the same time encourage family stability 
and civic responsibility, for they considered that where 
"the size of the holdings remains adequate the peasants form the 
solidest elements in West Indian society, and it is among them 
that the social virtues of forethought and the care of children 
are most ccmnonly to be found." (11) 
They concluded that the primary sector for food production in the future 
should be peasant agriculture thereby restating Chamberlain's policy 
objective from the previous century. Given the lack of available 
evidence to suggest that any extension of peasant agriculture was 
feasible in many territories, the thinking behind the Report seems to be 
more an expression of faith in the old 'yeoman' virtues than a rational 
approach to economic development. 
The reliance on agriculture for the development of the West Indies 
was also a result of the extremely limited role allowed by the 
Commissioners for industrial development. They rejected the idea of any 
application of local government or imperial funds to industrial 
development except where the purpose was to improve markets for 
agricultural produce or to contribute to import substitution. The first 
Comptroller of Welfare and Development, Sir Frank Stockdale, took a 
similar line and in the main industrial development during this period 
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was specifically related to the easing of wartime shortages. 
In the post-war period other factors emerged to provide further 
reason for the speedy development of the colonial territories. Firstly, 
the state of the British economy led to a need for the creation of new 
markets so that British products could be absorbed and the dollar crisis 
eased. Further, with the carving up of the world into spheres of 
influence between the new superpowers, the West Indian colonies became of 
significant international interest and although the Caribbean was clearly 
within the Western ambit, its strategic importance was such as to make 
programmes for social and economic development which would promote 
political security, a matter of "security as well as 
humani tar iani sm. ,,12 Anticipation of the coming new poli tical world 
order led to the creation in 1942 of the Anglo-American Caribbean 
Commission, a conSUltative and advisory body set up by the two 
governments concerned, with a view to easing the path to development in 
the Caribbean in the light of its new global importance in relation to 
the war. 
The Labour Party's post-war entry to government in Britain made no 
radical difference to colonial policy: 
"During the forties the official creed advanced by both major 
political parties in Britain was that the colonies should be 
prepared for eventual self-government. There was unanimity on the 
concept that social and economic development was the prerequisite 
for the assumption of political independence." (13) 
Theparties differed on the extent to which public enterprise should play 
a role in development but Labour agreed that private enterprise was 
important. A bi-partisan policy evolved with spokesmen for both parties 
supporting the welfare approach and a continued economic and political 
association with Britain as its colonies assumed independence. The 
emergence of nationalist movements throughout the Empire gave added 
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urgency to development. By the time of the ]tassing of the second Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act in 1945, however, the I welfare I approach was 
being questioned and its limitations recognised. 
In the Caribbean the limitations of the welfare approach to 
development had become quite evident and had been exacerbated by new 
factors. The increasing rate of population growth in stagnant economies 
meant that any effect of purely palliative welfare measures would soon be 
\'dped out by population increases alone. Welfare measures could not be 
supported by any significant redistribution of wealth since national 
incomes were too small for such action to result in any appreciable rise 
in individual standards of living. Increases in government revenues 
raised were absorbed by price increases on imports and labour. In 
Guyana, for example, direct taxation rose from 12% of the national budget 
at the beginning of the war to 36% in 1944 but the increase in revenue 
produced was largely taken up by increased salary disbursements, a War 
Bonus introduced to supplement wages in the face of rising prices and the 
increase in the cost of materials and supplies.14 In addition, the 
sensitivity of the local economies to world market conditions over which 
local governments had no control meant that there was no guarantee that 
new welfare measures introduced with Colonial Development and Welfare 
funds could be maintained by locally generated resources when the Act was 
terminated if there was no independent economic growth. 
By mid-decade commentators both in Guyana and the West Indies as a 
whole were calling for the reappraisal of development objectives and 
strategies. Simey noted that by 1945 the only industrial scheme of any 
note to be financed by Colonial Development and Welfare funds was a small 
cotton spinning industry in Barbados. This he saw as indicative of a 
mistaken reliance on agriculture which could not in his assessment 
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provide sufficient employment for the growing population.ls He also 
argued that welfare would have to be built on economic regeneration and 
development and that "lack of economic foundations makes futile any 
attempt to produce reliable plans for the social reconstruction of the 
West Indian colonies."16 O.A. Spencer, financial advisor to the Guyana 
Government, was similarly critical of welfare wi thout economic 
development. He argued that' pump-pr iming' welfare spending did not 
produce growth in economies like that of Guyana due to their sensitivity 
to international price factors. He proposed that the welfare-development 
formula be reversed: 
" 'Welfare' must spring from' Development' and be condi tional and 
consequential upon it." (17) 
He warned also that without any appreciable increase in national income 
it was doubtful whether services could even be maintained at their 
existing level. 
This kind of reassessment of development priorities was reflected in 
a directive given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1945. He 
pronounced that: 
"Without economic development it will be impossible for the 
dependencies to maintain from their own resources the improved 
standards which are desired for thern."(18) 
He indicated, further, his wish that economic development be more 
strongly promoted. 
The reasons proferred for redirecting the emphasis from welfare to 
development were essentially financial. A 1945 Act, essentially a 
renewal of the or iginal 1940 Act, provided for a vast increase in the 
monies available to all the colonies to one hundred and twenty million 
pounds over a ten year period, with allocations for individual 
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territor ies accruable from year to year. If the larger sums available 
were used exclusively for welfare projects and no substantial economic 
growth was realised, then the economies would not generate sufficient 
funds to maintain the level of welfare provision attained at the end of 
the period of financial assistance. Therefore it was seen as necessary 
that economic development be supported by increased allocations to 
projects specifically directed towards the raising of national incomes. 
It is important to note that mid-decade the priority given to 
agriculture in the region and the low level of development investment in 
industry also carne to be questioned at the Colonial Office level. Sir 
John McPherson, Comptroller, wrote: 
I~e chief asset of the West Indies is the land and plans for its 
more effective and balanced use, and more adequate marketing of 
its products must rank high in all development prograrnarnes. But 
responsible opinion today is much more optimistic than was the 
Royal Commission about the prospects of increased industrial 
developnent in the area."(19) 
Industry was not to compete with metropolitan industry, however, as 
emphasis was to be on the processing or partial processing of the area's 
raw products. 
Locally, support for according more attention to industrialisation 
carne from the West Indian Conference, an intergovernmental meeting, at 
its First Session of 1944 and also from the Anglo-American Caribbean 
Commission which endorsed the Conference's views.20 Thus, by the second 
half of the decade the Colonial Office position on a development plan for 
Guyana and the region, one which received support from other bodies, was 
that industry should be encouraged more strenuously and that whilst 
projects that contributed to the promotion of social welfare should 
continue to be developed, they must take second place and be built upon 
economic development. 
188 
Another important mid-decade corrective, introduced in the 1945 
legislation, was administrative. In addition to the weaknesses in 
existing arrangements noted earlier in the chapter, it became clear that 
if the much larger sums of money made available were to be expended 
effectively and rapidly, a new approach to planning would be necessary_ 
The old~~ and piecemeal orientation was to give way to real planning 
with all that implied in terms of outlining objectives, assessing overall 
needs and programme development. To this end local governments were 
required to set up relevant departments where necessary or expand on 
existing administrative capabilities so as to produce detailed 
development plans. 
A third broad direction for the future, the diversification of 
agriculture, whilst not new, continued to be stressed by the Colonial 
Office and received support from the Caribbean Commission. The latter 
organisation recommended diversification to the participating governments 
and the British section accepted, noting that the proposal was already 
the avowed policy of the British West Indian Governments. 21 
Gyyana - Deyelqpment and Welfare? 
An analysis of developments in Guyana during 1945-1953 shows that 
none of the policy objectives relating to agricultural diversification or 
industrial development was met. Welfare spending continued at a high 
level. Little commitment to industrial development was demonstrated. 
Diversification in agriculture, although developed successfully during 
the war period, lost government support and in Guyana agricultural 
development, rather than moving towards self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, 
was concentrated dramatically on another export cash crop, rice. 
A breakdown of total annual expenditure indicates that the 
proportion of the budget allocated to the social services did not decline 
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TABLE 6(i) 
Law and Order 
Social Services 
Economic D=ve1oprrent 
Annual Expenditure on Law and Order, Social Services and 
Economic Development as Percentage of the Annual Budget, 
1920 - 1954 
1920 1931 1937 1939 1942 1944 1945 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
-- --
15.5 14.0 12.2 12.6 11.8 11.3 10.3 9.3 8.66 9.42 8.24 8.36 7.62 7.37 8.87 
~ 
23.5 20.9 20.5 21.3 25.2 28.0 28.6 22.54 22.38 25.34 26,65 28.54 27.0 27.06 27.95 
7.4 6.0 6.7 6.1 7.9 8.1 8.8 8.8 9.35 11.37 10.56 9.93 9.24 11.69 10.28 
Sources: 1920-1945 Spencer, O.A., (1946) "Memorandum on the Financial Position of British Guiana, 
1920-1946", Georgetown: The Daily ArgosY,Tab1e VII; 1947-1954 Colonial Annual Reports, 
British Guiana Colonial Office H.M.S.O. 
TABLE 6 (ii) 
Development Expenditure proposed 1947-51, Actual 
Expenditure to the end of 1950 
EXEenditure ProEosed 1947-51 
P·er Cent Actual 
of Recurrent Expenditure 
Capital Total Eer Annum to end 1950 
$ $ $ 
Health 523,705 2.6 174,378 626,402 
Education 1,849,122 9.1 264,800 1,253,900 
Other social services 68,814 0.3 86,320 138,666 
Communications 3,853,430 19.0 1,150,560 
Drainage and 
Irrigation 5,358,786 26.4 80,000 5,945,000 
Geology and Mines 72,400 0.4 56,920 98,300 
Agriculture and 
Fisheries 1,846,306 9.1 76,608 710,423 
Forests 1,143,944 5.6 53,930 210,000 
Town Planning, 
Urban Housing 3,332,844 16.4 36,760 843,654 
Rural Housing, Land 
Settlement 1,549,401 7.6 113,680 1,605,802 
Trade and Industrial 
Development 509,000 2.5 63,000 
Interior Schemes 207,635 1.0 75,940 
20,315,387 100.0 1,082,336 12,573,407 
Source: An Economic Survey of the Colonial Territories Cmd. 880 
London, H.M.S.O., 1951. 
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Development Plan, failed to allocate more than a meagre sum to interior 
development thus failing to meet a demand expressed by elements of the 
local population for increased development, and hence job and investment 
possibilities, in the hinterland. Hopes were raised in Guyana by 
statements made by Mr. O. Case, Chairman of the Secondary and ~inor 
Industries Committee which suggested that the accepted notion that the 
interior held no commercial value was incorrect. He referred, for 
example, to the "enormous quantities of raw materials" including silicia, 
timber, kaolin which it promised and also the hydropower potential the 
hinterland held.24 These statements were eagerly reported by sections of 
the press.25 
A Ten Year Development Plan was, however, published in 1947 without 
any SUbstantial allocation to interior development. This was in large 
part a reflection of government's continued emphasis on coastal 
development, but also in expectation that the report of a Settlement 
Commission (Evans), to be published in November 1948, would make some 
recommendations wi th regard to interior development. The Settlement 
Commission had been appointed by the Secretary of state to investigate 
the potential of the interior of Guyana and Belize (British Honduras) for 
the settlement of European war refugees and surplus West Indian island 
populations. It adopted very wide terms of reference and considered 
economic prospects in the hinterland; the Governor referred to it as a 
"Development Commission". 26 It recommended schemes costing between 
seven-and-a-half million and fifteen million pounds. This, together with 
the promise of the imperial government to form a Colonial Development 
Corporation, raised fresh hopes of interior opportunities. The Annual 
Report for 1948 stated: 
"The original ten year plan was principally concerned with 
development in the coastal belt. Apart from $1,000,000 for 
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in the post 1945 period but actually increased, whilst the budgeted 
allocation to economic development including drainage and irrigation, 
remained fairly stable. (See Table 6{ i» . The World Bank Mission reported 
that, in real terms between 1949 and 1953, the budget showed: 
Increase in government revenue 26% 
Increase in social welfare expenditure 31% 
Increase in development expenditure 5% 
Decrease in expenditure on economic departments 4% (22) 
In terms of the development programme itself, including expenditure from 
Colonial Development and Welfare funds, there was, they felt, 
"a tendency to devote a perhaps over-generous proportion of the 
Colony's financial resources to social welfare expenditures which 
were only indirectly productive." (23) 
The planning function for the production of the colony's Ten Year Plan as 
required by the Colonial Office was carried out in eleven sub-committees 
which reported to a Main Development Commi ttee which had the colony's 
Economic Advisor as chairman and unofficial and official members of the 
Legislative Council and representatives of business and commerce as 
members. Firm proposals were made for the first five years' expenditure, 
but the plans for the second part of the period were left vague. The 
expendi ture proposed can be seen in Table 6 (i i). A total of 26.9% of the 
total development allocation went to the social sector excluding 
education (i.e. housing, health, social services) with the largest single 
other area of allocation being under the heading 'drainage and 
irrigation'. Hence it is clear that the general view that spending on 
economic projects should be increased at the expense of social ones was 
not adopted in the actual allocation and expenditure of funds. 
One other point may be usefully noted here. The Ten Year 
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forestry development, only $200,000 was provided for schemes in 
the interior. However, the Report of the Settlement Commission 
••••• holds out hopes for considerable development in the 
interior."(27) 
Budgetary commitment to the interior remained small, although some 
advances were made in forestry, and the settlement of the interior by 
new immigrants failed to materialise, the final judgement being that much 
more in the way of surveys and other preparatory works were necessary 
before such settlement could take place.28 Wi th the end of the 
settlement scheme the suggestions for interior development by the 
Commission were shelved and the interior continued to be neglected with 
the concentration of population and resources on the coast was 
maintained. The reasons for this are probably several and include 
uncertainty about the true economic potential of interior projects. Host 
earlier assessments of the hinterland had not been encouraging. But it 
is probable also that the sugar lobby and other coastal interests were 
instrumental in producing a climate antithetical to any real change in 
direction. This is supported by Mr. case's statement to the Georgetown 
Chamber of Commerce that fear was being expressed that interior 
development might detrimentally affect the sugar and rice industries, 
principally by attracting labour away from them.29 
The 1947-49 Report on Development and Welfare in the West Indies 
attributed at least part of the slow pace of economic development to 
technical difficulties. Undoubtedly local governments found it easier to 
build on existing welfare foundations than generate new projects. 
However, it is likely that at least in the case of Guyana there were 
other, more important, factors involved. A.P. Thorne, Economic 
Consultant to the Guyana Government at the time states that the Colonial 
Office issued a memorandum to the local government indicating that in 
spite of the general desire expressed in the colonies for 
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industrialisation, Britain's current problems in securing world markets 
necessitated that colonial, and especially Guyanese, industrialisation 
should not be encouraged.30 He also speculates that this attitude 
towards Guyana's development was behind the retiring of the popular and 
pro-industralisation Governor Lethem and the removal of Mr. Case, the 
Governor's primary assistant in the promotion of secondary industries.31 
What is certain is that the allocation of five hundred thousand 
dollars to industrial development proposed by the Sub-Committee on 
Industrial Development for the setting up of a British Guyana Development 
Corporation was insignificant and indeed was never effected.32 The lack 
of enthusiasm for any realistic funding of industrial development shown 
by the Sub-Committee was undoubtedly a reflection of the interests of its 
members. Of the six, one was from the Demerara Electric Company which 
was jealously guarding its market by opposing the development of hydro-
electric power except under its own aegis or that of another Canadian 
company, Demerara Bauxite, which also had representation on the 
Committee. A third member represented the Sugar Producers' Association 
and a fourth William Fogarty Ltd., a foreign-owned dry goods business.33 
None of these entrenched companies appeared willing to support proposals 
for development which might represent competi tion for labour or other 
resources. 
As the example of committee composition cited above indicates, 
administration under the 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act did 
not alter existing patterns of influence in policy making. Rather, after 
1945, the role of private interests always consulted previously became 
formalised and institutionalised as representatives of those interests 
assumed conSUltative positions within the expanding bureaucracy. 
Formerly, policy was formulated by the Governor and his officials under 
the direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and subject to 
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lobbying from sectional interests, the strongest of which were the 
planter and mercantile groups. These goups were now co-opted into the 
planning process itself. Further, policy decision-making became more 
entrenched within the bureaucratic machinery. The tendency to deal with 
questions of policy as problems in administration was strengthene~ The 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act did nothing to democratise policy 
making. It rather institutionalised the non-bargaining element 
characteristic of colonial policy making and increased implementation by 
fiat. Nor was the essential elitism and conservatism of the 
administration affected. In spite of the recognition made by the Royal 
Commissioners that race prejudice was a growing problem in the West 
Indies and constituted a "serious obstacle to the harmonious political 
development which is necessary as a preliminary to the eventual grant of 
wider powers to the elected representatives of the peoples of the West 
Indies",34 the staffing of the Colonial Development and Welfare 
apparatus in the West Indies did little to contribute to a reduction in 
tension. The Comptroller and his staff were all English although there 
were many West Indians who could have filled the posts.3 5 Not 
surprisingly, given the constitution of development committees and sub-
committees, the development debate, such as there was, never contemplated 
any radical restructuring of the economy or anything except gradualism in 
the movement towards independence. 
Agricultural PolicY 
Next, agricultural development will be considered. By 1946 war 
conditions had induced a situation where a new direction in economic 
development was conceivable. Yet in 1945 Dr. Benham, Economic Advisor to 
the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies, 
concluding his survey of the economic position of the sugar industry in 
relation to the rest of the economy, stated that the sugar industry was 
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the mainstay of the colony.36 This was the view that prevailed; 
subsequent years showed a retreat from the initiatives of the war years. 
By 1947 the Governor was claiming that the programme to grow more food 
locally was a 'short term policy' and had proved too expensive for 
government to justify its continuance when war no longer made it 
absolutely necessary. This was in spite of the position taken in 1942 
when the Department of Agriculture entered into discussion with the Sugar 
Producers' Association with regard to the adoption of a 'long range 
policy of diversification' in line with the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission Report (Moyne). 37 
The divide between Colonial Office directives and actual 
developments in Guyana during the period under discussion is illustrated 
by the following statements appearing in the Development and Welfare 
Report for 1948-49: 
"It is desirable that the area should not depend for its stability 
exclusively upon anyone crop, and a diversification of the 
economy together with the establishement of some minor industries 
is required as a basis of the next stage of econanic progress:" 
and 
'TIrainage and irrigation required for the opening up of lands for 
cUltivation continue in British Guyana to absorb most of the funds 
available for the Colony's developuent."(38) 
That is, most funds were expended on the developnent of rice lands. 
The initial expansion of rice was adopted as a war measure to 
provide rice for the Caribbean market whilst traditional sources were 
unable to supply. The Department of Agricul ture Report for 1940 noted 
that: 
"Because of its importance as a food crop, both locally and in the 
neighbouring colonies, a substantial part of the Department's 
activities was directed tCMards the extension of rice." 
197 
Between 1943 and 1944, Colonial Development and Welfare funds were used 
to undertake drainage and irrrigation schemes which increased the land 
available for rice cUltivation by fifty percent. In addition experiments 
were made with the introduction of machinery for cUltivation and 
threshing. 39 The future of rice in Guyana, in the short term at least, 
was made more secure in 1946 when Caribbean governments contracted with 
the Rice Marketing Board, sole supplier since its establishment in 1939, 
to accept at least 80% of their requirements from that source at a fixed 
price for five years. The war time initiative in rice continued. By 
1952 the acreage in rice for the main harvest had risen to 133,970 acres 
from 76,500 in 1944, largely as a result of the government's investment 
in drainage and irrigation.40 (See also Table 6(iv)). The heavy 
commitment of Colonial Development and Welfare funds to rice relative to 
other areas of development which reflects the allocation of funds from 
all sources is shown below: 
Head 
Agriculture 
Public Health 
Education 
Social Welfare 
Land Settlement and Housing 
Drainage and Irrigation 
Camnunications 
Interior Development 
Total 
TABIE 6(iii) 
Colonial Develqgment and Welfare Fund 
EXPenditure in Guyana to December 1950 
Assistance III % 
166,381 5.5 
165,384 5.4 
215,626 7.0 
68,858 2.3 
127,075 4.1 
1,918,268 62.6 
219,645 7.2 
180,865 5.9 
3,062,102 100.00 
Source: Calculated from Annual Report, British Guiana. Colonial Office, 
H.M.S.O. 1950 p4. 
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TABLE 6 (i v) 
AREA UNDER RICE CULTIVATION, SELECTED YEARS, 1884 - 1955 
Year 
1884 - 88 
1903 
1908 
1914 
1918 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
Source: Nath, D., op.cit. 
Acres 
about 2,500 
17 ,500 
29,746 
47,037 
60,432 
29,333 
52,287 
70,882 
57,859 
63,015 
93,637 
153,000 
Table 14 p.260 
• 
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The head 'Drainage and Irrigation' in Table 6(iv) mainly covers 
expenditure on the preparation and maintenance of rice lands, the setting 
up of rice mills and the introduction of machinery for use in rice 
production. Drainage and irrigation schemes also benefited the 
production of crops other than rice but government initiatives were 
comparatively minor in these other areas. For example, of the 30,000 
acres to be brought into cUltivation at Black Bush Polder, part of the 
Courantyne Drainage and Irrigation Project began under the Ten Year Plan, 
27,000 were earmarked for rice. 41 There were undoubtedly purely 
economic factors which argued for the development of the rice industry to 
the exclusion of other agro-industry, notwithstanding the Colonial 
Office's recommendations of greater diversification and self-sufficiency 
in agriculture. The guaranteed market and good prices arranged in 1946 
indicated, at least in the short term, a secure future for rice. The 
cost of developing rice lands was enormous, however, and it is certainly 
arguable whether the investment was justifiable given the comparatively 
meagre returns offered.42 Further, whilst expansion in rice CUltivation 
could absorb some displaced labour from the sugar industry with its 
contracting labour requirement, its amenability to mechanisation made it 
a poor long-term prospect in terms of employment generation. 43 On 
balance it seems that social and political factors were also instrumental 
in producing the emphasis on rice as well as purely economic ones. 
The position of rice relative to developments in the sugar industry 
was of particular importance. Historically rice had been encouraged to 
develop as a supplement to wages earned on the estates and had later 
been grown as an alternative to estate wages when estate work could not 
be had or when low wages made rice growing more attractive. There is 
some evidence to suggest that this view of rice as complementary to sugar 
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remained the official one. For example, the Development Sub-COmmittee on 
Agriculture recommended that no expansion of the spring crop be allowed 
in sugar areas so that rice would not be competitive with sugar at 
critical periods in the crop cycle.44 
SUMMARy AND CONCLUSION 
Doubtless Colonial Development and Welfare funds were insufficient 
to support any radical restructuring of the economy of Guyana or 
elsewhere. But this was never the task set. In Guyana, national 
budgetary allocations to the social sector continued to be set at 
relatively high levels as compared to the economic and developmental 
sectors. Within Colonial Development and Welfare funded programming, 
spending was heavily concentrated on drainage and irrigation. Hinterland 
development and industrial development were ignored in favour of a 
massive investment in rice lands made in an effort to provide an 
additional employment for the rural population which was compatible with 
the sugar industry's well-being. The welfarism without reconstruction of 
the 1940-45 period did not really change in the next phase, offical 
Colonial Office pronouncements notwithstanding. In addition to 
metropolitan pressures against anything but agriculture-linked spending, 
there were strong local pressures in Guyana leading in the same 
direction. 
By the time that Ten Year Plans were being drawn up in 1946 social, 
economic and political conditions had begun to change, in some ways 
radically, from those explored by the Royal Commissioners in 1938-9. 
These changes will be explored fully in the next chapter. At this point 
we note only that increasing population and consequent pressure on land 
and housing, trade union and political activism and a growing 
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nationalisation, presented new problems both for the sugar interest and 
the colonial power. 
For sugar the dominant question in the forties was how to preserve a 
sufficient, cheap and quiescent labour force in the face of increasingly 
clamant demands for higher wages and improved working conditions. For 
the colonial power it was how to guide the nation to independence on a 
basis that would ensure a continued economic and political relationship 
with Britain. Welfarism was seen as the answer by both groups. 
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0IAPrER SEVEN 
E<PmHY MlD SOCIETY 1940-1953 
In this chapter it will be argued that the applications and other 
outcomes of the "development and vlelfare" policy in Guyana described in 
the previous chapter were the result of profound changes occurring in the 
society, particularly in the sugar industry, population structure, the 
level of mass rx:>litical mobilisation and in the constitution. Social 
and economic developments during the period to be examined began with the 
Royal Commission of 1938 and ended with the suspension of the 
constitution in 1953. They form the background to the way in which the 
new deve10pnent and welfare ideology actually functioned in the social 
welfare area. 
Changes in ..the Sugar Industry 
The effects of the war on the sugar industry were several. The 
early years contributed to its prosperity as a result of a guaranteed 
British market at improved prices due to Europe's difficulty in obtaining 
sugar from war affected areas. From 1942, however, severe dislocations 
were caused by shipping difficulties because of German action in the 
Atlantic. In the remaining war years the problems grew. Labour costs 
increased whilst productivity declined. The quality of cane dropped as 
fertilisers to which the sugar producers were accustomed became 
unavailable and unfamiliar types were resorted to.l An additional 
difficulty was posed by the government's requirement that the estates 
devote a proportion of their land to the gro\'ling of food crops so as to 
assist in the war plan to achieve greater self-sufficiency in food. 2 
More imrx:>rtantly, a labour shortage became evident in 1942. This led to 
the curtailment of planting programmes, making necessary harvesting from 
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ratoons.3 (Ratoons require less attention, hence less labour, than new 
plants but they give a lower yield). 
Government encouragement to local peasant food production 
contributed to a 50% increase in ground provisions between 1941 and 1945 
which may have at least partially caused the labour shortage experienced 
in sugar as labourers devoted more time to their plots. Whilst the 
acreage maintained by sugar estate workers was small, usually under one 
acre, the good prices guaranteed for root crops during the war made the 
workers less reliant on sugar wages for their subsistence. As one 
contemporary report noted,possibly with intended sarcasm, "they could 
manage to live without giving up so much of their leisure to working for 
the estates.,,4 
Rice, however, was probably more important in claiming a share of 
sugar workers' time, although it does not appear that at this stage there 
was any large scale movement away from the estates to the rice fields. 
The number of adults, defined as over twelve years, resident on the 
estates, increased by 1,789 between 1941 and 1942, but the average number 
employed weekly in the field decreased from 25,060 to 20,356.5 
Table 7(i) , 
AVerage Number Employed Weekly in the Field (Sugar Estates) 1940-1943 
Resident 
Non Resident 
Total 
p = piece workers 
1940 
15,963 
10,752 
26,715 
1941 
16,120 
8,940 
25,060 
1942 
13,230 
7,126 
20,356 
t = time workers 
1943 
9,163 
P 5,977 
t 4,206 
19,346 
Source: Department of Labour Reports, British Guiana, 1940-1944. 
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The reason for the decrease in time allotted to estate work by the 
labourers adduced by a committee set up to investigate problems in the 
sugar industry was that: 
"resident workers find it more profitable to work on their rice 
fields and farms and some non-residents have left working on the 
fields on the estates for more profitable occupations. (6) 
The price for rice rose from $46.60 per ton in 1939 to $81.35 in 1942, 
thereby offering a return for labour which compared favourably with 
estate work. Whilst rice growing did not cause many to abandon estate 
work altogether it made workers less reliant on sugar wages and thus 
likely to decrease the number of weeks they spent in work on the sugar 
crop. 
Rice had been a factor in the Guyanese economy since the beginning 
of the century and had reached significant export levels before the war.? 
The bauxite industry, however, grew to unprecedented levels between 1941 
and 1943, stimulated by American wartimealuminiurn requirements.8 This 
development was also blamed for the deficit of labour in the sugar 
industry. However, most of the workers in the bauxite industry were of 
African descent. By the forties the regular field labour force on the 
estates was almost entirely Indian so any loss to the sugar industry 
occasioned by the developnent of bauxite was numerically small. It may 
have been critical nonetheless, as Africans tended to provide the skilled 
factory labour on the estates. Labour of this sort was drawn to the war-
time United States Army Base at Atkinson's Field.9 
The shortage of labour experienced in 1942 and 1943 was one of the 
factors leading to major changes in the sugar industry which were to 
affect policy relating to health, housing and social welfare on the 
estates. The general trend during the forties, a trend which became more 
pronounced in the next decade, was towards a rationalisation and 
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stabilisation of the labour force in the industry. There was a movement 
away from a labour force composed largely of an undifferentiated mass of 
low paid workers with a large casual element to a reduced number of 
regular workers. The transformation was to be accomplished through 
mechanisation. Interest in mechanisation was generated initially by the 
labour shortage which although diminished, was still experienced in 
1945.10 At this point such a solution became feasible with the prospect 
of a return to normal shipping conditions. By this time the Department 
of Agriculture was reporting that: 
"Important developments may be anticipated in field mechanisation, 
which are arousing considerable interest at the moment and which 
should help to ease the labour problems." (II) 
The other factor stimulating interest in mechanisation in the war 
years and immediately after was the level of industrial unrest in the 
industry. The Moyne Commission had found evidence of extreme 
dissatisfaction on the estates not only with wages and living conditions, 
but also with the entire structure of estate production, its colonial 
context and its legacy of demeaning social relations. Since 1937 the 
workers' grievances had been articulated by its union, the Man Power 
Citizens' Association (M.P.C.A.) the influence of which had grown through 
the war years. Strikes had continued unabated. Ten estates were 
involved in stoppages in 1942, eighteen in 1943, thirteen in 1944 and 
eleven in 1945.12 
The labour relations situation did not improve a great deal in the 
post-war period in spite of the Department of Labour's mediation. The 
sugar workers gradually lost faith in the M.P.C.A.'s ability to secure 
better conditions. On failing to attain power within the union the more 
radical element formed a new union, the Guyana Industrial Workers' Union 
(G.I.W.U.). This new organisation could soon call upon more supporters 
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than the M.P.C.A. but the Sugar Producers' Association refused to 
recognise i t.13 The demand for recognition became part of the backgound 
to a strike on Enmore Estate in 1947 called by G.I.W.U. ostensibly to 
protest at the introduction of new work practices.14 The police were 
called in to deal with the strikers. Shooting into the crowd they killed 
five workers and injured fourteen others. 
A Commission of Enquiry, occasioned by the continuing disturbances 
on estates, chaired by Dr. J. A. Venn, was set up in 1948 with wide terms 
of reference to investigate the organisation of the sugar industry. The 
Commissioners gave particular attention to working conditions and the 
level of amenities on the estates. Although commending management for 
the steps taken to improve housing and social welfare, the report made by 
the Commission was extremely critical of many practices and conditions. 
Many recommendations in the area of welfare policy were made.lS The 
welfare programmes of the major company, Bookers, were begun by the time 
the report was published in 1949, but the circumstances from which it 
arose added to the pressure for reform on the estates. 
By 1948 labour problems rather than labour shortage was the primary 
inducement to mechanisation. Increasing population and unemployment in 
other sectors reduced the possibility of a recurrence of the shortages 
experienced six years earlier. There is evidence that the basic 
motivation leading to mechanisation was not a consideration of any 
lowering of prices which could be effected through a reduction in labour 
input but the desire to minimise reliance on a militant labour force.16 
By 19S3 mechanisation was reported as having an impact on labour 
requirements: 
"Apart from stoppages of work, the level of employment would still 
have been lower than the previous year as the use of mechanical 
equipment tended to displace labour." (17) 
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A further factor generating the move towards rationalisation of the 
industry was the cost of welfare to the steadily increasing numbers of 
persons resident on sugar estates but not engaged in sugar production. 
Such people typically still received free medical and other services from 
the estate.18 The estates had no legal obligation to these people nor 
indeed since the end of the indenture system to any of their workers and 
theoretically could have reduced costs simply by refusing to provide the 
customary benefits, though such a move may have been judged impolitic 
given the volatile state of labour relations. Considerations of this 
type became unnecessary in the context of the overall plan to rationalise 
the industry. It was estimated that by 1945, of the approximately 50,000 
adult residents on the estates there were five to six thousand who: 
"earn their living as domestics, shopkeepers and shop assistants, 
hucksters, seamstresses, tailors, priests, teachers, cartmen, 
fishermen and so forth."(19) 
In addition, there were: 
"a considerable number of housewives who go out to work only 
occasionally or not at all and a number of young persons (aged 12 
to 17) who do little or no paid work."(20) 
The non- or partially employed women and youths had been a 
longstanding feature of the estate population although the ranks of 
unemployed may have been swollen during the depression. Concern about 
this 'surplus' population was generated at this point because of the 
industry's drive to regularise and reduce the work force and offer a new 
welfare package to its work force. 
A reorganisation of the sugar industry to bring it into line with 
the principles of modern capitalist production was facilitated by a wave 
of amalgamation with most of the smaller, locally owned estates being 
absorbed or ceasing cultivation and a multinational, Booker McConnel, 
becoming increasingly pre-eminent. As Table 7 (ii) shows, the reduction 
') , , 
TABLE 7 (ii) 
AREA UNDER CANE CULTIVATION, SUGAR EXPORTED, SELECTED YEARS 
1841-1950 
Year 
1841 
1871 
1881 
1891 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
Source: 
Area Under 
Cane Cultivation 
(acres) 
24,850 
75,944 
77,379 
78,307 
69,532 
57 ,500 
57,244 
67,914 
70,822 
63,015 
72,403 
Nath, D. op.cit. p.249. Table 10. 
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Quantity of Sugar 
Exported 
(hogsheads) 
34,199 
104,204 
Tons 
92,323 
116,968 
83,765 
97,728 
114,542 
174,156 
142,714 
132,595 
173,283 
in the number of estates in the twentieth century did not affect the 
level of sugar production as acreage devoted to sugar was maintained 
fai rly steadily. 
By 1945, the situation was that: 
"Bookers are a public company; the other two (Sandbach Parker and 
Davson's) are private companies. The Demerara Company (Diamond, 
Leonora and Ruimveldt) owns all the shares of the Berbice 
Development Company (Blairmont, Bath and Providence). Versailles, 
Houston and Lochamber have entirely local shareholders and the 
Enmore and Resouvenir Estates have a considerable portion. 
Bookers have a large interest in Port Mourant and Wales and own 
all the shares in the other companies."(2l) 
Bookers owned fourteen of the twenty-three operating estates and in 
addition had local commercial interests and controlled most of the 
shipping. Guyana was reaching the condition in which it was often 
referred to as ''Booker's Guiana".22 The company's strength and its share 
of the Guyanese ,economy continued to increase post-1945 to a posi tion 
where it controlled fourteen of nineteen estates in 1960 which in terms 
of acreage gave it a virtual monopoly in sugar.23 
Population Changes 
Population trends were also making future labour def ici ts in the 
sugar industry less probable. Birth rates had been increasing slightly 
but steadily from the 1920s especially for East Indians, the 
beneficiaries of improvements in sanitary conditions on the estates, and 
continued to do so. Death rates decreased even more dramatically from 
1930, again most markedly in the East Indian population (see Tables 
7(iii) and 7(iv». 
The combination of a rising birth rate and a declining death rate 
produced unprecedented rates of natural increase. This trend was 
strengthened when malaria was brought under control for the first time 
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TABLE 7(iii) 
AVERAGE ANNUAL DEATH RATES 1931-1950 
East Indians Africans 
1931-1935 25.4 21.5 
1936-1940 23.3 21.0 
1941-1945 19.6 21.1 
1946-1950 13.7 16.6 
Source: An Economic Survey of the Colonial Territories. 
Cmd.880 London: H.M.S.O. 1952, p.57. 
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TABLE 7(iv) 
AVERAGE ANNUAL BIRTH RATES 1931-1950 
East Indians Africans 
1931-1935 37.1 27.1 
1936-1940 38.0 26.9 
1941-1945 40.6 28.4 
1946-1950 45.5 33.7 
Source: An Economic Survey of the Colonial Territories. 
Cmd.880 London: H.M.S.O. 1953, p.57. 
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through the application of D.D.T. to the surfaces of living quarters. A 
limited house spraying programme was launched on the estates in February 
1945, extended to cover 50,000 people in 1946 and made a country-wide 
programme in 1947. The effects were immediate and dramatic. From 280 
deaths and 15,490 cases in 1947, the rate dropped to an estimated 28 
deaths and 181 cases in 1952. By 1955 malaria was negligible as a cause 
of death (Table 7 (v)). 
Table 7(v) 
Malaria cases .and Deaths « 1947-1952 
Year Deaths cases 
1947 280 15,490 
1948 172 8,701 
1949 109 4,674 
1950 66 1,840 
1951 31 1,008 
1952 28* 181* 
*Estimate 
Source: Report of the Director of Medical Services, British Guiana, 
Georgetown: Government Printery, 1952. 
The eradication of malaria contributed only part of the reduction in 
mortality and increase in fertility. Newman concluded that it caused 40% 
of the post war increase in population growth rate in coastal Guyana.24 
The eradication of malaria enhanced a trend which had begun in the 19205. 
Similarly, Manders examination of census data demonstrates that a 
reduction in the death rate from 1920 was the cause of population growth 
until 1946 when the birth rate increased marked1y,25 so that malaria 
eradication greatly enhanced, rather than started, a reduction in death 
rates begun through public health measures taken earlier. 
Population increase brought a small growth in the potential labour 
force which foreshadowed the enormous growth in the late fifties when the 
children of the post war boom entered the labour market.26 Even in the 
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years before the rapid increase in population which was to corne the 
economy failed to provide employment for the comparatively modest earlier 
increase which must be counted as one indicator of the failure of 
Colonial Development and Welfare funds to meet Guyana's development 
needs. 
Unenployrnent 
There are no precise unemployment figures for the period available, 
but the 1946 census figure of 3,731 at a time when the work force was 
146,164 grew to what one contemporary source estimated at "not less than 
about 8,000 to 12,000 and maybe more" in 1954.27 Of particular interest 
is the trend towards high unemployment amongst the "unexperienced" 
(largely school leavers) which began to appear in the late forties. The 
1946 census estimate of this group was 1,300. By 1956 the estimate had 
risen to 10,100 according to a survey conducted by the International 
Labour Office.28 Of a total labour force of 164,600, 29,600 persons were 
estimated to be unemployed.29 (see Table 7 (vi)). 'lbere are difficulties 
in arriving at estimates of unemployment in economies where there is a 
great deal of casual, seasonal and family labour. However, another 
estimate of the 1956 figure which took into account seasonal employment 
by averaging the in-crop and out-crop periods in the sugar and rice 
cycles, considered approximately 14% of the labour force to be 
unemployed. 30 
The increase in unemployment was due to a steady decrease in jobs in 
the sugar industry and the failure of any other or any new sector to 
develop and provide extra jobs to match the population increase. Sugar 
was, as we have seen, moving towarus a contraction of labour requirements 
The World Bank Mission considered in 1952 that: 
"The prospect for expanding employment in the sugar estates is 
practically nil."(31) 
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TABLE 7 (vi) 
LABOUR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, OCCUPATIONS, 
MID-JULY 1956 
At Work 
Unemployed 
Total Labour Force: 
Industrial Occupations 
of the Total LAbour Force: 
Agriculture, mining and 
quarrying and other 
primary activities 
Manufacturing 
Building and Construction 
Transport and Communications 
Distribution 
Public administration, 
finance and professional 
Recreation and other 
services 
Never worked 
Total: 
135,000 
29,600 
66,600 
19,200 
11,500 
820 
18,400 
15,300 
15,300 
10,100 
164,600 
164,600 
Source: Extracted from Report to the Government of British 
Guiana on Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment 
in the Colony in 1956. International Labour Office 
Geneva 1957, Tables 3 & 4. 
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Whilst bauxite production continued to increase in the post war period it 
was never a large employer of labour: 
Source: 
Table 7(vii) 
Numbers Employed .in Bauxite, 1942-1950 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1,600 
2,950 
1,100 
1,030 
1,600 
Department of Labour Reports. 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1,843 
2,409 
2,510 
2,350 
Rice was in the main produced on small units of less than six acres 
normally worked by family labour. The capacity of this sector to absorb 
the growing number of unemployed was limited. It depended upon more 
lands being made available for cultivation. Its potential for 
mechanisation was fairly high indicating a future decrease in labour 
requirements. Returns tended to be unstable and when insufficient were 
supplemented from wages drawn elsewhere, most usually in the sugar 
industry where, as we have seen, labour requirements were contracting. 
In addition to the increase in the rate of population growth, 
changes in fertili ty and morbidi ty patterns led to changes in the age 
distribution of the population. The proportion of children to the total 
population has been estimated from census data to have increased from 38% 
in 1931-46 to 46% in 1946-60.32 The implications of this change in 
balance are clearer when the child population is taken as a proportion of 
the working age population defined as between the ages of 15 and 64 
years. Then, it has been calculated, in 1921 the number of dependents to 
working age persons was roughly 1:2. In 1946 the ratio was 3:4 and by 
1960, it was 1:1.33 
Apart from the macro-economic effects of such a change it also 
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represented addi tional pressure on household budgets. On the broader 
level, the growth in the number of children meant that the already 
inadequte provision for housing, health and education were placed under 
increasing stress. The situation which has become so familiar a part of 
third world societies was fast being arrived at; rapid population growth, 
low economic development, rising expectations. 
Urbanisation 
In addition to the problems posed by population growth in a stagnant 
rural sector and to some extent arising from it, Guyana experienced urban 
growth. The population of Georgetown, still the only major town, had 
been growing steadily from 1921 (see Table 7 (viii». 
Table 7 (viii) 
The population .Qf Guyana .ruld Georgetown, 1921-1946 
1921 
1931 
1946 
Georgetown 
No. % of total 
59,624 
69,663 
94,358 
19.4 
21.9 
25.1 
Source: Census Reports, British Guiana. 
Guyana 
307,391 
318,312 
376,146 
The proportion of the population living in Georgetown, however, did not 
change radically between 1931 and 1946, but this is partly because East 
Indian fertility rates were higher than African rates, producing a higher 
rural rate as East Indians were predominantly rural dwellers (see Table 
7 (iii). Although East Indians had taken up urban based occupations with 
growing success since the turn of the century, they remained concentrated 
in the villages and on the sugar estates. 
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In terms of the pressure on housing and services provided in the 
city, the most important factor was not the pror~rtionate increase but 
the absolute number added to the population. Between the censuses of 
1931 and 1946, the population of Georgetown grew by 19,040)4 Natural 
increase and rural-urban migration both contributed to the growth. The 
latter had begun to cause concern by the mid-forties. To illustrate the 
concern felt in urban circles, reference may be made to the pressure on 
housing. The shortage of housing in Georgetown had become so severe that 
it was affecting all classes. The Graphic reported that the middle 
classes too were being thrown into debt as the shortage had forced rents 
so high that even they could not meet them. That this group should be so 
affected caused additional concern: 
"These are the people who bear the brunt of taxation. These are 
the people who keep the social and industrial wheels of the 
country turning, the 'white collar workers' as they are called" 
who, because of the housing shortage were forced to 
"keep their mouths shut and pay higher rents or do without 
somewhere to live." (35) 
In local government circles the subject of concern was the drift of 
population from some rural areas. In one area comprised of the villages 
of Anne's Grove and Two Friends, for example, the 1931 population of 
1,535 had dropped by 120 to 1,415 in 1949.36 Natural increase in the 
rural areas compensated for any drift to the towns in the long term and 
even as a proportion of the population the rural areas sustained only a 
small 10ss.37 In the short term, however, and in the context of 
impending crisis in Georgetown, the comparatively small drift was 
sufficient to cause alarm and provoke thoughts about possible remedies. 
The Commissioner of Local Government was quoted as saying: 
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'~e only solution to the problem lies in providing villagers with 
better amenities such as electric light, a village hall or 
community centre, a library and playing fields. Cottage 
industr ies should also be developed." (38) 
The fear of an uncontrollable increase in population pressure on 
Georgetown was an important motivating force towards the development of 
various schemes to be discussed later, aimed at increasing the 
attractiveness of village life so as to minimise "push" factors 
contributing to population movement from rural areas. Thus the slight 
trend towards urbanisation in the forties coupled with improving rates of 
natural increase had an impact on policy thinking both in terms of the 
pressure exerted by the growth in absolute numbers of city dwellers and 
in terms of its consequences for policy for the rural areas.39 
Another aspect of urbanisation is the extent to which it may 
aggravate unemployment in the city. No precise figures for Georgetown 
are available but it is likely that the movement of people from the 
country to the town increased urban unemployment. The capi tal works 
programmes financed with Colonial Development and Welfare funds did not 
get under way in the city until the fifties and although the economy was 
buoyant in the immediate post war years, it is improbable that industrial 
developments in the city were sufficient to engage the extra labour 
force. A contributory factor may have been the higher poor relief 
benefits given in Georgetown as compared with the country rate. 
One official estimate of the level of unemployment in the city in 
1949 gave the monthly average for January to March as between 750 - 800 
with the March figure at 965. 40 This official figure represents an 
appreciable increase from a negligible official rate of unemployment 
noted for 1946. Both rates are undoubtedly under-estimates. Of 
interest is the official description in 1949 of an "appreciable 
percentage" of those seeking employment as "undesi r able unemployables n, 
who 
"inasmuch as they are said to be fitted for no beneficial form of 
occupation they would remain more or less among the perpetually 
unemployed."(41) 
Constitutional ;Q.Dd Political Develognents 
Unemployment in the thirties had been met with by short-term relief 
work. Solutions of this kind were inadequate to the problems of social 
control posed by what was emerging as a trend towards a new level of 
structural unemployment. The problem for the colonial state in the 
thirties' depression had been to control the threatened civil disorder. 
Trade union organisation was then fairly rudimentary and there were no 
purely political parties. Between 1942 and 1948, however, union 
membership grew from 3,705 to 14,531.42 The mnnber of unions increased 
from six in 1939 to sixty eight in 1950 and by the latter date 
represented a large segment of the working population.43 Further, in 
1947 Dr. Cheddi Jagan formed the markedly left-oriented Political Affairs 
Committee and then in 1950 the People's Progressive Party (P.P.P.). The 
Party's manifesto called for immediate independence and a socialist 
programme for development. 
The issue for the colonial state was now altered from one of 
containing mass unrest to one of countering an organised radical political 
opposition, one which related local working and social conditions to 
wider issues of colonialism, capitalism and imperialism, issues of 
critical importance in the post-war period when independence was on the 
agenda. 
Whilst the post-war Labour government in Britain was committed to 
colonial independence,it espoused a gradualist policy with the emphasis 
on the development of "responsible" rather than radical leadership. 
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Creech-Jones, the Labour Secretary of State for the Colonies, put it 
thus: 
"With their hopelessly inadequate revenues and the need for 
services of every kind, one cannot get far in effective policy by 
reference to cliches about imperialism and colonialism." (44) 
The Labour government did not effect any real change in the overall 
approach adopted towards social and political development in the colonies 
although the Colonial Office became staffed by more people who were 
sympathetic towards colonial aspirations.45 In the West Indies this 
meant the gradual development of constitutions towards more 
representative forms along with planning for steady social and economic 
progress. As Ayearst remarks, in the West Indies 
"no drastic reforms were insti tubed and the Colonial Office went 
on much as before to apply a 'benevolent imperialism'. It seemed 
to the Labour Government that reform would necessarily continue to 
be gradual and to include not only political advance in the shape 
of more local representation in the colonial governments but also 
such British aid as might enable the colonies to attain a minimum 
of social advancement 'and a sound economic advance."(46) 
Constitutional changes introduced in Guyana from the 1940s were 
initiated in response to the disturbances which had swept the Caribbean 
with a view to giving broader representation as a first step in the 
development of "responsible" politics. The elected element in the 
legislature was enlarged in 1943, placing it further in the majority. 
The elected, unofficial component now included a representative each of 
the trades unions and of the sugar workers. It formed a majority in the 
new Executive Council and allowed elected representatives the possibility 
of influencing policy formation more directly than since the introduction 
of a Crown Colony form of government in 1928. In addition property 
qualifications for voting for the Legislative Council, which was 
retained, were reduced but remained sufficiently high to ensure that the 
professional, commercial and artisan classes retained their monopoly. 
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A widening of the franchise followed in 1945 giving the vote to literates 
owning or renting land to the value of $150 or renting property valued at 
$45 or with an annual income of $120. The result was that in 1946 the 
number qualified to vote was around 60,000 whereas previously it had been 
13,500.47 
The first legislature formed under these constitutional changes sat 
in 1947.48 The elected element, with the exception of Dr. Jagan, 
represented no specific political orientation. Its failure to support 
any of Dr. Jagan's proposals for reform was indicative of its 
conservative cast and inability to take a lead in even a gradualist 
approach to development. The rapid growth of the p.p.P.after 1950 was in 
part a reaction to the old political elite's failure to disengage itself 
from the commercial interest. The old guard was inadequate to the task 
of controlling the forces unleashed by a growing worker restiveness 
fuelled by increasing unemployment and radical political mobilisation. 
In 1950 a Commission was set up by the Colonial Office to make 
recommendations for further developments in the constitution which would 
pave the way to full self-government under a ministerial system with the 
retention of reserve powers by the Governor to ensure "public order, 
public faith or good government". It provided for universal suffrage and 
a bi-cameral legislature with a lower House of Assembly composed of three 
ex-officio members and twenty-four elected members and a State Council of 
nine members of which six were to be appointed by the Governor, two 
further on the recommendation of the six Ministers and one after 
consultation with minority and independent members of the lower house. 
Property qualifications for the elecled members were removed. 49 
Elections under the new constitution were held in 1953. The P.P.P. 
gained 51% of the vote and eighteen of the twenty-four seats. The other 
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political party of any strength to contest the election was the National 
Democratic Party. This party had its origins in the Negro League of 
Colored Peoples and had its major support amongst Africans. Its position 
was, in essence, opposition to the P.P.P. and communism. However, 
organisational weaknesses and ineffective policy formulation limited its 
impact. 50 
There is no doubt that the P.P.P. had the advantage over other 
parties in terms of organisation, propoganda and mobilisation and its 
success at the elections was in part a reflection of this superiority. 
More important, however, was the appeal of the P.P.P's attacks on 
colonialism to the largest section of the communi ty, the rural 
proletariat and peasantry which the Party had schooled in a recognition 
of the limitations in their own lives as products of a particular 
economic system. 
lHE 1953 ~TITUTIONAL CRISIS 
The new House of Assembly with its P.P.P. minisbers held power from 
27th April to 9th October 1953. At this point the Assembly was dismissed 
and the Constitution suspended by the Governor. 
The immediate occasion for this move was Jagan's attempt to push 
through a Bill which would empower the Ministry of Labour to conduct a 
poll in any industry where there was no recognised union or where there 
were two or more unions contesting for the position of bargaining agent. 
The results of the poll were to be decisive in securing employer 
recognition. The Bill was introduced to allow the P.P.P. affiliated 
Guyana Industrial Workers' Union (G.l.W.U.) to gain ascendance over the 
management favoured but less popular Man Power Ci tizens' Association. 
The government was prorogued the day after the passing of the Bill. 
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The colonial authorities had previously been disturbed by the manner 
in which the Elected Members had outmanoeuvred and ignored Ex-Officio 
Members in introducing other pieces of legislation and took the passage 
of the Union Recognition Bill as final proof that extremists had taken 
over the party. Jagan and his P.P.P. ministers were clearly not going to 
assume the position of 'responsible' politicians leading their people 
into 'responsible' independence according to the path of development 
mapped out for the colonies by the imperial government. 
As we have seen, Development and Welfare funds were applied in the 
first instance to contain social unrest and to provide a framework for 
economic development in which a local bourgeoisie would emerge to assume 
power upon independence. The constitutional changes of the period were 
engineered to give experience both to an emerging political leadership 
and an expanding electorate in the' responsible 1 exercise of political 
power. The success of the P.P.P. and the orientation of its leadership 
indicated the failure of the Colonial Development and Welfare programme 
and consitutional developments to fulfil those aims. In order to arrive 
at firm conclusions about the reasons for the Colonial Development and 
Welfare programme's lack of success (in terms of the political goals 
attached to it) in Guyana as compared to Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados 
where similar programmes had been launched, it would be necessary to 
engage in a comparative analysis of several aspects of the political, 
economic and social matrices in each of the territories. Here it is 
possible only to suggest tentatively the possible reasons for Guyana's 
more successful radical movement. 
One difference between Guyana and the Islands mentioned, which 
stands out and was probably important, lies in the structure of the 
labour force. In Guyana a large sector of the work force was 
concentrated in one industry - sugar - and its workers shared working and 
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living conditions on the plantations which in itself made the task of 
radical politicians easier. Further, the close relationship between the 
rice and sugar industries made for the extension of the radicalisation of 
the sugar workers to the peasantry. The economies of Jamaica, Barbados 
and Trinidad were, by 1950, more diversified and in none of them was 
there a single industry with a comparable concentration of workers. 
Lastly, the peasantry in these countries was, perhaps, less open to 
radical influence. 
In Guyana the election of 1953 demonstrated quite clearly that 
welfarism and little development could not meet the aspirations of the 
people nor contain the potential for radicalism arising from the social 
and economic situation. 
SUMMARy AND OONCLUSION 
The post war period opened with the promise of independence. The 
context in which this aspiration developed was one of increasing 
political mobilisation and trade union development, a contracting labour 
requirement in the major industry and a rapidly growing population. The 
agricultural policy adopted aimed at continued maintenance of the sugar 
industry as the prime sector whilst this industry began to mechanise and 
reduce the necessary labour input. The decision was taken to develop 
rice as the secondary agricultural sector even though rice cUltivation 
required heavy investment and could offer comparatively low employment 
prospects and these only on a seasonal basis. 
This proved to be a volatile mixture which was not contained by the 
application of '-welfare' as it was conceived. A political response to 
the radicalism of the Assembly could be achieved with comparative ease 
through the suspension of the Constitution; the apparent radicalisation 
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of large segments of the population which had made such an Assembly 
possible could not be dealt with so easily. The British government and 
its representatives in Guyana, together with elements of the Guyanese 
bougeoisie, responded to the problem as will be shown in the following 
chapter with a desperate attempt to wean the population away from radical 
politics through increased social and other spending. 
At the beginning of the period discussed, funds were allotted to 
welfare and economic development projects aimed at making 'responsible' 
independent government possible by eradicating the causes of social 
unrest uncovered by the Royal Commission of 1938. By 1953 the limited 
success of this programme for development was clearly demonstrated to 
have failed to achieve its political aims. 
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0IAPl'ER EIGEfI' 
SOCIAL POLICY R:ID WELFARE PEVEIDPl1ENT ll4Q -= .51 
Social Welfare 
In this Chapter developments in several areas of social policy and 
practice in the period between the West India Royal Commission and the 
constitutional crisis of 1953 will be examined. Particular attention is 
given to the way in which the programme of social amelioration embarked 
upon was aimed at the production of moderate social and political 
attitudes and to the consequences of the social policy adopted for 
relationships between the two major races. As indicated earlier the 
immediate impetus leading to the passing of the Colonial Welfare and 
Development Act was civic disturbance, and this background influenced the 
emphasis on the development of structures supportive of attitudes thought 
to be necessary to the eventual assumption of 'responsible' self 
government. The colonial administration continued to fear radical 
developments on the road to self-determination and the predominant 
concern throughout the forties and beyond continued to be with the 
promoting of 'correct' attitudes both at governmental and individual 
levels. A 'correct' attitude for local governments, in which 
increasingly the elected elements formed the majority, was political 
moderation. For individuals, 'correct' attitudes were those relevant to 
the practice of 'resIX:msible' civic virtues which, of course, included an 
eschewal of radical or violent response to social conditions. 
It was in this context that the British Government encouraged the 
formation of trade unions in the colonies provided these were set up and 
organised in accordance with gUidelines of the type embodied in 
legislation passed locally in Guyana, based on British legislation, which 
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included the control of registration of unions and certain condi tions 
relating to the control of funds and the provision of decision making 
mechanism. It was hoped that the formation of trade unions would produce 
moderate collective bargaining and reduce 'unreasonable' worker demands 
and unorganised labour disputes.l To this end training in Britain was 
prop:>sed: 
"Considerable thought has been given to the development of 
responsible Trade Unionism in the British West Indies ••• There 
is, however, still room for improvement, and development in 
structure, scope and responsibility might progress a stage further 
if p:>tential labour leaders were given practical training in the 
United Kingdom." (2) 
The Labour Departments, which were created in many colonial 
territories in 1942, gave assistance to the development of trade unions 
on approved lines. In Guyana the Labour Department saw its role as one 
of creating "an atmosphere unfavourable to disputes, encouraging 
negotiation and advising in the principles of Trade Unionism." 3 One of 
its earliest tasks was the setting up of joint negotiating machinery on 
the sugar estates, a move welcomed by most estate managers who 
demonstrated "a growing awareness ••• of the usefulness and purpose of 
trades unions." 4 
Trade unions and a labour department were the mechanisms promoted to 
avert radical challenges in the industrial area. 'Responsible' civic 
attitudes, on the other hand, were to be encouraged by the various 
elements making up the social welfare service. The moral infl uenee of 
institutions like co-operatives was considered of imp:>rtance in addition 
to the purely economic function of generating income. As the Social 
Services Sub-COmmittee of the Ten Year Plan Developnent Committee put it: 
"We regard the promotion of Co-operative Societies as of great 
importance. Their effect is both social and economic, members 
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securing a practical demonstration of the advantages to be derived 
from self-reliance and combined effort while at the same time 
enjoying a more beneficial organisation of that business." (5) 
Co=Qperatives 
The Co-operative Movement was s,een as the most imp:>rtant programme 
of those intended to "foster a spirit of independence and habits of 
mutual aid." 6 The greatest emphasis was on savings, thrift and credit 
societies; 
"Indeed it may be said that these societies consti tute the 
foundation of the (Co-operative) Movement. Their success is a 
clear indication of the need for thrift among salary and wage 
earners as well as farmers throughout the colony." (7) 
Thrift and savings societies were introduced into the schools to 
encourage the adoption of thrifty practices from childhood, but as well 
as teaching children simple accounting practices they were thought to 
"teach children how to conduct themselves orderly at meetings, 
make speeches, elect officers and use votes wisely." (8) 
(emphasis added) 
The Co-operative Movement was an instrument of colonial policy 
throughout the Empire at this period and in some territories they were 
important economic devices used to cut out middlemen buyers and encourage 
higher production of crops for the export market. 9 In Guyana, however, 
the co-operatives were small affairs geared towards production for local 
consumers and were encouraged with their social rather than economic 
benef i ts in mind. They were instituted in 1945 when six newly trained 
Social Welfare Officers returned from overseas to assume their posts. 
Thirty-nine groups were organised in the first two years with total 
assets of $7,000.00, a very small sum even when it is noted that at this 
stage many of the groups were still engaged in the study of co-operation 
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in preparation for the actual undertaking of particular enterprises. 
Typical of the projects were two marketing about 70 dozen eggs per week, 
one at calcutta, Mahaicony area and the other at Rose Hall.IO 
The stress on the social benefits of co-operativism rather than its 
value as a tool of economic development was characteristic of the general 
attitude towards social welfare as a whole at the local level during the 
period 1940 - 1953. 
!he Social Welfare Diyision 
The co-operatives were part of a wider programme put on by the 
Social Welfare Division which was instituted in 1945. On the 
recommendation of Simey, Social Welfare Adviser for the West Indies, this 
Division was established as an attachment to the Local Government 
Department. Simey was highly critical of the existing "somewhat old 
fashioned" relief services characteristic of the West Indies which he 
fel t had been car r ied out at the expense of mor e "modern constructive 
services ... II For him, this approach to welfare was the product of a 
social attitude more concerned with mere palliation than the proper 
investigation and subsequent cure of social ills. He felt that, in turn, 
this approach led to: 
"such activities as the continual tinkering with political 
constitutions, regardless of the social realities which condition 
their operation, and the paying of disproportionate attention to 
one specific social problem or another such as the care of 
'orphan' children or the technicalities of education 
administration." (12) 
He charged further that: 
"Colonial Administration has been too deeply influenced by passing 
fashions in the world of administration and the enthusiasms and 
prejudices of individual officials." (13) 
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The Social Welfare Division was created to assist in the c1evelopnent of a 
more integrated approach to social welfare and one which, unlike the 
largely voluntary efforts in the area hitherto, would concentrate on 
constructive rather than relief programmes. 
Provisions for social welfare in the colonies as a whole had tended 
to develop in a piecemeal way as a reaction to specific problems, much as 
they had in Britain, and tended to be modelled on British legislation and 
provision. Concern about growing crime and vagrancy amongst the young 
in urban areas led to the establishment of probation services and the 
building of juvenile courts, remand homes and reformatories in the 
1940s.14 In some of the Asian colonies concern about prostitution led 
to legislation directed at its curtailment and associated legislation for 
the protection of children. Urbanisation both in these Asian colonies 
and elsewhere had led to the abandonment of children and the appearance 
of vagrant bands in the cities. Child welfare legislation was enacted 
in many British colonies to deal with this.lS Such legislation was in 
many territories copied word for word from the English Children and Young 
Persons Act of 1933. 16 
The experience of the Caribbean area was similarly .ad~. The 
Royal Commission had suggested that a social welfare officer be appointed 
in each territory and that Social Welfare Committees be set up, but did 
not clearly delineate the field of social welfare nor provide a framework 
for action. Simey judged the Report's section on social welfare to be 
vaguely framed and considered that: 
"the remaining recommendations were of so miscellaneous a 
character that it proved hard to state precisely what the 
functions of these officers and committees should be." (17) 
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For him it was this climate of uncertainty had led to the creation of 
social welfare divisions which he saw as: 
"the line of least resistance ••• (to be used) as handy 
administrative dustbins in which to get rid of 
inconvenient governmental functions that could not be 
tidily attached to any of the existing departments." (18) 
Such criticisms notwithstanding, the creation of social welfare 
divisions in the caribbean and elsewhere did involve the application of 
the principle of planning to the area of welfare, an advancement on 
previous reliance on .ad .b..Q.Q measures. It also marked a new departure 
in government involvement in social affairs in so far as it introduced 
professionalism into an area hitherto largely in the hands of the 
voluntary agencies whose approach tended to one of middle class 
benevolence. In the Caribbean the class division between giver and 
receiver in charitable organisations, a division which had become 
repugnant to the British working class, had been further complicated by 
the correspondence of class and race so that parties to the charitable 
act were identifiable with race as well as class. 
The local government system in Guyana was more developed than 
elsewhere in the area and hence it was decided that it should carry 
social welfare since 
lithe Commissioner of Local Government had already adopted what may 
be termed a 'social welfare' approach to his work, and all that 
had to be done was to extend the functions of his department and 
his staff to include social welfare formally and officially."(19) 
This approach had already been recommended by Simey, when Social 
Welfare Adviser for the Caribbean, and held out by him as a model for 
other territories.20 The relationship between the Social Welfare 
Division and the local government authorities proved, however, to be an 
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uneasy one as the members of the village bodies were jealous of their 
authority and resented the intrusion of representatives of central 
government. In 1946, one year after the Division was started it was 
said that: 
"Social welfare work had not progressed well in the villages 
during the year to the extent expected, 'which is regrettable. 
The village local authorities have complained that they are being 
slighted in connection with the carrying on of social welfare work 
in the villages. The official arrangements which caused 
dissatisfaction is one of the causes of slow progress." (21) 
Eighteen months later the si tuation was not much changed. At a 
meeting of the West Demerara Chairman's Union, the President reported 
that whilst there was greater cordiality between local authorities and 
the Social Welfare department, there was still much room for improvement. 
He went on to pinpoint the problem: 
'~hat the local authorities desire is the greater co-operation of 
the Social Welfare Officers. The local authorities also contend 
that they are responsible for the carrying on of official social 
welfare work in their districts. They think that when a social 
welfare officer is sent to work in a village or group of villages 
he must be sent to the local authority or local authorities. In 
other words, the local authority in any place where work is being 
done must approve beforehand." (22) 
Social welfare's beginnings as an administrative and professional 
area in its own right was, then, hampered by difficulties which were 
apparently aggravated by the perception of the programme held by some 
elements of the local communities which led them to see it as an 
imposition by central governrnent.23 
"Rural Betterment" 
The general policy of the Division in Guyana was: 
"that emphasis be placed on the constructive rather than the 
relief services and that attention be focussed more on the rural 
areas than on the cities of Georgetown and New Amsterdam." (24) 
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The decidedly rural emphasis of the work is indicated by the 
institution of a Rural Betterment Service as an arm of the Social Welfare 
Division. The latter was manned by eight District Social Welfare 
Officers, a Co-operative Organiser, two 4H Club Organisers25 serviced by 
the Headquarters Staff of five Officers attached to the Local Government 
Department. Under this Service came the promotion of co-operatives, 4H 
clubs, women's groups e.g. Women's Institutes and cottage industries. 
The Rural Betterment Scheme was based both conceptually and in terms 
of practical organisation on a voluntary organisation called Jamaica 
Welfare Ltd. which had been established in 1937, chaired by Norman Manley 
and financed by a voluntary donation from the main banana exporting 
companies. Welfare Ltd. aimed at promoting rural community life, co-
operative, cottage industries and adult education.26 The organisation's 
work had been favourably viewed by the Royal Commission and the Social 
Welfare Adviser, T. Simey and funds made available by the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act were used to reactivate it in 1943. It had 
ceased because the war had put a stop to the shipment of bananas and 
hence to the fruit company's donations (which took the form of a cess on 
the value of bananas shipped). 
Most of the Division's activities involved, at least minimally, some 
aspect of economic development. This was probably thought a necessary 
inclusion in order to gain the interest of people whose low standard of 
living made economic improvement a prime motivation. But the main 
impetus directing the promulgation of the programmes was, at least 
initially, a concern with producing greater involvement at the community 
level, a development of 'proper' civic attitudes Conducive to the 
acceptance of 'responsible' political positions. Evidence of the 
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expectation of a link between the social programmes and the political and 
civic attitudes to be promoted is seen to be in the central role given to 
the co-operatives which, it was hoped, would develop: 
"the best type of leadership, bringing forward those individuals 
who can see beyond their own narrow, immediate interests; and if 
properly supervised, it provides graduated lessons in the 
management of a business enterprise, in the operation of economic 
forces, .and in .the working .Qf democratic processes." (27) 
(ernphasi s added) 
But whilst in the narrow sense the economic dimension of these 
programmes was minimal they also met an economic need, in the wider 
sense, in so far as they serviced the emerging new structure of the major 
industry - sugar. As has been shown, by mid-decade the estates were 
seriously involved with plans for increasing mechanisation and as a 
result of the streamlining strategy adopted which was leading to the 
decasualisation of the labour force, two effects began to be apparent: 
firstly there would be increasing labour displacement and secondly the 
remaining labour force would require transformation from an 
undifferentiated, casual mass into a modern, stable productive force. 
Both these processes could be eased to an extent by "rural betterment". 
Labour displacement from the sugar industry, although largely to be 
met by the development of rioe production, could also be ameliorated by 
the promotion of other cottage industries. But perhaps more important 
was the role that rural schemes could play in easing the tensions in the 
sugar belt arising out of poor economic conditions, through the 
encouragment of projects which would provide supplementary income. One 
function of the District Officers was seen to be for them 
"to devise ways in which rural populations can employ th em sel ves 
profitably between crops - with cottage or village industries and 
handicrafts." (28) 
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Thus, in addition to promoting attitudes and habits of inde~ndence, 
which were seen as sui table for and necessary to a modern labour force 
and much mooted in the estates' own welfare programmes, the Rural 
Betterment Service could, through its schemes, help to make the old 
pattern of rural under-employment more viable in an age of rising 
expectations and growing labour militancy. By 1947, as has been shown, 
the government's policy was to continue to place the major emphasis on 
sugar with rice as the complementary crop. Both rice and sugar involve 
a mainly seasonal labour requirement and neither wage labour on the 
estates nor rice growing on the predominantly small plots could provide 
either year round employment for the majority, or high levels of 
remuneration. If these two crops were to continue to be the main areas 
of agricultural development, there was a clear danger of increased labour 
conflict on the sugar estates and rural misery in the rice areas both of 
which were undesirable politically. 
The thesis that 'Rural Betterment' was essentially an instrument of 
social control designed for pacification of the villages is given some 
support by the dispr?portionate attention given to rural aspects of 
social welfare in comparison with that attracted by the urban areas. 
(See Table 8. (i), next page) 
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Table SCi) 
THE SOCIAL WELFARE DIVISION'S 
RECURRENT ANNUAT-d EXPENDITURE 1940 - 1945 
1. Rural Betterment Service 
2. Youth Service 
3. Child Welfare Officer 
4. Probation Service 
5. Belfield Girls' School 
Recurrent expenditure for 5 years 
Capital expenditure 
Grand Total 
$35,000.000 
4,800.00 
1,000.00 
5,900.00 
5,880.00 
$52,5QO.QO 
262,500.00 
25,000.00 
287,500.00 
SOURCE: Papers Relating to Development 
Planning, Vol. 2, 1948, Table l,p. 70. 
IVhilst village health and housing conditions during the first half of the 
century were no better than those in the urban centres, the rural areas 
as a whole, when estates are included, were better off than the urban 
areas in terms of water provision and public health provision. In 
addition, the urban :population had been with increasing rapidity, putting 
great pressure on infrastructure and employment in Georgetown. By 1946 
a quarter of the total population (i.e. 94,035) lived in Georgetown and 
its environs. Thus it is arguable that social need which could benefit 
from a welfare approach was as dire in the urban as the rural areas, and 
that the concentration of social welfare on the rural area was the 
outcome of considerations in addition to that of manifest need. 
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By the mid-forties the government of Guyana had committed itself to 
agricultural development to the almost total exclusion of industrial 
developnent. Hopes were pinned on the creation of a 1 etable peasantry' 
hence the more imaginative elements of social welfare were directed 
towards achieving this overall design for the future. 
Social Welfare in the City 
Whilst "dev,elopment and welfare" were the terms in which the 
development debate of the forties was conducted, and whilst Guyana 
devoted what some critics considered a disproportionate amount of public 
funds to the social sector as a whole - defined as including housing, 
health and education - 'social welfare' spending was comparatively small. 
(See Table 6(ii)) The uncertain basis on which it existed is indicated by 
this statement from the Sub-Committee for Other Social Services, a 
committee set up in connection with the drawing up of the 1947 
Developnent Plans: 
"This Sub-Committee has drawn up a moderate plan largely on 
account of the restricted shadow allocation which it was accorded. 
'Social Welfare' represents a new aspect of Colonial 
Administration and as such has been subject to considerable 
criticism in many quarters. Even now the recurrent cost of the 
basic Social Welfare Organisation is carried as part of a Colonial 
Development and Welfare grant which will fallon the Colony in 
1948/49 when present provision comes to an end." (29) 
The committee recommended that the Welfare division be maintained by 
local funds when the Colonial Development and Welfare grant ceased The 
Main Committee accepted the recommendation and it was endorsed and acted 
upon by the legislature when the time came in spite of Dr. Jagan's 
contention that social welfare should be regarded as 
II ••••• an attempt of a conscience-str icken poli tical order to 
correct sane of the ills inflicted on the people as a whole." (30) 
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The criticism referred to by the committee undoubtedly carne from 
those quarters concerned with tax increases but probably also reflected a 
conservative tendency in the administration. Miss Ibberson, who 
succeeded Simey as Advisor on Social Welfare to the Comptroller of 
Development and Welfare in the West Indies judged that the lack of 
development in social welfare administration in the region was related to 
governments being "a little shy of identifying themselves publicly with 
'welfare' perhaps because of the abhorence in many quarters of the 
31 
'welfare state' ••••• " 
The response to social problems in the urban area centred on the 
creation of institutions based on British patterns and introduced with 
little consideration of their appropriateness. The increasing problem 
of unemployment amongst the young and the threat of growing delinquency 
was dealt with through the introduction of a Probation Service. Also 
grants were made to voluntary bodies for the establishment of club 
facilities for the youth of Georgetown, these being seen by the Sub-
Committee members as "an increasingly urgent requirement." A new school 
for delinquent girls and a young offenders' detention institution were 
also planned.32 
The introduction of a social welfare programme manned by 
professionals together with state support of youth work represented some 
developnent towards the preventative, professional approach advocated by 
SimeYi but social welfare outside the "Rural Betterment" programme 
received limited resources and grudging support from the tax-conscious 
Legislative Council. It was low on the list of development priorities 
and, in the city, far from fulfilling the vitalising role Sirney had seen 
for social welfare in community development. Urban social problems were 
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overshadowed by the necessity of placating the rural masses towards whom 
the major development thrust was aimed except in so far as the question 
of the control of unruly youth arose. 
Social Security 
The publication of the Beveridge Report in Britain had generated 
great interest in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the colonies. It 
intensified demands for social security provisions: 
"In several parts of the Colonial Empire, a considerable and 
growing interest is being shown in the question of social 
security or social insurance ••••• it is clear that public 
opinion has been stirred by the 'Beveridge Plan' and 
representations by Colonial Legislatures or other 
authoritative bodies have often taken the form of requests 
for investigation into the possibility of adopting that plan 
or some modification of it." (33) 
In Guyana, long before, demands for the introduction of an old age 
pension had corne from the trade unions. In 1930 the Bri tish GUi'ana 
Labour Union made an old age pension one of the items of their programme 
for improved conditions. 34 A proposal for a contributory pension, part 
worker funded, part government funded, was made by the British Guiana 
Congress of General Workers to the Royal Commission in 193925 
As we have seen previously, however, the accepted policy by the mid-
forties was that: 
'~th Development and Welfare are necessary but the priority 
and proportions must be carefully weighed and consciously 
decided for that limited slice of the all-too-small 'cake' of 
National Income which the State is able to appropriate by 
taxation, may either be 'eaten' today in the form of 'social 
services' or set aside in the form of 'development' in order 
to increase the 'cake' of tomorrow and the day after, it 
cannot be had both ways." (36) 
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This effectively ruled out consideration of most non-contributory 
programmes of social secur i ty. The exception was the old age pension, 
introduced in Guyana in 1944 by Ordinance 17 of that year. The 
conditions for receipt of this non-contributory benefit were that the 
claimant be: 
1. Over sixty-five years old. 
2. A British subject for at least 10 years. 
3. Resident in Guyana for twenty years. 
4. Receiving a monthly income of below $4.50 in Georgetown or 
$3.50 in the rest of the colony, these being the sums received 
as pension benefits. 37 
The benefit went to 7,155 recipients in the first year of the 
Ordinance's operation.38 The pension was very small and could certainly 
not entirely support an old person. It was paid for in part by the 
reduction in the number of old people living in the Alms Houses, the Poor 
Law institution for the receipt of 'indoor relief'. The average daily 
number of inmates was 788 in 1943. By 1946, it had dropped to 590.39 
The labour pattern of the Car ibbean with its high levels of 
unemployment, under-employment and large element of casual labour made 
the introduction of a contributory social insurance scheme on a national 
basis complex. In addition the low incomes of most families meant that 
a contr ibutory scheme would have to be supplemented by a state 
contribution as it would yield extremely small benefits. Nevertheless, 
the level of social expectations had risen and this required 
consideration. 
For generations, probably from the days of slavery, there had been 
Friendly Societies in some form in operation in the West Indies. An 
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ordinance of 1913 had provided for their registration. In Guyana fifty-
one societies were registered by 1917.40 It had been suggested by Major 
Orde Brown, after the investigations he carried out preliminary to the 
1938 Royal Commission, that Friendly Societies merited encouragement and 
that: 
nif assisted to reduce their charges they might furnish a 
partial remedy for the lack of state provision for social 
services at present debarred by financial considerations." 
(41) 
This notion of the important role which could be played by Friendly 
Societies was endorsed by the Confer·ence of west Indian Social Workers at 
their conference in Barbados 1947, and investigated by a Colonial 
Development and Welfare funded research team between 1948 and 1949. 42 
The report resulting from the research noted a number of problems in 
the existing organisation of Friendly Societies in the West Indies, among 
them that: 
a) there was a prevalence of very small societies, 
b) the extent to which officers held more than one post or posts 
in more than one society led to opportunities for financial 
malpractice, 
c) a disproportionate part of expenditure went on management 
costs, and 
d) management was generally poor. 43 
A further limitation of the Guyanese Friendly Societies was that 
they only covered part of the population. Two-thirds of them were 
Georgetown based, they were preponderently subscribed to by Afro-Guyanese 
and sixty per cent of the membership was female.44 '!he sickness benefit 
offered by many societies was rarely more than $1 per week which was only 
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given for between three to six weeks and thereafter reduced. Most of 
the organisations were "purely financial", that is, they operated more 
like savings schemes than insurance schemes, with members withdrawing 
sums to meet festival costs, for example, at Christmas.45 
It was concluded that the Friendly Societies had neither the 
financial means nor the administrative expertise to be the basis for a 
national insurance scheme of any type. It was suggested that a limited 
"Colony Benefit Scheme" be started in a form amenable to expansion, 
administered by the government, subscribed to voluntarily, built up 
initially from contributions from the insured and operated primarily for 
sickness and death insurance. This scheme was turned down by the 
Secretary of State on the grounds that it would not be able to offer 
benefits larger than those given by Friendly Societies, thus placing it 
in competition with them, and would not give experience of compulsory 
benefits.46 The question of social security was left in abeyance, 
despite trade union pressure until the political crisis in 1953 gave 
added urgency to a review of the situation. Guyana, like much of the rest 
of the Empire, entered the fifties with a social welfare policy which was 
essentially residual and ameliorative, and a social security system still 
based on the Poor Law of 1855. 
Although spending on the 'social' sector remained high in the areas 
of health, housing and education, the original emphasis of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act on welfare in its widest sense as joint 
partner with economic development in the enhancement of life in West 
Indian society fell prey to the notion that 'welfare' and social security 
were 'frills' which could only be afforded when economic development had 
raised production and national income. 
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Social Welfare.QIl~ Estates 
Whereas estate involvement in worker housing and hospi tal care was a 
century old, management provision for worker welfare in the broader 
sense was virtually non-existent before the forties. This neglect was 
in striking contrast to the care given to the security and recreation of 
the senior staff who were all or nearly all, expatriates. With the 
exception of a few cricket fields laid down in the thirties, there were 
no recreational facilities of any kind provided by estates for workers.47 
The absence of facilities in estate communities was of far more 
significance than any comparable lack of facilities attached to factories 
in industrialised nations. Firstly, the nature of the estate was such 
that it combined work place with living place, so that an absence of 
facilities at work could not be compensated for by community based 
facilities as in other societies. Secondly, the absence of 
opportunities for communal recreation contributed to the demoralisation 
and dependency of estate communi ties to a much greater extent than it 
would in other communi ties. The social structure of the estates was not 
conducive to independent action nor strong group cohesion against 
management. There was a tendency for workers to look to the estate 
managements to meet their needs and solve their problems rather than to 
generate communal approaches to these issues. Since the cessation of 
indenture there had been no steady replenishment of religious and 
cultural life as provided earlier by successive waves of immigrants. 
Religious leaders, whilst still of great influence felt their importance 
waning as the East Indian population became increasingly creolised.48 
Further, the main religious bodies had never assumed a political 
character in Guyana, nor had they taken a very active role in the 
promotion of social welfare.49 
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It is not suggested that a communi ty hall, sports activities and 
sewing circles for girls could overcome the dependency and demoralisation 
which was the outcome of a century of indenture and degrading working and 
living conditions, nor that their absence was the cause of it. However, 
such facilities and organised activity can provide a framework through 
which those with leadership skills may develop as group representatives. 
In the post-war per iod a new management atti tude towards social 
welfare emerged as part of a policy "to foster the self-reliance of their 
employees and to encourage them to stand on their own two feet".50 '!he 
old policy was based on thinking such as is commented on here: 
'~e well established argument against allowing the estate worker 
too much opportunity to make money 'on the side', and indeed 
against giving him too high wages is that experience has shown 
that he will only work to earn sufficient to satisfy his simple 
needs and will then take life easily until money runs out." (51) 
A new policy was developed in the context of the changed structure 
and organisation emerging in the industry. The Chairman of Bookers 
McConnel Ltd., by this point by far the largest company in Guyana, saw 
the improvement of conditions on the estates as vital to the future of 
the sugar industry as can be seen from this illuminating statement; 
"I'm preaching the fact that •••• we cannot distribute profits at 
the expense of assets human or material. Proper living 
conditions for staff and labour must be a charge on the business 
parallel with the maintenance of our land and equipment in the 
highest economic state. There's no doubt that of late years many 
of our estates have shown prof its at the expense of the future ••• 
The Board need not fear I'm encouraging expenditure on luxuries -
far from it. The point is that certain things must be put right 
if the industry is to survive - factories must be efficient, staff 
and nuclear labour must be well housed and cared for, mechanical 
field equipment must experimented with and purchased, drainage and 
irrigation must be really good, our technical staff must be 
strengthened and all these are minimum requirements. (52) 
(emphasis in original) 
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As a result of the new direction to be taken several projects were 
launched on the estates with the aim of improving social welfare. '!he 
British Guiana Sugar Producers' Association apfX)inted a Social Welfare 
Organiser whose duty it was to promote the new management philosophy_ 
He was attached to the Social Welfare Department of Government and took 
up duties at the beginning of 1946.53 The timing of this appointment 
and the attachment of the Officer to the government department suggests 
that the company did not wish to appear to have fallen behind the state 
in the advancement of workers' interests. Ristor ically, the provision 
of housing and medical attention had been used to control workers and 
also to advance the claims of the planters that the industry benefitted 
the whole society, with part of that benefit accruing from the provision 
of houses and hospitals at cost to themselves, and hence to justify low 
wages. In the post-war period the anticipated changes in the structure 
of the workforce which would make it smaller and, it was hoped, more 
stable made direct control less necessary and increasing labour militancy 
made it less possible. An appearance of modernity in management-labour 
relations, including a concern for the welfare aspect, was calculated to 
advance the interests of the industry. It is also probable that the 
estates' management wished to retain autonomy over the estates and so 
were concerned to create parallel provision for estate workers and so 
avoid state intrusion. 
The programme encompassed the formation of new groups for youths and 
workers and the strengthening of already existing ones such as the Boy 
Scouts. A variety of indoor and outdoor activities were encouraged in 
these groups including sports, handicrafts, film shows and the use of 
librar ies which were started on some larger estates.54 Sports clubs 
with the accent on cricket, were particularly encouraged and the sports 
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grounds and other facilities upgraded 
For women and girls homecraft classes were introduced, sponsored by 
the wife of the Social Welfare Organiser, apparently on a non-paid, 
voluntary basis.55 In addi tion, modern creches, to be used by working 
mothers, were being built and staffed by trained personnel. These were 
replacing the old "grannie" system which had persisted from the days of 
slavery and in which some old women of the community with no formal 
training were recognised by the estates as child-minders. 
All these activities were promoted as likely to contribute to 
character building, civic pride, the profitable use of leisure time and 
the improvement of industrial relations. Trade union activity amongst 
sugar workers and the growing strength and militancy of the union 
encouraged management to seek for a basis for a new relationship with 
workers. The promotion of social welfare was a relatively cheap, non-
controversial area which could be hoped to contribute to that new 
relationship. Why, however, the stress on developing tr ai ts of 
independence and community feeling, when for decades the estates had 
encouraged qui te the opposi te? As the Venn Report noted, the social 
welfare programmes did not represent pure altruism on the part of the 
estates' management: 
"The Companies have declared it to be their policy to foster the 
self reliance of their employees and to encourage them to stand on 
their own feet. Following this principle they have since the war 
embarked on a considerable programme of social welfare on the 
estates, feeling that, by an examination and understanding of the 
problems and difficulties of their employees and by the provision 
of more amenities of life, they will point the way to a higher 
standard of living and give an incentive to personal and family 
arnbi tion •••• Increased producti vi ty is needed today in the 
industry and a self-reliant man with an incentive to improve his 
position is naturally enough going to be a keen worker and put 
more effort into his job." (56) 
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Histor ically, sugar had been produced by a mass of casual, 
relatively undifferentiated labour. Whilst the proclivity of that 
labour to work less than a full week and sporadically at that, due to a 
preference for tending rice lands and vegetable plots, had been a cause 
of concern to proprietors in the past, its impact had been minimised as 
long as labour was cheap and plentiful and the nature of the bulk of 
tasks such that one man could easily substitute for another. But as we 
have seen, the post-war per iod brought changing condi tions. As a 
consequence decasualisation, a reduced labour force and mechanisation 
were being introduced. These changes in turn necessitated a different 
kind of wor ke r. In effect, more modern conditions and relations of work 
required new worker attitudes consonant with modern production relations 
characterised by a streamlined labour force and higher levels of 
production per worker. It was hoped that social welfare measures would 
breed a desire for social and material advancement which could be 
fulfilled by working for time over and above that necessary to yield 
income to meet basic needs. 
As well as fuelling ambition and thus producing higher production 
levels, the welfare measures were expected to play a role in the 
production of 'responsible' worker attitudes, a role also outlined for 
state sponsored programmes as indicated earlier. The various activities 
to be promoted in the sporting and social areas were to be run from 
communi ty centres built on the estates which in the words of the Sugar 
Industry Labour Welfare Fund Committee were' 'naturally the focal points 
for activities aimed at the development of individual and community 
responsibility among the members."S7 
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The recommendation of the Venn Commission in the area of social 
welfare was that each large estate should provide for its workers a 
welfare officer, playing fields, a nursery and a community centre. This 
was accepted by government and the British Guyana Sugar Producers' 
Association and by 1953 there were nineteen community centres. '1l1e rank 
and file workers were to be taught and encouraged towards 'independence' 
and 'responsibility' through community involvement through the centres. 
For the local staff members a further innovation was introduced. As 
indicated earlier, there had always been provision for the recreation of 
senior staff and the estate Staff club had been important as a symbol of 
the class and race divisions in plantation society. In the post-war 
period the Junior Club was instituted as a matter of policy on Booker 
controlled estates thus extending club membership to the mainly clerical, 
and other local junior staff. This was a means of binding more tightly 
the loyalties of local staff to the stratification system of the estate 
and to the company itself this being seen as necessary in the context of 
growing nationalism, militancy and anti-colonialist feelings in the 
country. 
A critical awareness of the relationship between colour and status 
was developing in the Caribbean as a whole and creating a potentially 
explosive situation.58 In a society where class lines followed colour 
lines very closely, the possibility of race conflict aggravating labour 
conflict was clear. On the estates the class/colour relationship had 
always been very clear, underlined by their social organisation. The 
(usually white) planter and his (often white, expatriate) overseers and 
managers occupied a social sphere distinct from the labourers, indentured 
or free. Their housing was phYSically separate and of a greatly 
super ior kind. Their social life was conducted differently and in 
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different places, with the staff clubs playing an important role in 
marking lines of status and racial differentiation. 
The new political climate in the post-war period indicated to the 
companies that some blurring of the class/colour lines would be advisable 
if anti-white/anti-management sentiments were not to be aggravated. 'Ihe 
high priority given to the creation of junior staff clubs attests to the 
urgency with which the companies viewed the problem of securing the 
loyalty of the more 'reslxmsible' sections of the work force. That the 
estate social workers themselves were to playa similar role is indicated 
by this further reflection from J. Campbell, Director of Bookers' 
McConnel Ltd., on the training of social workers: 
"I most sincerely hope this experiment will succeed not only 
because good local Social Welfare Officers are badly needed to 
carry out the mass of the work to be done in this sphere, but also 
because the influence and leavening effect of young Indians who 
have gained balance and a sense of proportion in a position of 
some authority in the sugar industry would be immeasurably 
valuable." (59) 
Social welfare on the estates developed as part of management 
strategy to transform the labour force into one more appropriate for 
the execution of modern production practices and business philosophy. 
In addition, it was designed to dampen discontent with plantation society 
and its manifestations of class/colour differences. In actuality, by 
promoting ambition and independence it probably caused higher 
expectations which in turn provoked greater dissatisfaction. 
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HOUSING 
(i) Urban Housing 
Urban housing was, up to the forties, largely free from state 
control of any kind except that relating to public health ordinances. 
There was no planning authority nor any government responsibility assumed 
for the provision or supervision of housing. The ci ty of Georgetown, 
unlike other colonial cities, was not superimposed on an existing city 
grown out of traditional culture and pre-capi talist economic systems. 
It developed originally as a port for the transport of sugar and cotton 
and became in addition the military and administrative centre of the 
colonial state. Finally, it became also the commercial centre for local 
merchants and for the sugar companies, more particularly Bookers, which 
extended operations in Guyana to the selling of agricultural implements, 
dry goods, groceries and pharmaceutical items. Housing in the city was 
largely owned by large landlords who had successfully resisted, through 
their control of municipal committees, any attempts to control thei r 
operations. 
The growth in the city's population in the twentieth century had 
resulted in overcrowding and deterioration of housing stock. A Housing 
Committee of 1934 had reported in terms that were surprisingly 
enlightened. It recommended that the building of tenement ranges be 
made an offence and that the conversion of two or three-storeyed 
buildings into tenements be similarly treated. It also suggested that 
government assistance be given to proprietors to improve their 
properties. Most importantly it was recommended that the government 
enter the arena of public housing via the setting up of a housing trust 
and the giving of financial aid, for it was considered that: 
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"It is impossible, in our opInIon, for the scheme to be carried 
through by private enterprise. There is a gap between what the 
private owner considers an economic rental and what the tenants 
can pay." (60) 
Nothing came of these recommendations and it seems likely that 
interests which militated against the state expanding its role and hence 
raising expendi ture,and thus taxation, prevailed. The disturbances of 
the late thirties, however, made the authorities, both at Colonial Office 
and local government levels, aware that social conditions, including 
housing, had to be improved if further troubles were to be averted. 
It was in this period that a link between poor housing and social 
disturbance began to be recognised. The Der:artment of Labour and Local 
Government in Guyana reported: 
"Evidence is not lacking to show that r:art of labour unrest is due 
to the realisation, however vague, on the r:art of the worker that 
his standard of living is too low and that he can never hope to 
raise that standard until his house is provided with a degree of 
comfort which is at present beyond his reach ••••• good housing 
accommodation forms an important link in the promotion of 
satisfactory relations between the employer and his workers, and 
from this aspect as well as social grounds it is desirable that 
some standard should be laid down and enforced for providing the 
plantation worker with an improvement in his housing." (61) 
Further, by the end of the 1930s both the Orde-Browne Report and the 
Royal Commission were recommending that "any slum clearance scheme should 
be undertaken as an essential social service rather than an economic 
proposi tion" • 62 
In the Caribbean) as elsewhere in the colonial world and indeed 
Britain too, it was clear that large segments of the working class would 
be unable to pay economic rents for improved housing and therefore it was 
not to be realistically expected that private enterprise would undertake 
the re-housing of this group without some financial inducement from 
government. That colonial governments should become involved in 
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housing, at least in respect of slum clearance and related re-housing, 
became part of colonial policy empire-wide. A Colonial Office Paper 
stated: 
"In the Colonial Empire as in the United Kingdom, slum clearance 
schemes must often be regarded as a social service essential to 
the community rather than as an economic proposition." (63) 
In Guyana the Colonial Office directive in the area of housing was 
translated initially into a survey of housing needs conducted in 
Georgetown in 1945 and guided by the Town Planning Advisor to the 
Comptroller of Welfare and Development.64 The results of the survey 
indicated the depth of the problem. Seven thousand, nine hundred and 
ninety four houses were surveyed and of these 2,309 were deemed unfit for 
human habitation, 5,303 needed repair and a mere 382 were considered 
structurally sound. Over 90% of the dwellings were rented, a factor 
which obviously contributed a great deal to the problem and which was 
compounded by the inability of many residents to pay high rents. Not 
only were the structures generally of poor quality, they were also 
overcrowded. The tenement was the predominant form of housing: 58.5% 
of housing in Georgetown and 54.6% in New Amsterdam (the other, much 
smaller, urban area) w,as of this type. This, together with the fact 
that very few dwellings had more than two bedrooms, (indeed most [58.6%] 
only had one), contributed to a high rate of overcrowding as judged by 
density per bedroom. The Town Planning Advisor's conclusion was that 
the slums of Georgetown were worse than those anywhere else in the 
British Caribbean.65 
Pressure on existing housing had been increasing due to natural 
increase and the flow of people into the city over the previous two 
decades and was likely to continue to increase as a result of a 
continuance of urban drift and natural population increase. 66 [See Table 
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7(viii)] In addition, a rise in building costs and a shortage of 
materials resulting from war conditions had contributed both to a slowing 
down in new developnents and dilapidation of existing housing. Finally, 
the introduction of rent restriction covering all housing in 1941 acted 
to make some landlords less able or willing to make repairs.67 In some 
cases they refused to make repairs so that the Council would make a 
closing order on the property, the tenants would be forced to leave and 
they could introduce new, higher-paying tenants. Another practice was 
to evict on the grounds of nuisance and convert a house into more 
lucrative 'apartments' or demolish a low rental building entirely and 
build another high cost accommodation on the land.68 These ploys made 
the housing situation of the lower income group critical. 
A housing authority of the type recommended by the 1934 Committee 
was eventually created by the Housing Ordinance No. 24 of 1946. Linked 
with this legislation was a further ordinance to control development in 
both rural and urban areas, the Town and Country Planning Ordinance No. 
25, 1946. Tbgether these ordinances marked a radical extension of the 
state's powers in this area. The Planning Ordinance, which was based on 
similar Br i tish legislation, represented the assumption of government 
powers and responsibilities in the control of land development. 
Planning was to be effected through a Central Housing Planning Authority 
set up under the Housing Ordinance. This Authori ty could declare an 
area a slum and through purchase or compulsory order acquire the land and 
secure re-development. 
State involvement in the urban areas was, however, confined to the 
clearance of slums and the provision of alternative accommodation. By 
1953, that is over the first seven years of the Ordinance's existence, 
the only new project under way was in connection wi th the clearance of 
Albouystown, a notorious dockside slum area; the re-housing of 231 
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families from the district was to be accomplished through the building of 
100 low cost houses for rental in La Penitence, an area just outside the 
city which had been canefields. This was in addition to a small project 
to house 48 families at Wortmanville, an area of Georgetown, begun in 
1946. Even this scheme for two-bedroom self-contained flats did not 
meet the needs of the poorer section as the monthly rental of $10 was 
beyond the means of most of the workin'9 class and sui ted more to 
artisans, foremen and persons of similar status.69 
Slum clearance alone could not affect the other major housing 
problem in Georgetown which was a shortage of accommodation. Measures 
to encourage building were taken, mainly tax exemptions for builders70 , 
but more radical measures and the finance to support them were not 
introduced until the 1953 crisis provided the impetus. 
{ii} Rural Housing 
Whilst housing needs in the rural areas were perhaps less dramatic, 
they were still great. The bigger estates had been improving their 
housing provision but many families were still housed in ranges which in 
one contemporary view represented "the worst kind of urban dwelling".7l 
In the villages the houses were often clustered together and very small, 
producing overcrowding not dissimilar to that found in urban slums. The 
housing of people on former sugar estates which had been converted to 
rice posed a particular problem. When the estates ceased cultivation, 
workers often continued to occupy the range housing provided by the 
estate management, which had in many places become extremely 
dilapidated. 72 
The main lines of rural developnent in housing were defined in terms 
of the decision to revamp the sugar industry and develop rice. 
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Accommodation of the needs of the sugar industry was accomplished through 
the setting up of a Sugar Industry Welfare Fund from which housing loans 
were made to sugar workers.73 The development of rice was to be 
assisted through the establishment of further land settlement schemes. 
As in social welfare, the stress was more on rural rehabilitation than 
urban problems. 
The Housing .Qf Sugar Workers 
The Moyne Commission had addressed the question of estate housing 
and concluded that the government must accept some liability for the 
rehousing of estates' workers. That they should somehow be rehoused 
could no longer be questioned - and indeed was not questioned by the 
Cormnissioners. 
The estates' managements had shown themselves unwilling or unable to 
comply with the recommendations of a 1932 Committee that housing be 
improved and cottages only (not ranges) be built. By 1936 the Central 
Board, dissatisfied with the level of estate rehousing activities, had 
set down new standards, but this had produced only limited results. 
O1ange was slow and by 1941 the view of the Dep:lrtrnent of Labour was that 
the 'very small improvement in the housing conditions (on estates was) a 
matter for serious concern".74 By 1944, 1,163 of the 1,371 ground 
ranges condemned by the Board were still standing.75 
Although estates had been willing to keep on the responsibility for 
housing estate residents and government more than willing to allow them 
to do so, the continuous labour unrest in the industry, fueled by 
increased expectations characteristic of this period made it politic for 
both estates and the colonial government to resolve the problem of 
providing improved housing more satisfactorily. 
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In addition the social and demographic characteristics of the 
estates' population changed considerably bet\'leen 1900 and 1950. The 
ratio of women to men rose from 63:100 in 1891 to 87:100 in 1931.76 A 
more natural balance arose after the cessation of the large scale 
immigration which had led to a situation where males were in the 
majority. The number of ex-indentured labourers taking up their option 
to return to India had steadily declined from between one and two 
thousand per annum in the first decade of the century to the 311 who 
returned in the last ship chartered for the purpose in 1949.77 The 
estate communities were increasingly composed of locally born families 
rather than foreign born males. This change in the structure of the 
population altered both housing requirements and housing expectations of 
the population. In addition, increasingly the estates population 
included persons who did not actually work for the estates. As indicated 
earlier, one estimate was that of a total adult population of 45,917 
persons, 11,735 were not employed by, nor ever worked for the estates but 
were engaged in trades such as bakery, butchery and dress making; that 
is, they were privately employed servicing the estate community. In 
addition, there were approximately 4,189 children, bringing the 
percentage resident but not engaged by the estates to 22.2%78 
Whilst the estate population contained increasing numbers of persons 
who did no work for the estate, on many estates an increasing amount of 
work was done by non-residents. As Giglioli put it: 
"The condition of mutual advantage which caused the customs 
established during indenture to be continued even after the 
cessation of indenture and its legal implications, have now to a 
great extent, ceased to exist or, at least, appear to have changed 
to the unilateral advantage of the estate resident." (79) 
Developments in the industry during the forties leading to the 
movement towards rationalisation of the labour input and mechanisation 
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also provided reasons for estates' managements to alter their view of 
worker housing. There emerged a policy of differentiating between key 
or 'nuclear' workers and non-essential or 'extra-nuclear' workers. 80 
Following on the recommendations of the Royal Commissioners, the 
Comptroller of Development and Welfare proposed that estates should make 
land for house lots available and either given free, sold or leased to 
government, and that the Central Housing and Planning Author i ty should 
provide the financial assistance necessary to enable estate workers to 
build their own houses. 'Nuclear' workers, he proposed, would continue 
to be housed by the estates. 81 
Discussions between the British Guiana Sugar Producers' Association, 
the Commissioner of Local Government and the Colonial Secretary ensued 
and the proposals were adopted in principle. Government thus assumed 
the responsibility for re-housing an estimated 6,555 families.82 It was, 
however, by no means clear from whence the finances for such a large 
undertaking would come, and in 1947 the Development Sub-Committee on 
Housing put forward only a 'pilot' scheme involving three estates -
Wales, Versailles, Port Mourant - which would involve the building of 
1,596 houses.83 In 1948, however, a levy on sugar exports, legislated 
for two years earlier was imposed and the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare 
Fund (S.I.L.W.F.) instituted. 84 It was intended that this fund should 
be made available for the housing of sugar workers and on the strength of 
this the re-housing project was to be extended to all estates. 
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Table 8(ii) 
Home OWnership on Estates by Sugar Workers 
Resident .in Resident .in 
.xeru: Estate Owned HouRing Self Owned on Estate Prqperty 
1943 47,054 27,727 
1944 43,831 27,823 
1945 N/A N/A 
1946 43,832 29,513 
1947 44,451 30,335 
1948 42,761 33,031 
1949 43,287 34,698 
1950 41,432 38,738 
SOORCE: Department of Labour Reports. N/A - not available. 
The finance for the project became available in 1950 when the 
Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund Committee took over responsibility for 
all house loans advanced from the estates. From Table 8(ii) it can be 
seen that re-housing was proceeding fairly rapidly even before Sugar 
Industry Labour Welfare Fund loans came into operation. The dominant 
company, Bookers Bros., McConnel Ltd., had already begun to encourage 
horne ownership and resettlement for surplus workers before the agreement 
with government was made. In 1940 an area at Plantation Bath was 
selected for workers to build their own houses on. The intention was 
that "the settlers [would] be able to obtain casual employment on the 
estate in the same way as workers who live in the adjoining villages." 85 
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Even this encouragement of home ownership was not new as since 1917 
selected individuals had been allowed to lease estate land upon which to 
build a house, so that by 1946, 41% of the estate population lived in 
their own houses, often built with financial assistance from the 
companies. With government's assumption of responsibility for the 
housing of non-essential workers, the estates could support an 
accelerated drive towards self-ownership. Further, a new sensibility was 
developing, leading to the "general opinion" that: 
"A large number of workers live in their own houses, frequently 
away from the estates and ••• these employees are more indep:!ndent 
and, with more incentive, are keener and better workmen than those 
who rely on the estates for their housing." (86) 
The advantages of worker home-ownership to the estates were, by the 
1940s, several. It was clear that the old ranges had to go. Many were 
simply falling down anyway, but yet more importantly they had become a 
focus of worker discontent. As the Venn Commissioners put it, referring 
to the ranges: 
'~ere can be no peace on the sugar estates until this depressing 
legacy from former days is removed." (87) 
It was obviously cheaper for the companies to encourage self-
ownership than to build and maintain large numbers of new houses 
particularly if higher standards were demande~ The old imperative of 
tying a large workforce to the estate no longer operated so forcibly and 
the estates could concentrate on the rehousing of the estimated 5,262 
families (of a total of 10,944) containing nuclear workers.88 These 
families were to be housed by the estates on condition of their continued 
employment with the estate. 
In 1938 the sugar companies were defending range housing before the 
Orde Brown Inquiry on the ground that East Indian patterns of 
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socialisation led to a preference for this kind of accommodation, and had 
found that their provision of housing without legal obligation to do so 
provide a useful factor in bargaining with Government. By the post-war 
period, conditions had changed so drastically that the old ranges were 
finally condemned, although they were not to disappear completely for 
many years, and the companies were content to disengage themselves from 
the responsibility for housing it had so long sui ted them to take. They 
did, however, continue to sponsor home-ownership schemes of various kinds 
themselves after the division of responsibility with government, in the 
absence of immediate action from that quarter, until 195'0 when financial 
responsibility for all such schemes was assumed by the Sugar Industry 
Labour Welfare Fund. From that year it offered home loans to all sugar 
estate residents. Plots were leased out by the estates at a nominal 
ground rent of $2.88 per annum for a period of twenty-five years with the 
right to renew the lease. The estates individually retained the 
prerogative to decide whether land should be leased or sold to the 
Government. (The major company, Bookers, retained control until the 
196'Os.) They remained responsible for roads and main drainage. 
Although Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund loans could be obtained 
for building on land not owned by the estates, very few loans of this 
type were applied for. In 1952 for example there were 1,829 
applications in relation to estate land, and 77 for loans to build on 
land outside the sugar area.89 This preference for remaining on estate 
lands was undoubtedly due primarily to the favourable terms of lease and 
the prepared land offered by the companies. For the estates relocation 
of workers on estate lands meant that even whilst they were going ahead 
with mechanisation plans, they could still be assured of part-time casual 
labour located nearby whenever it was necessary, such as at crop time. 
Between 1951 and mid 1953, 3,200 houses were built with Sugar 
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Industry Labour Welfare Fund loans, This contrasted with the 
comparatively slow pace in urban development. The generous terms 
offered to the sugar workers, with loans of up to $1,000.00, representing 
50% of the cost of an average-sized hou.se, also contrasted sharply with 
the difficulties experienced by urban low income workers in securing 
finance. 
In this way, then, part of the cost of housing sugar workers, except 
for 'key' personnel, was transferred to the state and thus 'socialised'. 
The method by which this was accomplished had two important long-term 
consequences. Firstly, the people being re-housed on estate lands were 
almost entirely East Indians which meant that ethnically segregated 
communities were established again even after the break-up of the 
or iginal 'plantation communi ties'. Secondly, because the Sugar Industry 
Labour Welfare Fund monies came directly from a levy on sugar exports, 
the unusual principle was established of allocating government revenues 
to one section of the workforce, which in this particular case was also 
identifiable as belonging to a specific ethnic group. 
These factors undoubtedly enhanced the feelings of insecurity that 
had been developing within the black community. The concentration of 
development funds on agriculture, the support to the sugar industry and 
the development of rice, clearly favoured the East Indian group. The 
increasing importance of rice had led to Indians acquiring land for its 
production, often fran Africans. One conunentator saw it thus: 
"Wi thin recent years an acute sociological problem has developed 
in Br i tish Guiana. It is the supplanting of the Negro by the 
East Indians in ownership of land in the coastal areas and the 
need for creating fresh avenues of employment for the dispossessed 
landholders." (90) 
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African hopes were for developnents in industry and especially in 
those industr ies connected with the inter ior where Afr icans had 
traditionally worked; in gold, diamonds and timber. 9l As noted 
earlier, however, the years immediately after the war produced little in 
the way of industrial development and virtually no investment in the 
interior. Indeed, the major context in which interior development was 
discussed during the period was in connection with investigations of the 
prospects for the successful settlement of displaced persons from Europe 
and surplus population from the West Indian Islands. 
Other factors were also important in producing the attitudes 
involved in the racial disturbances of the early sixties. However, the 
effects of housing and development policy as a whole contributed to 
ethnic antagonisms. These seem to have been developing in the post-war 
period, leading the President of the Transport Workers Union to state in 
a May Day Parade speech in 1950 that: 
''Recently... an even more dangerous monster, aiming at destroying 
working class unity, has reared its ugly head in our midst. I 
refer to the serious obstacle of racial antagonism now being 
infused in the trade union movement by the invidious propaganda of 
unscrupulous politicians and careerists who build their following 
on a racial chauvinistic line to the detriment of working class 
solidarity."(92) 
Social policy of the period could only make more fertile the ground upon 
which the "oonster" fed. 
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(iii) Other Rural Housing 
The most urgent problem in rural housing apart from that involving 
estate residents was presented by the areas on the Essequibo Coast and 
Islands, where sugar production had been abandoned for many years. Some 
of these had been selected as land settlement areas and housing projects 
were being pursued in relation to this intent. An investigator of this 
area reported that, with people still using decayed old ranges there was 
"a need for immediate improvement in housing condi tions.,,93 
It was clear that most of the people living in the area who were 
surviving from the CUltivation of small plots of rice lands leased from 
landlords would, like the urban slum dwellers, be unable to pay economic 
rents or re-house themselves by building their own houses. As a 
consequence the Development Sub-Committee recommended that a scheme be 
adopted for this area which involved subsidies and loans for people 
earning less than $60.00 per month, amounting to a third of the cost of 
the building as a grant, and a half of the cost as a loan, with the 
maximum cost of the building fixed at $650.00. 94 
Although the rural problem was not considered as dire as the urban 
situation, improved housing in the countryside was seen as important "as 
some counter attraction to the town and urban life where overcrowding is 
already rife and unemployment more than an incipient problem. ,,95 
The Sub-COmmittee's proposal was rejected by the main committee as 
too costly and approval was given only to an experimental scheme 
invol ving the building of 25 houses, the repair of 25 and the enlargement 
of 25 more in each of the Essequibo areas viz. Leguan, Wakenaam and the 
Coast. Even this limited plan moved slowly due to the intransigence of 
the landlords who were unwilling to sell house lots and thereby lose 
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control over their tenants. 96 The inadequacy of this project can be 
estimated from the findings of the 1943 survey that 1,954 houses in the 
areas surveyed ought to be pulled down and that a further I, 545 were in 
need of repair. The only other project in the rural areas excluding 
those for the rehousing of surplus estate labour concerned the re-housing 
of families in dilapidated ranges and cottages on the government 
controlled Anna Regina estate.97 '!he acuteness of the housing problem 
and the inadequacy of government action or private initiatives to meet it 
is indicated by the estimate that, with population increasing at around 
13,000 per annum by 1950, 2,000 additional units were required each year 
over and above those replacing old stock.98 
The post-war housing posi tion in Guyana was very similar to that 
which could be found in other colonial countries. Lack of planning in 
the urban areas, poor company housing on the estates and rural poverty 
had led to a low standard of housing which became critical in a situation 
of rapid population growth and rising expectations and aspirations. 
Lana Settlement 
Land settlement policy in the forties, like housing policy, also 
tended to give the appearance that one group was being favoured over the 
other, since it became linked with the development of rice which had 
al ways been seen as an 'East Indian crop'. Even before this, land 
settlement was viewed as promoting East Indian interests against those of 
Africans. For example, although condemning schemes to date as "petty" 
one contemporary figure, Alfred Crane, a local senior magistrate and 
former member of the Legislative Council, contended in 1938 that a third 
of rice farmers were African and claimed that they, too, should benefit 
from land settlement schemes. He saw such schemes as the only means of 
271 
breaking the stagnating clutch of the estates for the benefit of both 
racial groups. He argued further that the African, due to the dearth of 
village lands, was driven to swell the ranks of the urban unemployed. 
His view of the rural dilemma which, he felt, a land settlement programme 
would resolve, is interesting for its summation of the developing AFrican 
view of their own situation: 
"Farming in village districts can at best provide villagers with 
bare subsistence. For the purpose of improving their homes, 
educating their children and developing their communities, 
villagers can obtain nothing from their farms and the little 
progress achieved in the amenities of civilised community and 
domestic life during the last century has been obtained almost 
exclusively from money earned in the gold and diamond fields. 
The great bulk of the people has not emerged from the state of 
primary poverty since the emancipation. Low wages, which 
provided less than bare subsistence made savings of any kind 
impossible ••••• The accumulation of capital for even small 
~entures has been impossible. II (99) 
& & Thorne, President of the British Guiana Workers' League, similarly 
claimed that settlement policy had discriminated against Africans who, he 
claimed, were already at a disadvantage having been supplanted as skilled 
labour on the estates by cheaper East Indian labour.IOO Hence, while 
land settlement projects to date had had but little effect on patterns of 
land control in the country, they had produced an effect on African 
perception of their treatment by government. 
As has been shown, land settlement had developed as an expedient way 
to discharge the state's financial obligations to expired labourers and 
as an inducement to immigrants to stay in the country_ It had then 
become attached to colonisation schemes. It had never been part of a 
coherent policy for the development of land or the large scale settlement 
of local people on their own land. The .ad lli& nature of land settlement 
policy is indicated by the lack of unified control for the responsibility 
of their management, the department responsible for the settlement being 
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dependent upon the conditions surrounding and time of their assumption by 
Government. 
Table 8(iii) 
Departmental Control of Land Settlements 
--" -------------------------------- ---_. 
Name Date 
Started 
Acreage No. of 
Farmers 
Under 
Control of 
-------------------------..------------------------
Plantation Windsor 1910 -
Forest, La Jalousie, 1912 
Hague 
Anna Regina 
Vergenoegen 
Clarity Amazon 
Cane Grove & 
La Bonne Mere 
1929 
1946 
1936 
1948 
3,800 
8,747 
3,862 
170 
7,233 
609 
825 
200 
Housing 
& 
provision 
farms. 
423 
1910-1932 
Land & Mines 
Department. 
1932-1954 
District 
Canmissioner 
under 
Canrnissi one r 
of Local 
Government. 
Department 
of 
Agriculture. 
Canmissioner 
of Local 
Govermnent. 
" 
" 
SOURCE: 
Guiana. 
Brown, F.A. Report on Land Settlement Problems in British 
1953, p.2. (unpublished). 
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One consequence of the varying control [see Table 8(iii)] was that 
the character of the settlement reflected the emphasis of the government 
department controlling it. Thus Anna Regina, controlled by the 
Department of Agriculture, was the more efficient in terms of rice 
production. 
By the mid-forties, population increase made colonisation schemes as 
a means of adding to popula tion redundant. Fur ther, the retaining of 
East Indian labour or the saving of money on passages to which emigrants 
were still entitled were no longer importan~ Land settlement could now 
be considered in another context: it became an adjunct to the policy 
evolved to deal with surplus labour from the estates and to the plan for 
development of the r ice industry, i tsel f in a large part a response to 
the changing labour requirements of the sugar industry. Specifically, 
land settlement in this period was to be developed in connection with 
drainage and irrigation schemes. It was reported in 1949 that: 
" ••• in reality land settlement schemes in British Guiana are in 
fact aiming at providing for the beneficial occupation of sections 
of land brought within main drainage and irrigation schemes."(IOl) 
The Moyne Report had recommended that land settlement be based on mixed 
farming with a movement away from specialised export crops. Yet, as we 
have seen, in the post war period the government significantly withdrew 
support for the peasant based diversification of crops which had emerged 
during the war. 'llie agricultural emphasis remained with sugar and with 
rice as its complement. 
The new, planned approach to land settlement as an instrument of 
development policy began with experiments, including the construction of 
model houses on the Anna Regina Estate land which was almost exclusively 
tenanted by East Indian rice farrnersl02• 'lliis activity was initiated as 
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a Colonial Development and Welfare scheme, financed by a grant of E4,225. 
In 1943 a Land Settlement Committee was set up and a Land Settlement 
Officer appointed. Two years later a further grant of £57,609 from 
Colonial Development and Welfare funds was made for land settlement 
projectsl03 • 
Under the Ten Year Development Plan 1947 - 1956, two large drainage 
and irrigation projects, at Corantyne and Boeraserie were intended to 
facilitate the development of large areas devoted to rice. The first 
major new land settlement under the Ten Year Plan at Vergenoegen, on the 
right bank of the Essequibo, demonstrates the character of land 
settlement policy in this perio~ Vergenoegen-cum-annexis were estates 
which had gone out of CUltivation and much of the land was now 
uncultivated, other of it leased out to tenants for the purpose of rice 
cultivation. Location within the Bonasika irrigation scheme gave access 
to water. The land was also wi thin 5 1/2 miles of two sugar estates 
where part-time employment would be available periodically, hence a land 
settlement scheme would be useful as a means of drawing off surplus 
population from the estates.104 The first thing done after purchase of 
the land by government on February 1946 was the repair of the drainage 
and irrigation system "so as to make a portion of the land available for 
.' 
rice cultivation.lOS 
Vergenoegen then, had the virtue of being related to a drainage and 
irrigation scheme, and thereby made suitable for rice CUltivation. 
Further it was near to estates and so could take off surplus populatio~ 
The relationship between land settlement, sugar and rice in planning 
during this period is indicated further by the recommendation made by a 
1943 Land Settlement Committee that the size of holding offered to 
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settlers should depend on the possibility of estate work being available 
to them with smaller plots going to those in areas adjacent to sugar 
estates.106 In a similar vein, the Development Sub-Committee on 
Agriculture recommended that no expansion of the spring crop of rice be 
allowed in sugar areas so that rice would not be entirely in competition 
with sugar for labour.107 
In the same year, 1947, government acquired Plantations cane Grove 
and La Bonne Mere, also in the Essequibo area, after a petition was made 
by residents requesting such government assistance following the 
cessation of cUltivation by the proprietors. Sugar production in 
Essequibo County had been gradually declining and had ceased altogether 
during the war. Apart from government owned estates which had been 
given over to rice, large tracts of land were in the possession of 
landlords who often "resolutely refuse [d] to grant long leases or sell 
house lots - a course which they consider[ed] would destroy the control 
over their tenants possessed by them. ,,108 The state was seen by the 
farmers as a preferable landlord. Cane Grove and La Bonne Mere too 
became largely made over to rice cultivation, although the raising of 
cattle was also encouraged. l09 
By 1950 the relationship between land settlement and the cultivation 
of rice seems to have been firmly established. The Local Government 
Commissioner reported that: 
"Land settlements are established primarily for the growing of an 
export crop - rice, and to serve peasant cultivators who desire to 
reside on and make their livings from their holdings and who do 
not desire except in a larger degree to supplement the returns 
obtained from their holdings by undertaking wage-earning 
employment. "(110) 
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Here too then, the direction of policy appeared to favour the East 
Indians who were the chief rice growers. 
The significance of land settlement projects in Guyana can be seen 
when the context of land ownership and tenure is examined. Ninety per 
cent the colony was Crown Land. Since 1931 the policy had been not to 
grant freehold, but to give grants of leasehold for up to 99 years, more 
generally for 21 years, and this was the practice adopted on the new land 
settlements.lll The rest of the land on the coastal strip was in the 
hands of the estates, or of landlords with large holdings in the case of 
coastal land no longer used for estate sugar cultivation. The landlords 
tended to be conservative in terms of the development of the land. 112 
Tenants had no security of tenure, leases being renewed in general 
annually.113 Landlords also tended to be against tenants owning their 
own houses due to the loss of influence for them which this entailed.114 
A Departmental Report of 1954 summed up the position thus: 
"Some sugar estates provide small portions of well-drained and 
irrigated lands to their workers, but very often the only course 
open to the small farmer is the rental or lease of Crown Lands 
which are held by private individuals on long lease at nominal 
rental. These lands are let out to farmers under conditions of 
varying severity. The rent is either exorbitant or the drainage 
has been allowed to deteriorate. In other cases, irrigation 
facilities are either non-existent or ingress and egress a 
problem. Should a landlord desire for any reason to dispossess 
his tenant he applies methods designed to force his unfortunate 
'subject' to abandon his holding. In many cases the difficulties 
with which the tenant is faced are accentuated by the fact that 
the landlord is rice miller and moneylender as well."(l15) 
Land settlement schemes represented an opportunity to break the 
stranglehold of landlords on the development of the coastlands and, for 
the settler, better conditions for the growing of crops and securing of 
his livelihood but to have any real impact on the predominant pattern of 
Guyanese economic and social life a large, integrated programme was 
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necessary. The ownership of most of the prime agricultural land by the 
estates and big landlords remained a stumbling block to the aspirations 
of the landless which was unaffected by the land settlement programme. 
The programme continued to be relatively small-scale and linked to the 
opening up of expensively claimed new rice lands. 
As we have seen, the developnents in medical care, public health and 
sanitation which had occurred in Guyana since 1920 occurred mainly on the 
sugar estates. The growth of village populations had not been met by 
increased medical provision and large areas of the countryside, outside 
of the estates, were in effect without medical care. The Royal 
Commission had recommended that rural health centres be established and 
financed by Colonial Development and Welfare funds. The aim of the 
health units was: 
"to supply at low cost the various activities which are required 
to promote the health of rural communities ••• the development of 
maternity and child welfare work, venereal disease clinics, school 
medical services and the better education of the public in health 
including nutr i tion ••• "(116) 
In Guyana work on health clinics began before Colonial Developnent 
and Welfare funds became available, taking up the recommendation of the 
Orde Browne Inquiry. The programme continued using these funds in 
1940.117 By 1947 there were nine of them. 118 Apart from the clinics, 
there were six other Colonial Development and Welfare funded projects. 
Two projects were concerned with the provision of additional medical 
staff, a school Medical Officer and a Sister Tutor, one with the training 
of sanitary inspectors. A fourth project aimed at providing medical 
services for the Amerindians who inhabited the interior of the country. 
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The most far reaching project was the establishment of the Mosquito 
Service which developed out of the Malaria Survey and Yellow Fever 
campaign projects. The Malaria Survey continued the work initiated by 
the Malaria Research Unit, and was followed by a systematic malaria 
eradication campaign which brought malaria under control by the end of 
1947. 
Apart from the dramatic success of the malaria campaign, the 
position of the rural population not engaged with the sugar industry was 
not much improved during the 1940s. As noted earlier, the Government 
Medical Officers of Health could hardly cover the areas to which they 
were assigned: 
"Most of the medical distr icts are too large and populous to be 
efficiently or adequately served by their respective officers. 
For example, the Port Mourant Officer has charge of a district 23 
miles in length with an estimated population of 32,000." (119) 
Nor was the urban service keeping pace with population increase or 
increased demand. The number of patients dealt with in the Government 
hospitals and dispensaries on both in- and out-patient bases was growing 
fast. At the No.1. Dispensary in Georgetown, for example, 17,252 
patients were seen in 1939, whilst in 1944 the figure was 32,543.120 
The rural problem was aggravated by the almost total absence of any 
doctors in private practice. Only one country village, Buxton, had a 
private practitioner resident.12l Government Medical Officers of Health 
were also in short supply as were hospital based specialists. The 
latter were mainly expatriates from the Colonial Service and Guyana did 
not pay well in comparison with other colonial territories. 
The 1947 Health Sub-Committee of the Development Planning Committee 
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proposed two new cottage hospitals, at Mahaicony and Wakenaam, and 
fifteen new rural centres, with extensions to existing facilities at 
Bartica, Suddie, Berbice and Mabaruma. Its other major recommendation 
for extending ooverage of the rural population was that the Government 
and the Guiana Sugar Producers' Association should corne to an arrangement 
whereby estate hospitals would treat persons in their area who were not 
estate residents in addition to those who were.122 
A large proportion of admissions to the estates' hospitals had been 
due to malaria and malaria related diseases. As indicated, the almost 
total eradication of malaria was accomplished by 1950. This made the 
old hospi tals, with thei r large capaci ty, redundant. As can be seen 
from Table 8(iv), the number of admissions was drastically reduced 
between 1946 and 1948 as the incidence of malaria fell. 
Year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
Table 8{iv) 
Sugar Estates Hospitals Admissions ~ = l2!a 
All Diseases ~ Malaria 
Total Admissions 
(all diseases) 
21,222 
17,745 
24,527 
11,113 
12,843 
Malaria Admissions 
9,408 
9,752 
5,144 
1,760 
872 
SOURCE: Report of a Committee of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry of B.G. 
(Venn) p. 179 Table xxxvi 
The Venn Commissioners found practically empty estate hospi tals, 
some harbouring only a few old people whose 'ailment' they judged to be 
desti tution. In one hospital with accommodation for 100 there were only 
280 
seven occupied beds.123 The twenty-one sugar estates hospi tals had a 
total accommodation for 1,409, that is one bed per 51 persons living on 
the estates, as against an accommodation ratio of one bed per 993 persons 
in the five existing state hospitals.1 24 This capacity was now more 
than generous and represented an unnecessary expense to the estates. 
From the estates' view point an extension of state provision to 'extra-
nuclear' workers and a rationalisation of their own provision for 
'nuclear' labour was both economical and suited to the new organisational 
principles of the industry. 
The Venn Report noted the gross underprovision of hospital 
facilities for the countryside: 
"It startled us to find that outside the estates, no prOV1Slon 
exists at the moment for hospital treatment in the villages and 
rural districts. Urgent cases are sent to the hospitals at 
Georgetown or New Amsterdam but these, the only two of the five 
public hospitals in the colony which serve the 'sugar belt' are 
themselves overcrowded with town p:ltients." (125) 
The Health Sub-COmmittee's proposal that Government arrange with estate 
managements for the treatment of non-estate residents on payment of 
agreed fees was rejected by the Commissioners on the grounds that, on the 
whole, estate hospi tals were not up to modern standards, in some areas 
they were unnecessarily m.nnerous and generally they ",ere badly sited in 
relation to emerging patterns of population distribution. In addition, 
the Commissioners were not satisfied with medical supervision in estates' 
hospitals, noting that Government Medical Officers visited estate 
hospitals only on average three times a week. The rest of the time 
sicknurse/dispensers were in charge and it was considered that, even when 
these were fully qualified, this grade of worker was not trained to take 
such a level of responsibility.126 
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The recommendations of the Commission were in line with the emerging 
requirements of a stream-lined sugar industry and also with the necessity 
of developing a more comprehensive system of care for the burgeoning 
rural population inside and outside the industry. In essence they 
suggested that: 
1. The government assume responsibility for all rural hospital 
services. 
2. Those estates' hospitals that were redundant due to their proximity 
to others should be demolished immediately with the rest remaining 
in temporary use until the needs of the whole rural population had 
been assessed. 
3. The Government should ultimately provide at least four, and 
preferably six, additional, state hospitals sited so as to serve 
both estates and villages. 
4. The estates should each provide a modern dispensary for its resident 
'nuclear' population, instead of the existing hospital, and also an 
ambulance service for the carrying of hospital cases to the nearest 
state institution. 
S. That a Government Medical Officer be designated to supervise these 
dispensaries. 
The industry, which had for a long period found it useful to assume 
responsibility for the provision of health care for its workers, counting 
the sums incurred as production costs, was now willing to quit that 
responsibility and cut costs. In 1938 the managements of all the 
estates had agreed together that an Estates Medical Officer be appointed 
and that a central hospital for each sugar estate area be established to 
meet the needs of the estates in its vicinity.127 This indicates that 
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estate managements held at that time an intention to continue providing a 
full medical service to estate residents. However, as we have seen in 
the case of estate housing, the steady increase in the number of estate 
residents not employed in the industry and the plans for mechanisation 
with consequent reduction in the workforce, made the provision of 
extensive coverage of large populations unattractive. In addition, many 
of the estate hospitals, although held up as models of what could be 
achieved in tropical medicine at the turn of the century, had become 
dilapidated and required replacement or extensive refurbishment. This 
encouraged managements to view favourably schemes which would lessen 
rather than increase their expenditure on medical provision. 
The recommendations of the Venn Commission were accepted in 
principal by Government but, as in the case of the housing sector outside 
of the rehousing of estate workers,' the pace of development which 
followed was slow. This prompted the British Guyana Sugar Producers' 
Association to implement the reorganisation of their medical services 
from 1952. In this year the demolition of obsolete hospitals began, a 
process largely accomplished by 1956, and new dispensaries took their 
Place.128 [See Table 8(v)] 
Table 8(v) 
Number of Estate Hospitals 1926 - 1969 Selected Years 
Year 
1926 
1938 
1946 
1949 
1954 
1955 
1960 
Number .Qf. Estate Hospitals 
30 
21 
21 
20 
12 
5 
2 
SOURCE: Reports of the Surgeon General (1926 - 49), Reports of the 
Medical Department (1954 - 60) • 
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In this way the estates reduced their responsibility for medical 
care, which for nearly half a century they had assumed without legal 
obligation. Clearly this, together with the rapidly growing population 
and its settlement in new areas, threw additional burdens on the state 
sector. Hence both in health and housing the demand for state services 
grew dramatically because of the extension of state responsibility to the 
whole population at a time when natural population growth and increased 
demand were already creating pressure on existing provision, and when 
political developments encouraged the government to seek to meet these 
demands. The total number of general hospital beds in 1937 was 2,555: 
938 in public hospitals, 50 in a private hospital and 1,567 in estate 
hospitals.129 In 1954 the total number was 3,113 : 2,263 in public 
hospi tals, of which approximately 900 were 'special' beds, and 850 in 
private and estate hospitals.130 State provision together with private 
expansion failed to substitute for estate provision since the number of 
general beds actually fell to about 2,200. 
The sparsity and low level of existing services made it difficult to 
effect any dramatic change without high expenditure, and whilst the 
health budget did increase between 1946 and 1953, material shortages 
during the war and the immediate post-war years, increased costs after 
1950 due to the re-evaluation of the pound sterling amd staffing 
shortages throughout made progress slow. 
Services remarked in his Report for 1954 that: 
The Director of Medical 
"It is extremely worrying to the Medical Department that few of 
the major and minor improvements to Medical Institution~ in the 
colony which it has recommended for a considerable perlod have 
corrnnenced." (131) 
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Colonial Development and Welfare expenditure did not have any 
radical effect on the level of health provision, with the major exception 
of the malaria control programme. Nor did planning in the forties 
attempt any re-evaluation of priorities. The programmes introduced 
tended to be directed, as in previous years, at specific diseases rather 
than attempting to improve general standards of health. The accent 
continued to be on cure rather than preventio~ The urban bias of state 
provision was not radically altered even in the years immediately 
following the decision to withdraw estate hospital provisio~ 
CONCLUSION 
Developments in social policy between 1940 and 1953 were essentially 
conditioned by the changing requirements of the sugar industry. By this 
period this policy was evolved not by a legislature composed of sugar 
barons and their agents but by bureaucrats who decided that sugar was to 
remain the primary crop and that rice was to be encouraged as its 
adjunct. Interior development was never supported in any substantial 
way, nor was the development of industry. Changes in the sugar industry 
were of critical importance in the shape taken by land settlement policy, 
in social welfare' policy and in housing and health policy. 
The level of social and economic development achieved during these 
years and the direction that they took failed to keep pace with the 
population growth or to dampen the emergence of radical nationalism. 
In so far as it was the intention of the colonial administration to 
encourage economic and social development to a level where 'responsible' 
independent politics would emerge, it manifestly failed. Economic 
development was too slow to provide alternate employment for those made 
redundant in the sugar industry, or to create jobs to match the increase 
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in papulation. Social policy was inadequate either to meet people's 
material needs in health, housing or income, or to produce more 'stable' 
communi ties. The direction taken in both economic and social policy 
acted to prolong the life of the plantation society with its traditional 
confinement of economic activity and population to the coastal strip, its 
emIilasis on export cash crops, agricultural bias and racial separation. 
Indeed, as has been indicated, the policies adopted actually increased 
ethnic separation and hostility. 
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SOCIAL OOLICY .8l'ID THE lill. POLITICAL CRISIS 
In this chapter it will be argued that the political "crisis", i.e. 
the success of the Peoples' Progressive Party (P.P.P.), acted as a spur 
to a continued high level of spending on the social sector in an effort 
to wean the masses away from nationalist radicalism. This path was 
contrary to the one recommended by a r-lission from an international bank. 
Before the events of 1953 described in Chapter Seven, the government 
had commissioned the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (I.B.R.D.) to conduct an economic survey of Guyana. l The 
resultant Mission evaluated the existing development programme and 
suggested its own 5 Year Plan for 1954 - 1958. Its Report, presented in 
August 1953, pointed out what it considered to be a disproportionate 
increase in spending on non-economic, that is 'social welfare', fLIDctions 
between 1949 and 1953. It mentioned also that a 'substantial share' of 
the development programme itself had gone to this sector in the form of 
public health, education and housing projects. The general thrust of 
the Bank's own proposed development plan was to "give greater weight to 
the directly productive sectors of the economy, which did not ••• receIve 
, t 11 t' ,,2 an adequate share of past Investmen a oca Ions. 
The Report recommended that the agricultural sector be expanded and 
diversified and additional food crops grown to meet local needs. The 
coastal transport and communications systems were to be improved. 
Forestry was to be upgraded. The problems arising in the wake of 
population increase were recognised and in the social sector higher 
d ' b th ural and urban housing was recommended as were expen Iture on 0 r 
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addi tional pr imary school s to meet the growth in the numbe r of school 
children.3 The problem of population pressure on land in the rural 
areas was clearly recognised: 
"Chronic agrarian under employment looms as one of the main 
problems of the present farming structure." (4) 
There was, it was reported, no prospect of the sugar industry offering 
more employment in the forseeable future; mechanisation in the rice 
fields was liable to reduce employment possibilities in this crop. It 
was estimated that there would be an average increase of 600 farmers per 
annum which, over a five year per iod, would necessi ta te an addi tional 
45,000 acres if each new farmer was to be settled on farms of 15 acres.5 
This meant that: 
"The expanded schemes, plus additional riverain lands which may be 
opened by public or private enterprise will be barely enough to 
meet the most urgent needs by 1960."(6) 
High priority to the extension of farm lands was therefore recommended, 
but it was also suggested that a new land policy be evolved: 
"Not only new land but a new land policy will be needed. 
Heretofore local agricultural development has been conceived 
largely in terms of production; the aim for the future should no 
longer be 'production' alone but also employment of as many people 
as possible at a satisfactory level of production."(7) 
The agricultural programmes recommended, however, mainly aimed at 
expanding rice production. Of a $24,487,500 programme recommended for 
agriculture, $10,880,000 was to be spent on two drainage and irrigation 
projects largely devoted to the development of rice lands, $1,150,000 on 
land settlement similarly directed and $4,500,000 directly on industrial 
plant connected with rice. [See Table 9(i)] 
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Table 9(i) 
The I.B.R.D. Recommended Five Year Plan 1954-1958 
Sources of Funds $1000 Investment Programme $1000 
------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Government funds and revenues 
a. Funds from annual revenue 
b. Additional funds from annual 
revenues 
(1) From savings on State 
subsidies 
(2) From savings on 
operating loss of 
State enterprises 
c. Loan funds not disbursed, 
end of 1953 
d. Estimated surpluses, end 
of 1953 
e. Repayment of Agricultural 
Bank and other State loans 
f. Other credits repayable 
during the period 
2. Colonial Development and 
Welfare Grants 
a. Allocated for 1954-6 
b. Estimated possible, 1957-8 
41,800 
23,000 
4,000 
3,500 
5,300 
3,000 
1,000 
2,000 
11,100 
6,600 
4,500 
13,100 
1. Agriculture 
a. Drainage and 
Irrigation 
projects 
b. Land settlement 
c. Rice Developnent 
Corporation 
d. Other agricultural 
projects 
e. Research and 
surveys 
f. Agricultural 
credits 
2. Transport and 
Communications 
3. Forestry 
4. Social Welfare 
5. Public Works 
(including sea 
defences) 
6. Industrial credits 
7. Hydro-electric 
power (Tumatumari 
project) 
8. Surveys 
(geologic etc.) 
24,487 
10,780 
1,150 
5,000 
1,106 
2,251 
4,200 
22,304 
2,280 
7,450 
5,450 
1,500 
1,440 
400 
9. Credit Corporation 600 
3. New Loans 
------------------------------------------------------------------------65,911 66,000 Total Total 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: David W. Opt cit. p.348 and I.B.R.D., The Economic Development of 
British Guiana, op.cit. pp. 30-6. 
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In 'social welfare', of a $7,450,000 total suggested, $6,000,000 was 
to fund rural and urban housing, this being seen as the most outstanding 
need in relation both to the need to cater for a growing population and 
as part of the programme of resettlement of people on the agricultural 
lands to be made newly available through the drainage and irrigation 
projects. Apart from education, where primary school building was 
recommended, health was the only other social need to be considered. No 
major capital expenditure was thought necessary in addition to the 
Colonial Development and Welfare programmes for malaria control and 
hospi tal improvements already under way. The eradication of malaria was 
expected to reduce demand. Hence it was considered that "the medical 
and health services are faced with no urgent immediate needs for 
addi tional facilities".8 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development plan did 
not, then, differ greatly from the Ten Year Plan already in operation. 
The emphasis was almost entirely on coastal development with nothing 
anticipated for the interior except further surveys and research. 
Industrial development was minimised and was to receive only $1.5 million 
in credits and technical assistance. Agricultural development was 
considered the key to the improvement of economic productivity.9 Lip 
service was paid to agricultural diversification whilst actual projects 
were mainly oriented to the expansion of rice production. Finally, it 
was in line with the prevailing theory that 'welfare' must be a result of 
increased production and not be a precondition of it. 
This approach towards the relationship between welfare and the 
economy, or the 'productive' and the' social' sectors had developed in 
the 1940s. It had, however, proved impolitic in the face of increased 
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social unrest and industrial strife to plan or expand on the basis of 
this theory and as a consequence 'non-economic' spending in Guyana had 
increased. Similar considerations affected the way in which the 
I.B.R.D. Plan, which was accepted as sound in principle by the 
government, was effected. 
The administration's response to the constitutional crisis of 
November 1953 was essentially to attempt to increase rapidly the pace of 
economic development and also improve social conditions through increased 
spending and investment. Shortly after the crisis the Governor wrote to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies: 
"In the light of recent developments in this Colony •.• it has 
become imperative that the Development Programme drawn up by the 
World Bank Mission should be implemented as far as possible with 
the utmost despatch if public confidence in the Administration is 
to be restored". (10) 
The Interim Government was wholly nominated with a Legislative Council 
composed of a speaker and twenty-seven members, these being members of 
the opposi tion in the previous government, and a nom ina ted Executive 
Council of ten members, all of whom were also members of the Legislative 
Council.ll In addressing the newly constituted House of Assembly, the 
Governor promised greater production, more employment, better social 
services and more homes.l2 
A separate Development Budget broadly based on the I.B.R.D. Report 
was devised and a Credit Corporation established to handle the funds and 
assess claims for development work.13 For this Plan there were no 
committees or indeed any consultations with local opinion. It was drawn 
up hurriedly in London and brought back to Guyana by the Governor at the 
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Table 9 (ii) 
Development Project Estimates 1954 55 ($) 
project Area Grant Loan Revenue Total 
--
AGRICULTURE 
Drainage and 5,680,000 700,000 241,845 6,594,845 
irrigation 
Land settlement 1,655,000 95,000 1,750,000 
Other 2,073,217 220,000 241,000 2,534,217 
FOREST PROJECTS 1,164,116 485,660 1,649,776 
TRANSPORT AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 3,118,400 7,130,590 75,460 10,324,450 
CIVIL AVIATION 115,000 115,000 
POSTAL AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 120,000 2,500,000 2,620,000 
PUBLIC WORKS 1,327,767 483,593 1,824,360 
FINANCE 
Agricultural 2,500,000 2,500,000 
credits 
Rural Self Help 1,000,000 1,300,000 2,300,000 
Assistance to 
Industry 
Other 100,000 400,00 500,000 
HOUSING 
Rural and Urban 3,030,000 3,030,000 
Housing loans 2,000,000 2,000,000 
(exclusive of 
sugar workers) 
Housing, Land 768,750 768,750 
Settlements 
Housing, Public 1,770,000 1,770,000 
Officers 
Housing Loans, 2,000,000 2,000,000 
Public Officers 
EDUCATION 548,000 548,000 
HEALTH 1,068 1,068,000 
Total 21,000,000 29,300,000 2,797,898 44,098,898 
SOURCE: Calculated from Development Estimates, Georgetown: Government Printery 
1957 (App.iii). Programme of Development projects approved in principle 
by Leg.Co., 26 March 1954. 
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end of January.14 It covered the two years 1954 - 1955 with the 
intention that it should be later absorbed into a longer term plan. (See 
Table 9(ii)] The Plan allocated $44 million to be apportioned $33 
million to economic development and $11 million to the development of 
social services. This compares with an investment totalling $66 million 
as proposed by the I.B.R.D. over a five year period, and a total of $26 
million allocated for the ten year period of the previous Development 
Plan. The proportion allocated to the social sector in the Development 
Budget, one quarter, was substantially more than the $7.5 million or 11% 
of the total investment advocated by the LB.R.D. and clearly represented 
the administration's view that notwithstanding the economists' advice 
that investment should be mainly in the 'productive' sector, the 
political situation called for an immediate improvement in social 
conditions, one which could not wait upon sufficient economic development 
to finance it. The Royal Commission set up to report on the situation 
leading up to the withdrawal of the Constitution recommended that during 
the Interim Government's period of office "plans for social and economic 
development [WOUld] be energetically pursued" so that "the gradual 
improvement of social and economic conditions \-lould help to bring about a 
t ,,15 d' t . th' change in the political outlook of the electora e, an 1 was In IS 
spirit that the administration proceeded. 
The 'economic' sector plan for development followed closely that 
recommended by the I.B.R.D. The proportionately high expenditure on the 
social sector did not represent any change in the current ideolOgy 
regarding the relationship between the economic and welfare development. 
There is no evidence of any change in philosophy since the government's 
economic advisor in the late 19405, Mr. O. Spencer, had cautioned that 
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"i t would be most imprudent to embark on any further signif icant 
expansion in the level of those [social] services until it is clearly 
established that the level of National Income and Output is growing and 
w ill be able to maintain them" .16 It could be argued that an adequate 
explanation of high spending in the social sector is that it arose 
because the economy could, in accordance with this philosophy, afford to 
introduce increased services and maintain them since a real growth of the 
national income averaging 4.6% per annum had been achieved between 1947 
and 1952, and the annual budgetary expenditure on services had been 
increasing since 1947. The 1953 - 54 Plan, however, represents a very 
definite commitment to increased welfare spending whereas previous 
increases often represented reluctantly incurred increased costs rather 
than expanded programmes. The speed with which programmes advanced in 
the post 1953 period as compared with the few years before also suggests 
strongly that whilst many of the projects were not new and in fact the 
new developments, economic as well as social, were in line with the 
previous plan for development, the quickening pace of development was 
occasioned specifically by a conscious intent to dampen social unrest and 
political radicalism so that there could be a return to the programme for 
independence under a 'responsible' government. The government clearly 
shared the view propounded in the editorial column of the Daily Chronicle 
that: 
"A development programme must be ambitious if it is to catch the 
imagination of the people and wean them away from the paths of 
communism into which the P.P.P. was leading them." (17) 
The initial months of the two year period were taken up with 
planning and administrative changes. The Credit Corporation had to be 
set up and staffed. New Departments of Housing, Land Settlement and 
Drainage and Irrigation were created and these required organisation. 
300 
During 1954, however, in spite of the fact that the necessary legislation 
was not passed until May, sixty of the seventy-nine projects incorporated 
in the programme were got underway.18 Regional Developnent Committees 
and Area Sub-Committees were established in each of the twelve 
administrative districts, headed by District Commissioners and composed 
of locally stationed Government Technical Officers and representatives of 
the local residents, one of the functions of which was to advise the 
Credi t Corporation on projects for the locality. 
The lack of local expertise and available technical skills reduced 
the economy's capacity to absorb the planned amount of capital and slowed 
down project development. Expenditure over the two years fell $19 
million short of the $44 million envisaged in the plan.19 There were 
charges of inefficiency and corruption in the administration of the funds 
and it is possible that this too hampered developments.20 Yet spending 
in 1954 alone represented an enormous increase over budgetary expenditure 
in the previous year: $8,522,345 as against $857,485.21 However 
inadequate the response may have been the 1954/55 expenditure did form 
the basis for later developments, particularly in the development of the 
rice industry, and stimulated the pace of development in the social 
sector even if it did not much extend it, whilst re-committing the state 
to involvement in welfare provisio~ Public expenditure nearly doubled 
between 1952 and 1957. The increase in the development component of 
that growth was more than double. Expendi ture increases in the social 
sector were, despite the recommendations of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development Mission, relatively greater than in any 
other sector. This may have been partly a function of the greater 
capacity of this sector to absorb capital investment rapidly but was also 
indicative of the government's recogni tion that the years of Colonial 
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Development and Welfare projects had failed to develop social services to 
a level which satisfied popular expectations and reflected its hope that 
massive investment in housing would produce fast results in terms of 
political objectives. 
Deyelqpments in the Social Sector 
In this section "post-crisis" developments in housing, health 
communi ty development and social securi ty are considered. It is not 
argued that these are solely the outcome of government's (either local or 
British) perception of the political instability of the period22• Rather 
it is suggested that the crisis speeded up developments which might have 
taken longer otherwise, made the strict application of prevailing 
economic theory concerning the primacy of economic development 
politically unfeasible, directed priorities and, in some cases such as 
community development, conditioned the form projects took. 
(i) Housing 
As has been shown, government initiatives in housing had been 
confined largely to the re-housing of former estate residents. This 
programme was accelerated with a diversion of $2,500,000 from the sugar 
industry financed Price Stabilisation Fund (set up at the same time as 
the Welfare Fund to assist the industry), to the Sugar Industry Labour 
Welfare Fund, on December 7th 1953. Between 1954 and 1957 the Sugar 
Industry Labour Welfare Fund financed the building of 33,553 new houses 
for sugar workers23• Government activity in other areas of housing had 
been, as has been shown, minimal. rrhe political crisis was the catalyst 
to activi ty. The I.B.R.D. Mission had recommended that $6 million be 
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spent on housing over five years. The Development Budget for 1954 -
1955 allocated $3 million in two years with a further $1.75 million for 
the housing of public officers and $4 million for housing loans exclusive 
of those to sugar workers. The Government acknowledged that "it is 
generally known and accepted that the need [for housing] is great. The 
population concerned is more than half the COlony.,,24 
Housing was considered to be the social service on which money spent 
would have the most immediate impact, both in raising sanitation and 
health levels and general standards of living. The Robertson 
Commission, set up in 1954 to investigate the constitutional situation 
after the crisis, noted the "squalor of much of the housing" and also 
that there was much dissatisfaction wi th housing on the estates where 
"the problem is thickest and the discontent greatest. ,,25 There was a 
further development of the old idea that giving the people "a stake in 
the nation", histor ically thought of in terms of land, now in terms of 
house ownership, would have a stabilising effect.26 The interest taken 
in housing public officers undoubtedly represented an attempt to 
alleviate the grievances of this section of the public and secure their 
loyalty to "responsible" political principles. 
During 1954, 1,399 houses were constructed in rural areas. 27 
Between July of that year and January of 1955 the entire allocation for 
housing to the British Guiana Credit Corporation, which was the body 
handling housing loans, was dispersed.28 Midway in 1955 a housing scheme 
to provide 1,400 new houses for the lower income group in Georgetown was 
launched.29 A housing advisor from the caribbean Commission assisted the 
Housing Department in the organisation of self-help housing schemes, 
beginning in 1954. In these schemes the government provided land 
preparation, bulk purchasing of materials and skilled building foremen to 
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supervise whilst self-help group members provided the labour 
themsel ves. 30 The rate of building that could be achieved using this 
method relative to the enormous need for better and additional housing 
raises questions about its choice for any part of the housing drive, even 
though it reduced costs.3l The idea of self-help as a means of building 
houses (community centres and other public facilities were similarly 
built), especially in rural areas, was promulgated for social and 
psychological reasons. It was hoped that it would stimulate communal 
activity, presumably of a "responsible" sort, and generate a greater 
appreciation of government through a greater understanding of the stages 
necessary to project development.32 
The number of houses actually buil t overall may have been 
insufficient, and indeed was criticised as such by, amongst others, the 
President of the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce, W. Raatgever, who 
claimed that the slums were unaffected by mere "show piece" 
development.33 It was, however, an improvement on the virtual 
standstill that existed previously except in relation to Sugar Industry 
Labour Welfare Fund financed building. Estate workers as a group still 
had a better opportunity of obtaining financial assistance towards 
acquiring a house and this contributed to a continuation of the 
perception of many Africans that Indians were in a favoured position.34 
Such perceptions are difficult to document, but the gradual development 
of the sugar industry as "East Indian" in labour terms together with the 
emergence of separate streams of social policy for estate workers and 
others, with the former often actually or apparently superior, certainly 
played a part in the racial animosities that were exploited in the late 
Fifties and early Sixties, culminating in the terrible events of 1962/63 
when a state not far from civil war developed. 
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(ii) Community Deyel<mment 
In the post-crisis scheme for social development, the old "Rural 
Betterment" programme re-emerged as a Community Development Programme. 
This was run as another function of the Regional Development Committees. 
These Committees were author i sed to "arouse interest in economic and 
social development, encourage a spirit of enterprise and self-help in 
rural areas, develop the co-operative movement, and promote and supervise 
community self-help schemes (except the housing schemes which were dealt 
with by the Ministry of Labour, Health and Housing).,,35 
Communi ty Development was placed not under the Social ~7elfare 
Division, which on the face of it might seem the obvious department to 
handle it given its experience in Rural Betterment, but was made the 
responsibility of the District Administration Division. In the earlier 
discussion of ''Rural Betterment" in Chapter Eight, it was suggested that 
whilst the economic value of projects was considered a necessary 
motivating component there was a primary concern with the promotion of 
"responsible" civic attitudes. The assignment of Community Development 
to a department other than Social Welfare had the virtue of enabling the 
programme to be seen as more economically biased. The District 
Administration Division was, in addition, already fulfilling a co-
ordinating function, one which would be necessary in relation to the new 
development approach and was also seen as more prestigious than the 
Social Welfare Division.36 
In 1955 an American expert in community development was loaned by 
the International Co-operation Administration as part of a wider 
technical aid programme. Three villages - Golden Grove, Nabaclis, Huis 
t'Dieren and Crabwood Creek - were selected for intensive development on 
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an experimental basis. Committees were set up to promote improvement in 
every aspect of life: horne, leisure and work.37 Elsewhere, rural 
development continued upon the lines set by Colonial Development and 
Welfare programming with more community centres being built, continued 
support of voluntary organisations such as Women's Institutes, and 
further assistance to handicrafts and co-operatives.38 
The three village project was not repeated elsewhere nor continued 
after the pilot period. The project's failure could be attributed to 
the problems outlined by Dr. Vaughn, the organiser: inadequate experience 
and leadership skills in the community, administrative difficulties and 
frustration developing from overly ambitious expectations.39 Equally 
important, however, was the necessity of provoking initiatives and 
enthusiasm from the villagers themselves. Community Developnent was 
seen by the government as an attempt to use the method of "planning from 
the bottom up", 40 and was promoted as such. The government officers 
involved in the projects often found it difficult to adopt this new 
approach and usually were not trained to do so. Nor did the political 
emergency encourage an atmosphere where new approaches would be allowed 
to develop gradually. Yet the involvement of the villagers themselves 
was of crucial importance in two ways; firstly, in order to accomplish 
the practical aims of projects; secondly as an imrx>rtant goal in its own 
right in so far as it related to the political objective of encouraging 
and facilitating a non-radical way of dealing with community problems and 
an accommodation with the Inter im Government. It was precisely this 
local enthusiasm which the communi ty development programme failed to 
generate. Dr. Vaughn himself considered that the three village project 
r t ,,41 
at its conclusion was far from being a "people s movemen • The 
administrative, organisational and attitudinal problems associated with 
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communi ty development hampered its success, but it is doubtful that, 
especially given the political climate in which it was introduced, it 
could ever fulfill either the economic or the political role assigned to 
't 42 1 • 
(iii) Health care 
Developments in health care continued along the lines set out by the 
Venn Commission, the recommendations of which were generally endorsed by 
the Medical Enquiry Committee (Clarke) which reported in 195443 • The 
Clarke Committee recommended the provision of three additional general 
state hospitals and six additional cottage hospitals:-
Existing State Hospitals (1954) 
General 
Special 
Small 
Mining Area 
Facilities 
Cottage 
(small rural) 
Interior 
.skk~ 
GeorgetCMn 
Berbice 
Suddie 
Best (Tuberculosis) 
Berbice (f.1ental) 
Mahaica (Leprosy) 
Mabaruma 
Bartica 
Charity 
Ida Sabina 
Rupununi 
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PrQp0sed Additional 
State FacilitieQ 
General 
Cottage 
Leonora 
Skeldon 
Port Mourant 
Wakenharn 
Diamond 
Mahaica 
Mahaicony 
Le Grange 
Fort Wellington 
The demolition of the old estate hospitals and the construction of estate 
dispensaries proceeded, so that by 1954 there were only twelve hospitals 
offering 550 beds. The expectation was that the state would provide the 
additional district and cottage hospitals recommended by the Venn 
Commission and that the medical role of the estates would be to provide a 
dispensary service to resident labour with ambulance facilities for the 
conveyance of patients to the nearest state hospi tal where necessary_ 
The state system was, however, far from ready to cope with the increased 
demand which, contrary to the expectation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development Mission, was resulting from the absolute 
increase in population, higher expectations and the contraction of estate 
hospital facilities. 
Of the twenty-three health clinics which were scheduled to have been 
built as Colonial Development and Welfare projects, few were actually 
completed. By 1947 there were only nine completed44 • In 1953 the 
public system provided 1,432 general beds which hardly compensated for 
the reduction in estate provision. Seven years after the recommendation 
made by the Venn Commission that additional State hospi tals be built, 
only one, at Port Mourant, had been started and even this was incomplete 
by 195645• The expansion of provision of health centres was still at 
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project stage by the time of the Clarke Committee at which point it was 
proposed that they be built by self help as community projects.46 
Staff difficulties added to the Department's difficulties. To the 
perennial problem of attracting expatriate doctors, which resulted from 
the comparatively low salaries, was added the fear of many potential 
recruits that "a career in colonies with growing nationalistic 
aspirations ••• may be prematurely terminated or .•• national 
discrimination may be exercised to their detriment. "47 Local people 
trained as doctors usually preferred to go into private practice as the 
increase in real income since the 1930s afforded them better 
opportunities there than formerly, and although the state now sponsored 
the training of some local doctors at the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of the West Indies, the first students did not graduate until 
1954 and these were not of sufficient numbers or experience to make much 
of an impact on the deficit.48 
Although in practice many people still had access to free medicine 
and treatment as paupers or pensioners there was no truly national system 
of care nor any form of national health insurance. 49 Standards were 
sometimes low, and there was gross overcrowding at the Public Hospital 
Georgetown. Persons with insufficient or inappropriate training were 
sometimes used to run dispensaries.50 This deficiency was of particular 
import because of the role played by dispensers in, especially rural, 
medical practice. The person operating a dispensary, ideally somebody 
specifically qualified for the task, would often be consulted for 
diagnostic and prescribing purposes. Dispensers were, in effect, in 
charge of the health clinics and although they were supposed to be 
visited regularly by the district Medical Officer, often this was not the 
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case. 
Finally, coverage of the rural population remained poor. There 
were a few dispensaries in outlying districts and the interior gold and 
diamond mining areas. There were the very small facilities with less 
than ten beds in Charity and Ida Sabina. The bauxite company, Demba, 
had operated a hospital for its work force since the 1930s at Kwakwani, 
and later provided another at Mackenzie. Beyond this there was no 
provision for those not engaged in the sugar industry. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Mission's 
Report had recommended that there be no increase in health expenditure, 
but the Clarke proposals suggested five new state hospitals. 
Expenditure on health planned for 1954 - 1958 was estimated at $3.5 
million over and above the usual annual costs.51 The extension of state 
provision had been firmly on the agenda since the Venn Report, but little 
had been done to accomplish it by 1957. It received renewed attention 
as part of the general re-thinking of social sector expendi ture policy 
promoted by the political crisis, but was overshadowed by the housing 
programme upon which resources were heavily concentrated. Investment in 
hospitals, health centres and health care generally was considered of 
lower priority, presumably as compared to the quick political pay-off 
hoped for from new houses. The slow development of state provision of 
health care contrasts with the much more vigorous approach taken in the 
development of state-assisted housing. 
Social Welfare ~ the Estates 
The sugar industry responded to the cr isis in a manner similar to 
the Government. It continued to develop its social welfare programme 
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and to place its faith in the stabilising function of house ownership52. 
The programme for the rehousing of 'nuclear' workers on the estates was 
boosted with the increase in finance received by the home loan programme 
through a further $2.5 million transfer from the Price Stabilisation 
Fund l' n 1955.53 AS' al W If OCl e are Adviser for women's and girl's work on 
the estates was appointed by Bookers.54 The Communi ty Centre building 
programme continued, paid for by Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund 
monl' es.55 The ct· de d ' f en res were conSl re lmportant or their contribution 
to the "responsible" attitudes government and industry alike wished to 
foster: 
liThe Community Centres on the Estates are naturally the focal 
points for activities aimed at the development of individual and 
community responsibility among the mernl:::ers ••• " (56) 
In addition, Bookers launched a pilot scheme for tenant cane 
farmers. There had always been a small number of independent cane 
farmers on the coastland. They sold most of their produce to the sugar 
companies, but had never been encouraged to expand either their acreage 
or their output per acre. The need for stability in the sugar belt was 
now considered of sufficient importance to necessitate at least a gesture 
in the direction of greater independence for sugar workers. The 
Director's Report for 1954 noted: 
"It is considered that the formation of a sturdy body of tenant 
farmers on Estates' lands will bring a stability which is lacking 
where there are only wage earners and ernployers".(57) 
So here again the notion of increasing peasant land ownership, 
bitterly fought against by the estates for the best part of the time, was 
trundled out at a time of need. The final irony is perhaps that the 
Chai rman of Bookers was instrumental in the formation of the National 
Labour Front (N.L.F.), (a party formed from a splinter of the United 
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Democratic Party, the party representing commercial interests at the 
previous election), which campaigned on the platform of "Land for the 
Landless".58 The scheme got underway in 1955 with 32 farmers taking up 
tenancies.59 The political instability and industrial unrest which 
caused an increase in welfarism on the estates also caused a continuation 
in the trend towards further mechanisation and a further reduction and 
de-casualisation of the workforce. One indication of this was the 
decline in the number of women working in the fields from 1950, brought 
about "principally as a result of the policy of the employers of 
stabilising and regu1arising their labour force".60 Overall field 
labour requirements dropped from an average, weekly number of 17,668 (low 
month) 25,587 (high month) in 1950 to 9,478 (low month) 19.150 (high 
month) in 1960.61 The decrease in the labour force in the fifties did 
not mark any reduction in the importance of sugar to the economy nor in 
the level of production. It indicated, rather, the development of the 
industry from a low technology, high labour input base to a high 
technology, mechanised base. Whilst labour decreased, acreage and output 
grew. Acreage under cane on estates rose from 71,472 acres in 1950 to 
94,103 in 1960 whilst sugar tonnage produced from 196,651 in 1950 to 
334,441 in 1960.62 
(v) Social Security 
The trend towards de-casua1isation in the sugar industry made 
developments in welfare, particularly social security, more feasible. 
Social security has many aspects, but worker demands, which had been 
growing steadily since 1945, focused on pensions, sickness benefits and 
unemployment assistance. In 1954, the Colonial Office commissioned an 
investigation of the possibility of introducing a wider social security 
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programme in the caribbean, particularly in Guyana and Barbados.63 The 
problems noted in the Report which resulted were clear and remained 
essentially the same as noted by the r10yne Commissioners fifteen years 
earlier; the economies of the caribbean could not afford high rates of 
assistance; the under- and un-employment of large numbers posed sf€cial 
problems administrative and financial and there would, at least 
initially, be difficulties in the administration of social security 
schemes. The general tone of the Report was, however, optimistic. 
Richardson, its author, noted elsewhere that the caribbean, although not 
wealthy, was not at the bottom of the financial league of nations, but 
was rather in the middle range, and most of its people were involved in 
the cash economy. Further, there was already an exper iential base in 
the benevolent associations found so frequently in caribbean communities. 
His view was that conditions in the region were favourable for the 
introduction of social security measures, especially in the form of 
sickness benefit, old age pension and industrial injury compensation.64 
The scale of unemployment, he felt, made unemployment benefits unfeasible 
financially and he saw the extension of relief work as the more 
appropriate method of assisting the jobless.65 
The demand for job related pensions was becoming more insistent and 
it remained an important platform for the major unions. The 
introduction of a pension scheme was one of the conditions for a return 
to work made by 400 bauxite workers employed by Reynolds Mining 
Corporation at Kwakwani.66 The sugar workers were less successful. The 
Venn Commission had recommended that a contributory pension scheme be set 
up to cover adult male workers. The worker contribution to the fund was 
to be at 2.5% of the weekly earnings and the employer contribution 5% of 
the same. At fifty years of age the worker, it had been suggested, 
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should receive a pension graded to length of service. In spite of 
repeated representations by the Union, no scheme was introduced. The 
state-run Rice Marketing Board proved more tractable and extended its 
pension scheme to weekly and monthly workers, as did several other local 
firms.67 Professor Richardson had recommended that government should 
initiate a national pensions scheme by meeting the administrative costs 
of a voluntary provident fund, but this was not done, neither was there 
any provision made for national coverage in case of sickness. Bookers 
did, however, introduce in 1958 a sickness benefit scheme where workers 
were credited with six days wage per annum to be drawn in case of illness 
of a week or more on an accruable basis. 
Professor Richardson also examined the system and rates of public 
assistance and consequent upon his recommendation, the monthly rate was 
put on a sliding scale from $4.00 to $7.50 in Georgetown and $3.00 to 
$5.50 elsewhere, with payment made in accordance with the result of a 
means test. Although there had been no formal means test previously, 
the practice had been to consider that to be eligible for assistance a 
person should have means slightly lower than those of a person entitled 
to an Old Age Pension. 68 
The middle class continued to provide for itself privately. 
Several factors combined to bring about an increase in and strengthening 
of the local middle class in the 1950s. In the public service, Colonial 
Development and Welfare and 'crisis budget' spending increased the number 
of local people holding 'white collar' jobs. In the private sector, 
higher government spending and an improved economy produced opportunities 
for advancement in clerical and lower management levels and it had become 
politically advantageous to offer the posts that arose to Guyanese. '!be 
major sugar company, for example, adopted a policy of "Guyanisation". 
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The ranks of junior staff had been increasingly open to Guyanese since 
the 1940s; from the 1950s, local people were considered eligible for 
senior p:>sts. By 1961 there were 137 Guyanese holding senior positions 
out of a total of 289.69 A proliferation of private services developed 
to cater for the demands of this expanding class. Civil servants 
already had some security under the old Widows and Orphans pension scheme 
introduced since 1892, and also pension rights. In education, new 
selective schools for the education of middle class children were 
erected. In health, several private hospitals were opened. Increasing 
numbers secured penSions related to their jobs. On the whole, however, 
there was no general expansion of the security of the masses except in 
relation to home ownership. Indeed the increase in structural 
unemployment and underemployment in the absence of unemployment benefits 
or a well developed scheme of relief work meant that for many, insecurity 
increased. [See Table 7 (vi) ] 
CONCLUSION 
The programme for development, economic and social, continued 
through the 1950s to be governed by principles developed in the previous 
decade. In the economy, sugar continued to be paramount with rice as 
its partner. In the social sector, welfare continued to be viewed as 
something which should, ideally, be p:lid for in advance out of rewards of 
increased productivity. There were, however, factors operating which 
militated against the low level of social spending which would have been 
logically generated by such a philosophy. Changes in the sugar industry 
required that state responsibility in housing and health be expended to 
cope with sugar workers who had previously had access to estate housing 
and health facilities. Further, the low stanoards obtaining in health, 
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housing, sanitation and community facilities became a political 
liability. The programme begun in the 1940s to raise standards and at 
the same time nurture 'responsible', that is non-radical, political 
attitudes had patently failed. The position adopted by the government 
in response to the political radicalism of the 1950s was the same as that 
produced in reaction to the unrest of the 1930s; the raising of social 
standards could not be delayed until the economic programme raid off. 
Economic and social planning did not change appreciably in direction 
in response to the challenge presented by the radicalism of the short 
lived P.P.P. government. It continued essentially along the lines which 
had been laid down by the programme formulated in 1947, although much 
larger sums were available. Social trends which had begun to emerge in 
the previous decade also continued. Population pressure increased. 
Unemployment increased, fuelled by lay-offs in the sugar industry and the 
inability of the second most important agricultural sector, rice, to 
absorb the labour surplus. The social sector was once again called upon 
to absorb and transmute the discontents resulting from failures in 
economic development. There is no evidence of a return to the 
philosophy which abounded in the early days of the Colonial DeveloIXllent 
and Welfare programme; social development was in no way seen as having a 
'pump-priming' economic function, nor was it seen as an investment 
necessary to the foundations of economic development. Social policy 
1953 - 1957 was in the final analysis another .ad ~ initiative derived 
from panic programming made in London with minimal consul ta tion with 
local bourgeois interests and none at all with the mass of people of 
Guyana. The resounding victory of the P.P.P. at the polls in 1957 when 
the constitution was restored indicates the failure of the social 
programme's political agenda. 
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Q)NCLusION 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of Guyanese history is 
the comparative stability of its major features over time. The 
nineteenth century opened with the establishment of sugar as the primary 
crop. Sugar retained its importance throughout the period studied. Its 
production was accomplished on planatations and although the twentieth 
century brought changes in ownership and the amalgamation of units, the 
planatation system remained intact. Similarly, the local political 
process in the nineteenth century was dominated by the planters whose 
influence also extended to the British power structure; the big business 
heirs of the planters continued to exert major influence on the 
determination of policy, social and economic, throughout the remainder of 
the period. Raymond Smith once wrote that to explain current conditions 
in the caribbean in terms of slavery was analogous to attributing mid-
twentieth century British balance of payments problems to the Napoleonic 
Wars.l Yet any tendency of caribbean people and others to make sense of 
their history in this way is perhaps understandable given the lack of 
change in many caribbean territories. 
In this chapter the aim is to summarise the foregoing analysis of 
social policy in Guyana. Further, in Chapter One certain characteristics 
of the colonial economy, the colonial state and colonial society and 
their relation to colonial social policy were proposed. In this chapter 
it is argued that Guyana exemplifies these characteristics and also that 
its development demonstrates the relationship of those characteristics to 
social policy (and vice-versa) as originally suggested. Specifically, 
the following points are considered: the role of social policy in the 
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production of the under-development associated with colonial economies; 
the part played by the colonial state in the structuring of the economy; 
the effect of the colonial structure on the relative power of classEs in 
Guyanese society to affect the policy-making process; the contribution of 
the subsistence sector to the plantation sector and the contribution of 
the latter to the under-development of the whole economy in their 
relation to social policy; lastly, the role of social policy in social 
control and the legitimation of the colonial state. 
It has been suggested in this study that social policy in Guyana, 
through its general tendency to afford support to the colonial economy, 
was part of the underdevelopment of both the social and economic sectors 
whilst at the same time being condi tioned by the colonial economy. To 
what extent has this been substantiated? The question will be considered 
first in general terms and is taken up again later in relation to the 
discussion of the specific areas of health, housing, social security and 
land settlement. 
First, the term 'underdevelopment' must be made clearer. Although 
the author is of the view that speculation on 'what might have been' if 
certain historical events had not occurred is generally an exercise in 
futility, it is considered of some use to ponder, for example, the 
potential for economic development of pre-colonial societies such as 
those in Africa and Asia which had existing traditional cultures. In 
such contexts it may also be valid to consider the ways in which 
colonialism 'under-developed' societies by dismantling existing social 
and economic structures. 
In the case of Guyana and other caribbean territories, the situation 
is different: these societies were not altered by colonialisation but 
created by it.2 'Under-development' in this context denotes a condition 
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where the colonial economy imposes limits on and directs growth in 
particular ways which preclude alternative modes of development which may 
be judged to be more productive of growth in the whole society and 
economy. Social policy contributed to underdevelopment in this sense 
insofar as it sustained the colonial economy which closed opportunities 
for alternative paths of development. 
This is not to suggest that this was the intention of the colonial 
state functionaries. On the contrary, colonial philosophy and often the 
personal predilictions of officials as well had the effect, particularly 
in the twentieth century, of moving governors to see themselves as 
representing the wider interest. 
Nor did underdevelopment as defined emerge out of 'systemic needs'. 
It was rather the outcome of the comparative power of the sugar interest, 
the local and metropolitan bourgeoisie, the local proletariat and 
peasantry, to affect the policy making process. In nineteenth century 
Guyana the planters were able, through their economic power and control 
of the legislature, to limi t expenditures from local revenue to those 
which benefited their own industry. State funds were concentrated on law 
and order. This protected planter lives and property and it also 
guaranteed production from their labour. Planter control of finance 
ensured the voting of immigration funds which assisted in the provision 
of that labour. This is not to suggest that the planters would have been 
able to determine the priori ties of state spending in this way against 
the wishes of the colonial power; minimal attention to the social sector 
or indeed to development of any kind was consonant with colonial theory 
regarding the role of the colonial state. 
The local bourgeoisie gained representation in the local legislature 
from the 1890s, but its ability and willingness to have any major impact 
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on policy-making was minimal. Its elected representatives' 
constitutional power was limited and, in addition, although they 
generally espoused expansionist policies in agriculture, industry and 
interior development, they were not 'anti-sugar' and usually went along 
with the administration. The events of 1953 demonstrated dramatically 
the ultimate limitations attaching to the power of the local legislature, 
showing that it could be sw,ept a~Tay at any time it took a direction not 
sanctioned by the colonial state. The two periods of state expansion in 
welfare and development (post-1940 and post-1953) were precipitated by 
mass action in the sense of their being reactions, in the first case to 
ci viI disorder and industr ial unrest, and in the second case to 
radicalisation of a mass political party which held legislative majority. 
Yet even in these instances there was no real popular involvement or 
participation in the policy and planning process. Hence, whilst class 
action in the form of str ikes and civil disturbance can be said to have 
led to an increase in state welfare expenditure the role of the masses in 
actual decision making remained negligible. In the post-Moyne period 
decision making in relation to social and economic policy was actually 
removed from the political process and entrenched even more firmly than 
it had been formerly in the administrative process. The clear line 
between rulers and ruled, characteristic of colonial society stayed, and 
the system of government remained essentially non-negotiating. 
The two instances of heavy state investment in social welfare (post 
1940 and post-l950) can be seen as attempts to use welfare to legitimate 
colonial rule. It is by no means unusual for states to use social 
welfare measures for this purpose; what is perhaps unusual is that such 
means were not used earlier, especially given the problems of 
legitimation faced by colonial states. That they were not can be 
attributed in part to the state's financial limitations which resulted 
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from colonial fiscal policy, economic underdevelopnent and to the state's 
tendency, at least until the 1940s, to use force rather than welfare to 
deal with social unrest. 
One form of state coercion existed in the legal restrictions 
associated wi th indenture. Another lay in the economic and poli tical 
powerlessness of the masses which made them dependent on the wages of the 
plantation sector. But beyond this lay the physical force which the 
state COUld, and often did, employ in dealing with strikes and civil 
unrest as in the riots in Georgetown in 1905 and the strikes on the 
estates in 1917, 1924 and 1948. The maintenance of social control in 
this way absorbed a substantial proportion of state revenues which could 
arguably have been used for social and economic development. When 
'welfare' was introduced in the 1940s as an alternative method of social 
control, the British Treasury had to back up the policy with finance as 
the local economy was destitute. Imperial investment in colonial welfare 
was instituted to ensure colonial loyalty in war time and became a 
strategy for buying time to advance social and economic conditions and to 
nurture civic and political moderation on the road to political 
independence. The political expectations held of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare programme involved a clear intention to secure 
social control through appeasement. 
Social policy contributed to under-development also in that it 
contributed to the viability of the colonial economy. Nineteenth century 
state regulation of estate labour's conditions, whilst not producing much 
in the way of welfare, did legitimise the practice of indenture which was 
so important to the plantation wage structure. Comparative neglect of 
village welfare exacerbated the stagnation of the non-estate sector 
necessary to the viability of the sugar industry. Twentieth century 
developments in population policy, approaches to health, land settlement 
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and housing arose to support the economic status .Q.UQ as the sugar 
industry changed; policy grew and adapted around the changing form of the 
sugar industry. 
Further, in Chapter One it was suggested that it was of some 
importance in the analysis of colonial economies, to note the 
relationship between the plantation and the subsistence sectors so that 
the contribution of the latter to the former may be gauged. In Guyana, 
as has been shown, the rural population was viewed by planter and 
colonial administration alike as a reserve labour pool for the estates. 
This affected social and economic policy in several ways. Firstly, 
industrial development and agricultural diversification (except to rice) 
which could have attracted labour away from the estates was discouraged. 
Secondly, land settlement policy was adopted only in relation to the need 
of the sugar industry to keep surplus labour available to it and never 
constituted an alternative to plantation domination of agriculture. 
Thirdly, the growing of rice and other peasant crops supplemented the low 
and seasonal wages offered by the sugar estates, thereby making 
subsistence possible whereas it was often not on sugar wages alone, and 
thus contributed to the viability of the wage structure of the industry. 
Social policy also added to social underdevelopment whilst 
contributing to the viability of the colonial state through its divisive 
effects on the masses. The separate development of estate welfare 
increased the differences in circumstances between estate workers and 
others, which differences reflected not only occupational but also racial 
groupings. These differences in turn enhanced perceptions of difference 
in interest between occupational and racial groups. In this sense 
separate welfare provision for estate workers continued the social 
separation of plantation workers described in Chapter One as 
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characteristic of plantation-dominated societies. \{hilst there have been 
many occasions on which sections of urban labour or even urban and rural 
labour together took joint action and whilst direct evidence of social 
policy's contribution to a weakening of class ties and a heightening of 
race divisions is difficult to find, it is quite probable that the 
structure of welfare and social policy, though not immediately 
responsible for race conflict, did form one strand in the complex causal 
chain leading to the disturbances of the 1960s. 
All these points can be illustrated by the effects of social policy 
in specific areas. Health care evolved from company, but state 
regulated, provision"on the estates and residual state provision for the 
rest of the population. Estate care developed in relation to the 
industry's specific requirements at different stages. Initially part of 
a system of surveillance and control of indentured workers, it became 1n 
the post-indenture period a means used by estate managements of 
attracting and keeping labour. Post-1945 when malaria control made the 
old, larger hospitals redundant and the attraction of labour no longer an 
~mportant issue, estate provision contracted to suit the needs of a new 
smaller and more regularised work force. Although from the 1920s to the 
early 1950s the estate system of health care was in many ways superior to 
state provision new developments in this period concentrated on the 
elimina tion of diseases which affected the productive capaci ty of the 
worker rather than the provision of total care to the whole worker and 
his family. 
The colonial medical service had the effect of stifling the 
development of the local medical profession for, in the context of 
village underdevelopment, private practitioners were not attracted to the 
rural areas, but until the post-1914 I;€riod, local doctors were rarely 
accepted into the colonial medical service. The separation of estate 
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health services led to the underdevelopment of the state sector insofar 
as it determined the location of and priorities of the government medical 
officers, both of which favoured the estates. This aff irms the 
proposition put forward in Chapter One that the plantation sector, rather 
than providing a model for development to the subsistence sectors of the 
local economy actually brings about the underdevelopment of other 
sectors. The minimal level of state provision aggravated the generally 
high level of, particularly infant, mortality which, in addition to being 
undesirable in itself, possibly reinforced underdevelopment by making 
Guyana a relatively unattractive investment proposition to foreign 
investors whilst leading also to a numerically inadequate population for 
the exploitation of the hinterland. Near zero natural population growth 
until well into the twentieth century also contributed in a curious way 
to the maintenance of the indenture system and consequently the 
plantation production of sugar by providing a rationale for indenture 
insofar as it could be held up as an essential means of keeping 
population up to required levels. 
Housing also followed two separate lines of development. On the 
estates houses were provided for indentured workers as a legal 
requirement. This assisted in the legitimation of contract labour and 
also formed another element in the control of workers. The state was not 
otherwise involved in housing until the post-Moyne period when state 
assistance and regulation in this area became part of the welfare package 
aimed at diverting social unrest and promoting economic development. 
This involvement grew after the 1954 emergency budget, again in response 
to political radicalisation of the masses which was interpreted by the 
authorities as a reaction to social dissatisfaction. As with estate 
heal th provision, housing by the estates followed a pattern of 
development dictated by the changing requirements of the sugar industry. 
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Workers began to be encouraged towards home ownership when the employers 
felt that this would contribute to the stability of labour relations and 
this trend was further encouraged when, post-1945, the sugar industry 
began to develop a new pattern of employment. The state assisted the 
industry in its housing policy in the first instance by a not very 
energetic and basically sympathetic application of housing regulations 
and in the post-1945 period by creating the machinery for the rehousing 
of sugar workers at a time when the industry wished to divest itself of 
major responsibilities in this area. 
This sequence of development resulted in the state assuming wider 
responsibility for housing at a time when relocation of surplus sugar 
workers, the generally run-down state of landlord owned urban 
accommodation and dilapidated rural housing combined wi th increasing 
population levels and higher expectations to create an enormously 
increased demand. As in the case of health care, estate provision of 
housing up until the 1940s had the effect of encouraging the state to 
assume residual, minimal responsibilities only to be obligated by estate 
withdrawal from these areas to increase its involvement at a time when 
population expansion alone required greatly increased investment. 
Another major effect of estate heal th and housing provision was that, 
after 1917, it functioned to perpetuate plantation society by 
exaggerating the geographical and psychological separation between the 
two main ethnic groups. 
Land policy, especially as it applied to land settlement, can also 
be seen as both contributing to underdevelopment and the colonial economy 
and resulting from it. As has been shown, nineteenth century colonial 
policy was directed. at the protection of the sugar industry through the 
restr iction of access to land by keeping the pr ice of Crown Land high. 
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This was changed in the 1890s but generally land policy continued to be 
made with at least some consideration of sugar interests. Land 
settlement began as an aid to the ailing industry and was dropr:ed when it 
no longer appeared to serve the purpose of retaining immigrant labour. 
It was later revived to attract colonists. At no time was it adopted as 
a major arm of development policy and it was always formulated with the 
needs of the sugar industry in mind. 
This provides another example of the way in which the plantation 
sector inhibits other sector development. The state1s approach to land 
policy had the effect of stifling agricultural development whether by 
local investors or settlers or by foreign investors. The only exception 
of note to this is to be found in the case of the rice industry. This 
was taken up and encouraged by the state initially as a means of 
enhancing the viability of the sugar industry at a time of economic 
recession. It was developed because of its compatibility with the 
production of sugar and its place in British plans for the region, Guyana 
being promoted as the 'rice bowl of the Caribbean'. 
The extremely conservative approach to land settlement contributed 
to and was influenced by, the state's tendency to restrict economic 
activity to the coastal strip and confine agricultural production to 
sugar and later to sugar and rice. A greater investment in land 
settlement could possibly have been a means of creating a more viable and 
successful peasantry, independent of the sugar industry and the large 
holders of rice lands. As it was, land settlement policy had a 
negligible effect on land holding patterns and the predominate 
concentration of agricultural effort on export crops. 
Social security remained for the whole period studied very under-
developed. Provision under the Poor Law introduced to cope with the 
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aftermath of slavery remained basically unchanged until the 1940s. 
Planter influence on Poor Law Boards allowed th 
I e partial allocation of 
benefits, with East Indians apparently excluded so as not to underl.line 
the wage structure in the sugar industry. Pressure from worker groups 
and later trade unions for the introduction of wider benefits did not 
produce any real development. Even the introduction of a small non-
contributory old age pension was the result of direction from the 
Colonial Office as part of a wider imperial policy rather than local 
agitation. An important factor impeding the development of state 
sponsored or state financed social security, even after 1940 when it came 
to be seriously considered, was the characteristic wage structure and 
employment p:!.ttern. Al though by no means excluding the IX>ssibili ty of 
social insurance, low wages, high levels of unemployment, casual and 
under-employment, made the introduction of national social insurance 
problematic so long as there was no radical change in economic structure 
or political priorities, hence the plantation element of the colonial 
economy hindered development in this area too. 
Social policy in Guyana from the mid-nineteenth century until 1957 
went through several identifiable stages. In the first, the state 
assumed a residual role whilst overseeing conditions in the sugar 
industry. Although a free market, laissez faire philosophy was eSIX>used, 
the state in fact intervened to support and assist the industry to 
survive the succession of crises presented by the end of slavery, the 
challenge of beet sugar and the end of indenture. The residual social 
policies adopted by the state in the period up to the 1940s were 
consistent with the maintenance of the existing economic structure. 
In the early 19405 a new approach to social policy emerged; 
henceforward welfare measures were to nurture and lay the foundation for 
economic development. The state began to abandon its residual stance 
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and, funded largely by the British Treasury, embark on a wider programme 
of welfare. The success of this theory of the relationship between 
welfare and the economy was relatively short-lived. It was followed by 
what was in a sense a reversion: the idea that development of the social 
sector is something which must be afforded and paid for out of economic 
development rather than being a precondition of it. The difference 
between the old and the new versions of this theory was that in the 
re-vamped form the state was to expand its direct involvement in the 
stimulation of the economy. 
As has been shown, however, the state in Guyana did not abandon its 
newly adopted role in the social sector. A combination of changes in the 
sugar industry and population growth put stresses on the social fabr ic 
which political mobilisation of the masses and the growth of anti-
imperialist and nationalist sentiments made potentially threatening to 
the established order • Consequently, social sector spending remained 
high at the expense of purely economic investment, which tendency 
continued into the 1950s as a result of the 1954/55 development programme 
which was introduced as a result of the {X)litical crisis. 
The increased spending in the fifties could not, however, meet the 
requirements generated by a rapidly increasing population, especially 
given the inadequacy of existing social provision and mounting public 
expectations. Nor was there any radical departure from economic {X)licies 
which appeared to promise little to the urban unemployed or the rural 
landless. Guyana consequently entered the period of self-government and 
independence, like so many other colonial countries, with a social sector 
ill-equipped to meet the problems generated by a young and growing 
population, an economy dominated by the production of agricultural crops 
in which only comparatively small increases in the demand for labour 
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could be expected and a very small manufacturing and industrial base. 
It can be concluded, then, that social policy as exercised in Guyana 
was integral to the working of the colonial economy. It supported and 
facilitated the maintenance of the plantation system of production at the 
expense of the development of other sectors of the economy. \'lhilst 
individual pieces of social legislation or welfare action may have 
produced benefits to the masses, as in the case of public health 
developments in the twentieth century, generally colonial social policy 
can be considered to have been part of the process of economic and social 
underdevelopment in Guyana. The character and effects of social policy 
helped to produce the relative lack of change exhibited by colonial 
Guyana which even today keeps fresh the group memory of slavery and 
indenture. 
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Notes for Chapter Ten 
1. Smith, R.T. (1962) British Guyana, London: Oxford University Press, 
p.204. 
2. It is not intended to dismiss the fate of the abor iginal peoples of 
the Caribbean area, but Simply to reflect that their societies were 
relatively unimportant to colonial society by virtue of their being 
extinguished or marginalised early in the process of colonialisation. 
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Note Where documents and government department reports were consulted at 
the Public Records Office, Kew, the C.O. number is given in the notes. 
When the C.O. number is not given, the report/document was located and 
consulted in the Guyana Archives or elsewhere. 
The archival material relating to Bookers McConnel Co. Ltd. in Guyana was 
destroyed by fire in Georgetown, 1945. 
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Prqposed Additional 
State Facilities 
General 
Cottage 
Leonora 
Skeldon 
Port Mourant 
Wakenham 
Diamond 
Mahaica 
Maha i cony 
Le Grange 
Fort Wellington 
The demolition of the old estate hospitals and the construction of estate 
dispensaries proceeded, so that by 1954 there were only twelve hospitals 
offering 550 beds. The expectation was that the State would provide the 
additional district and cottage hospitals recommended by the Venn 
Commission and that the medical role of the estates would be to provide a 
dispensary service to resident labour with ambulance facilities for the 
conveyance of patients to the nearest state hospital where necessary. 
The state system was, however, far from ready to cope with the increased 
demand which, contrary to the expectation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development Mission, was resulting from the absolute 
increase in population, higher expectations and the contraction of estate 
hospital facilities. 
Of the twenty-three health clinics which were scheduled to have been 
built as Colonial Development and Welfare projects, few were actually 
completed. By 1947 there were only nine completed44 • In 1953 the 
public system provided 1,432 general beds which hardly compensated for 
the reduction in estate provision. Seven years after the recommendation 
made by the Venn Commission that additional State hospitals be built, 
only one, at Port Mourant, had been started and even this was incomplete 
by 1956 45• The expansion of provision of health centres was still at 
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Elected Members 
Western Essequibo 
Demerara Essequibo 
Georgetown North 
Essiquibo Riber 
Berbice River 
Demerara River 
Georgetown Central 
East Berbice 
Central Demerara 
New Amsterdam 
West Berbice 
North West District 
Georgetown South 
Nominated Unofficials 
F.J. Seaford 
V. Roth 
T • T. Thompson 
W.J. Raatgever 
G.A.C. Farmnn 
C.A. McDoan 
G.H. Smellie 
Nominated Officials 
The President 
The Colonial Secretary 
The Attorney General 
Dr. P.G. Kelly 
T. Millard 
Major W. Bain Gray 
Prof. G.S. Dash 
Col. W.E.H. Bradburn 
Major G.C. Craig 
B.R. Wood 
S.H. Bagley 
APPHIDIX I 
1947 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
C.V. Wright 
Dr. J.B. Singh - t<ledical Practitioner 
Dr. J.A. Nicholson - ~~dical Practitioner 
T. Lee - Barrister 
C.P. Ferrara - Director, private business 
D.P. Debidin - Lawyer 
J. Fernandes - Shipping & Commission Agent 
Dr. G.M. Goosalves - Dentist 
Dr. C. Jagan - Dentist 
W.O.R. Kendall 
A.T. Peters - t<linister of Religion and 
Barrister 
W.A. Phang - ~lerchant 
J. carter - Lawyer 
Retired Civil Servant (museum curator) 
Retired Schoolmaster 
Merchant 
Secretary, Humphrey & Co. (diamond merchants) 
Merchant, proprietor, rancher, rice farmer 
Director, Demerara Life Assurance 
His Excellency the Governor 
ex-officio 
-do-
Surgeon General 
Colonial Treasurer 
Director of Education 
Director of Agriculture 
Inspector General of Police 
Director of Public Works 
Conservator of Forest 
Managing Director, Colonial Transport 
DeIBrtment 
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